Prosecutorial Discretion across Federal Sentencing Reforms: Immediate and Enduring Effects of Unwarranted Disparity by Cano, Mario (Author) et al.
Prosecutorial Discretion across Federal Sentencing Reforms: Immediate and 
 
Enduring Effects of Unwarranted Disparity 
 
by 
 
Mario V. Cano 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved November 2015 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee: 
 
Cassia C. Spohn, Chair 
Xia Wang 
Kevin A. Wright 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY 
December 2015
i 
ABSTRACT 
   
Contemporary research has examined the relationship between determinate 
sentencing reforms and unwarranted punishment disparities in states and the federal 
criminal justice system. Recent investigations suggest that legal developments in federal 
sentencing—namely, the High Court’s rulings in U.S. v. Booker (2005) and 
Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) which rendered and subsequently reaffirmed the federal 
guidelines as advisory—have not altered disparities associated with imprisonment 
outcomes. Punishment disparities following Booker and Gall, particularly racial and 
ethnic disparities, have been linked to Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ (AUSAs) use of 
substantial assistance departures. What remains unanswered in the literature is whether 
the changes in AUSAs’ decision making following the landmark cases has enduring 
effects and whether the effects are conditioned by defendants’ race/ethnicity and the type 
of case (guidelines cases or mandatory minimum cases), and whether the use of 
substantial assistance varies across U.S. District Courts.   
Accordingly, these questions are examined using sentencing data from the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, coupled with data from the National Judicial Center, U.S. 
Census Bureau, Uniform Crime Reports, and Interuniversity Consortium for Political and 
Social Research. This study looks at 465,476 defendants convicted from fiscal year 2001 
to fiscal year 2010 across 89 federal districts. A series of multilevel discontinuity 
regression models are estimated to assess the short-term and long-term effects of the 
Booker and Gall/Kimbrough decisions on AUSAs’ use of substantial assistance 
departures, accounting for contextual differences between federal district courts.  
ii 
The results show that AUSAs are less likely to seek motions for substantial 
assistance immediately and in the long term in the post-Booker period but are more likely 
to seek substantial assistance in the long term in the post-Gall/Kimbrough period. These 
effects, however, are restricted to the models that include all cases and guidelines cases. 
The interaction models show that Hispanic defendants facing a mandatory minimum 
sentence are less likely to receive a substantial assistance departure immediately and in 
the long term following the Court’s Booker decision. Moreover, the use of substantial 
assistance varies across federal districts. The results are discussed in relation to their 
implications for theory, courts and sentencing policy, and future research on punishment 
outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The advent of sentencing policy reforms across states and the federal criminal 
justice system—in the form of determinate schemes, such as presumptive guidelines and 
mandatory minimum and habitual offender statutes—has spawned a long-standing 
debate. The discussion stems from arguments on the effectiveness of such reforms aimed 
at heightening uniformity in sentencing practices by targeting and constraining the 
parameters of judicial discretion, reducing crime and drug offenses, and carrying out 
punitive sanctions for serious, violent offenders. Arguably the most important concerns 
encompassing the policy innovations are the broad, untamed authority afforded to already 
powerful prosecutors and the potential reintroduction of unwarranted disparity, 
particularly at the entry point of the criminal process: extralegal disparity that, in theory, 
the modern punishment reforms specifically sought to eliminate.1 Reforms undertaken at 
the federal level are excessively restrictive and retributive relative to any other 
determinate structure concurrently enacted by a state legislature, for instance, guidelines 
sentencing schemes in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Washington State (Stith and 
Cabranes, 1998; Tonry, 1996). Indeed, critics contend that the shift to a determinate 
approach, epitomized by sentencing guidelines and the proliferation of mandatory 
minimum penalties, has transformed the course of charge and plea bargaining, 
                                                          
1 While warranted disparity corresponds to the variation in sentencing resulting from legal characteristics 
(e.g., offense severity, criminal history, and sentence enhancements), unwarranted disparity encompasses 
the variation in sentencing that, independent of legal characteristics, results exclusively from extralegal 
characteristics, for instance, defendants’ race and ethnicity, gender, age, or citizenship status (Blumstein, 
Cohen, Martin, and Tonry, 1983; Bushway and Piehl, 2001; Spohn, 2000; Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 
1994; see also Unnever, 1982). Unwarranted disparity and extralegal disparity are used interchangeably 
throughout this dissertation. 
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positioning the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) or prosecutor as the “driving force” of 
the federal criminal process (Weinstein, 2003: 98; see also Forst, 1999, Reitz, 2001; Stith 
and Cabranes, 1998; Tonry, 1992).   
The rapid ascent of prosecutorial discretion in an era of formalized punishment 
schemes, which are particularly vulnerable to circumvention, may contribute to extralegal 
disparity, and thus enhance the disparate treatment of defendants. Early on, Blumstein 
and colleagues’ (1983: 220) investigation of the effects of sentencing reforms on legal 
decision making uncovered “adaptive responses by officials who alter case-processing 
methods in order to circumvent new rules and procedures for some categories of 
offenders.” This early finding is echoed by other courts and sentencing scholars’ 
assessments of the association between legal reforms and racial and ethnic disparities 
(Bjerk, 2005; Engen and Steen, 2000; Farrell, 2003; Lacasse and Payne, 1999; Merrit, 
Fain, and Turner, 2006; Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992; Schulhofer and Nagel, 1997; 
Ulmer, Eisenstein, Johnson, 2010; Ulmer, Kurlychek, and Kramer, 2007).  
Inquiries on whether unwarranted disparities persist following the inception of 
sentencing reforms have come to relatively different conclusions. The empirical literature 
on the effects of legal reforms demonstrates that sentencing guideline schemes across 
states—namely Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—have led to modest but lower 
inconsistencies in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing practices, especially 
disparities associated with race, ethnicity, gender, and parenting status (Blackwell, 
Simms, and Finn, 2008; Gorton and Boies, 1999; Griffin and Wooldredge, 2006; Koons-
Witt, 2002; Miethe and Moore, 1985; Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 1994; Wooldredge, 
2009; Wooldredge and Griffin, 2005; Wooldredge, Griffin, and Rauschenberg, 2005). 
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Similarly, in federal district courts, although the determinate sentencing approach has 
considerably increased sentence severity, reductions in extralegal disparities, in judicial 
decisions particularly, have been linked to cases processed subsequent to the passage of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 1999; General Accounting 
Office, 1992; Heaney, 1991; Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback, 1999; Karle and Sager, 
1991; U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1991; Waldfogel, 1991), although the extent of 
success (if successful at all) is largely governed by the type of offense, court jurisdiction, 
and outcomes at earlier stages of criminal case processing (Anderson et al., 1999; Hofer 
et al., 1999; Lacasse and Payne, 1999; Payne, 1997).  
In the last decade, the study of discretion and disparity in the federal justice 
system has become complicated in wake of a series of legislative and administrative 
directives and U.S. Supreme Court decisions, most salient being the High Court’s rulings 
in U.S. v. Booker (2005), Gall v. U.S. (2007), and Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007), which 
challenged the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ legality. In the end, the wave of legal 
contingencies framed and subsequently reaffirmed the federal guidelines as discretionary 
or “effectively advisory” rather than mandatory as a result, reallocating to judges the 
discretion rescinded almost two decades earlier. With the exception of cases that remain 
under the purview of legislative mandatory minimums and thus under the auspices of 
prosecutors, judges were “liberated” from the long-running determinate sentencing 
scheme.  
The recent punishment landscape has called on and drawn researchers to “identify 
and quantify the effects of this change and to learn whatever lessons this natural 
experiment might tell us about the federal sentencing system” (Hofer, 2007: 437; Engen, 
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2009, 2011; Frase, 2007; Spohn, 2011). Accordingly, an emerging body of literature has 
aimed to evaluate the sweeping changes in federal sentencing policy, focusing on 
whether the expansion of judicial discretion has led to an upsurge in extralegal disparity. 
Recent studies concluded that inequities in imprisonment, imprisonment severity, and 
judge-initiated departures (sentence discounts) have remained stable but have risen 
modestly for certain defendants, particularly Black and Hispanic males in the aftermath of 
the Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. decisions (Farrell and Ward, 2011; Hofer, 2007, 2011; 
Schanzenbach and Tiller, 2008; Scott, 2009, 2010; Tiede, 2009a, 2009b; Ulmer and 
Light, 2010, 2011; Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 2011a, 2011b; U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 2010b, 2011a, 2012; see, however, USSC, 2006). Essentially, extralegal 
disparity in incarceration outcomes has remained relatively constant across reforms.   
At the same time, the literature has examined the effects of determinate 
sentencing reforms on legal outcomes that precede final imprisonment decisions. Overall, 
these studies inexplicably found that the imposition of substantial assistance downward 
departures (i.e., 5K.1 departures)—discretionary sentence discounts exclusively at the 
hands of AUSAs—characterize the “locus of disparity in the wake of Booker and Gall” 
(Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 2011b: 1102; see also Hofer, 2007; Ulmer and Light, 2010), 
to the extent that “greater disparity affecting Black and Hispanic males characterizes 
departure decisions heavily influenced by prosecutors more than judge-initiated 
departures” (2011a: 1107). That is, while extralegal inconsistencies in imprisonment and 
judicial downward departure decisions remained relatively stable over time, federal 
prosecutors were significantly less likely to seek sentence discounts through substantial 
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assistance departures for minority male defendants convicted post-U.S. v. Booker (2005) 
and post-Gall v. U.S. (2007).  
The stream of evidence unequivocally demonstrates that the surge in disparity in 
the existing reform era is situated at the presentencing phase of the legal process. Thus, in 
the current federal sentencing context, a large part of unwarranted disparity stems from 
forces, to a certain extent, external to judicial discretion—AUSAs’ decision making. 
What is more, the extralegal effects observed in sentencing outcomes, including the rise 
in incarceration severity, are most pronounced in cases marked by legislative mandatory 
minimums, cases well beyond the scope of federal judges’ discretion (Maxfield and 
Kramer, 1998; USSC, 1991, 2004; 2011a; see also Anderson et al., 1999). Recent studies 
confirmed a positive relationship between racial minority groups and mandatory 
sentencing outcomes (Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2012; Rehavi and Starr, 2014; Starr, 
2012; Starr and Rehavi, 2013; USSC, 2011a). Fischman and Schanzenbach (2012: 257), 
for instance, found that a statutory minimum was more likely for Black defendants 
following Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S., but argued that the disparity effect may be attributable 
to changes in prosecutorial discretion, reflecting the “increased relevance of mandatory 
minimum penalties under a system of advisory Guidelines.” A recent leading study of 
initial charging decisions and charge reductions in U.S. District Courts prompted courts 
and sentencing research on the key sentencing policy changes to place emphasis 
downstream of the criminal process. The conclusions that were reached suggested that “it 
is likely that such a dramatic policy shift would have important ripple effects through 
earlier stages of criminal case processing” (Johnson 2014: 115). 
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These findings speak to the allocation of discretion in a dual punishment 
scheme—the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and statutory mandatory minimums. This raises 
the obvious possibility that the upsurge in AUSAs’ discretion subsequent to the inception 
of the determinate sentencing era (1987 to 2005) may have been strictly confined to cases 
involving statutory mandatory sentencing. Considered together, the empirical evidence 
lends credence to the notion that substantial assistance departures and mandatory 
minimum penalties, both of which are within the domain of prosecutors’ discretion, 
distort the criminal punishment process in the modern sentencing reform era and are, 
therefore, at the heart of unwarranted disparity. 
The section below briefly reviews the modern sentencing policy reforms in the 
federal criminal justice system. Then, current research issues and gaps in the literature are 
addressed, including a description of the proposed study. Lastly, the structure of the 
dissertation is laid out.   
FEDERAL SENTENCING CONTEXT 
 
Four decades earlier, Andrew von Hirsch (1976: 98) articulated that, “Wide 
discretion in sentencing has been sustained by the traditional assumptions about 
rehabilitation and predictive restraint. Once these assumptions are abandoned, the basis 
for such broad discretion crumbles.” In no other era of the American criminal justice 
system was this philosophy more central than during the latter half of the 20th century. 
Despite the popularity of determinate sentencing policies across the U.S. during the 19th 
century and first part of the 20th century, punishment throughout the 1950s and 1960s 
came under the dominance of the “medical model” and ushered in a series of landmark 
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U.S. Supreme Court decisions that compromised the “hands-off doctrine” that had 
characterized adjudication and correctional practices—due process and inmates’ access to 
the courts (Lowenthal, 1993; Walker, 1997). What is more, judges, those practicing in the 
federal criminal justice system in particular, exercised unfettered discretion to tailor 
sentences to fit defendants and their offenses (Frankel, 1972; Tonry, 1996).   
Individualized sentencing, which served as the major foundation of indeterminate 
sentencing, however, was relatively short lived. Opponents, calling on the states and the 
federal government to devise presumptive sentencing guidelines, sought to restrain 
judicial discretion and thus ensure uniformity in sentencing and eliminate unwarranted 
sentencing disparity (Frankel, 1972; von Hirsch, 1976). In addition to public resentment 
over leniency in sentencing practices and furor over public safety and soaring violent 
crime rates (Hatch, 1993; U.S. Department of Justice, 1996: 58), drug use, especially the 
consumption of crack cocaine (Musto, 1987: 274-277; Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration, 2006: 21) was mounting during the mid-1980s. 
Furthermore, indeterminacy in custodial sentences—that is, sentences that are uncertain 
and quantifiably defined by a parole authority—was criticized as “cruel” and “degrading” 
(Frankel, 1972: 39). Soon thereafter, federal lawmakers passed the Sentencing Reform 
Act (SRA) of 1984. The SRA created the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC), 
which was charged with developing a guidelines scheme that, with few exceptions for 
modifications or circumvention, framed presumptive sentences based on offense severity 
and criminal history, removing the majority of discretion from judges while leaving 
prosecutors’ discretion mostly untouched (Stith and Cabranes, 1998).   
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The federal sentencing process was further muddled, as two years later, Congress 
passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207), and, two years 
after that, the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181). 
This unprecedented legislation created a series of unduly severe mandatory minimum 
penalties for drug trafficking, conspiracy to traffic drugs, simple possession of drugs, 
weapon use, and repeat offenses. Thus, the presumptive sentencing guidelines and 
mandatory minimums coexist in the federal criminal justice system. The simultaneous 
administration of mandatory minimums and guidelines, however, mandates judges to 
impose the sentence reflected in the mandatory minimum if the sentence is higher than 
the penalty specified under the federal guidelines (Hofer, 2000), as is typically the case 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2003: 12; Schwarzer, 1992). This process has 
further eliminated judicial discretion, shifting most decision making to the charging and 
plea bargaining stages of adjudication. In fact, legal and sentencing scholars strongly 
contend that the enactment of mandatory minimums, and the guidelines scheme to a 
lesser extent, has steadily displaced discretion downstream from judges to prosecutors 
(Albonetti, 1997; Bjerk, 2005; Blumstein et al., 1983; Heaney, 1991; Nagel and 
Schulhofer, 1992; Schulhofer and Nagel, 1997; Stith and Cabranes, 1998; Tonry, 1996). 
This is of particular relevance in light of the federal sentencing policy reforms, as 
approximately 347,000 individuals are currently under the correctional supervision of the 
federal justice system (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014).   
Although mandatory minimum penalties are compulsory by statute, three 
mechanisms exist by which defendants may sidestep the mandatory sentence. The first 
mechanism, outside the scope of this study, encompasses a reduction in charges (or an 
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absolute dismissal of charges) or “de-mandatorizing,” as AUSAs may charge defendants 
with conduct that does not trigger a mandatory minimum penalty; for example, charging 
defendants with a lesser quantity of drugs (Kramer and Ulmer, 2009; Schulhofer and 
Nagel, 1997; O’Neill Shermer and Johnson, 2010; Ulmer et al., 2007; Wilmot and Spohn, 
2004). Second, a defendant may be relieved of a mandatory sentence by the safety valve 
provision, enacted by Congress in 1994.2 Defendants who meet the qualifications for a 
downward departure under the safety valve amendment, primarily first-time offenders, 
are sentenced below the applicable minimum at the discretion of the judge.  
The final and most complex mechanism by which defendants avoid being 
subjected to punishment under a mandatory sentencing statute or the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, which stems from the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, is a downward 
departure for providing substantial assistance or a 5K1.1 departure (USSC, 2011b: 464). 
The federal criminal code specifies that, “Upon motion of Government, the court shall 
have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a 
minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation 
or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense” (18 U.S.C. § 3553 (e)). 
According to Section 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the judge’s 
decision with respect to the appropriate sentence reduction may reflect the significance 
and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance; the truthfulness, completeness, and 
                                                          
2 The safety valve amendment may be applied by a judge when a defendant facing a mandatory minimum 
sentence meets the following criteria: (1) the defendant has no more than one criminal history point; (2) the 
defendant abstained from using violence, threats, or a dangerous weapon during the commission of the 
offense; (3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily harm to the victim; (4) the defendant did 
not engage in the role of organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor during the offense and is not involved in 
a continuing criminal enterprise; and (5) the defendant provided the government with assistance ((18 
U.S.C. § 3553 (f); see also U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, USSC, 2008). 
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reliability of the information provided; the nature, extent, and timeliness of the 
defendant’s assistance; and any danger or risk that resulted from the defendant’s 
assistance (USSC, 2011b: 464; 2011a).  
Only the AUSA may file and pursue a motion for a downward departure for 
substantial assistance, which must then be accepted by the court (judge), as is typically 
the norm (Cano and Spohn, 2012). And once the motion is granted by the court, the 
magnitude of the sentence reduction recommended by the federal prosecutor is 
formulated by the judge, resulting in a sentence that may be substantially lower than the 
sentence stipulated by the statutory minimum and presumptive sentence under the federal 
guidelines. While the legal elements that shape the incarceration decision, such as offense 
severity, criminal history, and statutory sentencing enhancements, are relatively clear, 
there is not one set criterion for what constitutes “assistance” to the federal government 
that leads to the investigation or prosecution of other offenders (Stith and Cabranes, 
1998). In contrast to the “statement of reasons” requirement for federal judges who 
sentence outside of the guidelines range (see Hofer, 2007), there is no mandate for 
AUSAs to document their reason(s) for filing a motion for a substantial assistance 
departure or removing a charge that triggers a mandatory minimum. The availability of 
the substantial assistance motion, invoked in slightly more than 60 percent of drug 
convictions across U.S. District Courts (USSC, 2011a), affords prosecutors the flexibility 
to offset the statutory minimums that judges would otherwise be compelled to impose. To 
this end, the reality and intersection of these two dynamics—laws that require a 
mandatory sentence and Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ capacity to seek a downward departure 
to remove a mandatory minimum penalty—assume a pivotal role in the prosecution of 
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cases, as they disadvantage and exacerbate punishment outcomes for non-violent, racial 
and ethnic minority defendants such as African Americans and Hispanics.  
As briefly mentioned above, it is of paramount importance to note, however, that 
a wave of U.S. Supreme Court decisions—most significant, United States v. Booker 
(2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. United States (2007)—struck down the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines and rendered them “effectively advisory,” thus “liberating” judges from the 
long-reigning presumptive sentencing scheme championed by Congress. In a similar 
vein, recent amendments passed by the USSC and the enactment of the Fair Sentencing 
Act of 2010 (e.g., 21 U.S.C. §801(2) (a) (b), (3)), including their retroactive application 
(USSC, 2008, 2011c, USSC), have significantly altered the landscape of federal 
sentencing, in that they consequently reduced, and, in some circumstances, eliminated the 
draconian sentences long required by mandatory minimum statutes. These noteworthy 
sentencing policy reforms and landmark High Court decisions are discussed in the 
following chapter on the development of federal sentencing practices in the last 30 years.   
RESEARCH ISSUES AND GAPS 
 
Since the late 1970s, sociologists, criminal justice researchers, and economists 
have embarked on several theoretical and empirical traditions that have driven the study 
of the relationship between sentencing policy reforms and criminal justice outcomes, 
particularly assessments of guideline schemes and unwarranted disparities based on race 
and ethnicity, among other defendant considerations. Despite the meaningful work that 
has systematically examined the legal and extralegal effects that shape sentencing 
practices, and to a lesser degree, plea and charging practices (Johnson, 2014; Kutateladze, 
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Andiloro, Johnson, and Spohn, 2014; Miethe, 1987; Starr and Rehavi, 2013; Wooldredge 
and Griffin, 2005), the current status of the research warrants further theoretical 
development and methodological attention (Baumer, 2013; Ulmer, 2012). Therefore, 
focusing explicitly on punishment outcomes within the sentencing reform context—
before and after the federal guidelines’ transition to advisory status—three major gaps in 
the literature are addressed. The first of these important research gaps comprises the 
framework developed to explain changes in legal actors’ discretion, followed by 
discussions on temporal effects of sentencing practices and the social context of courts 
and sentencing.   
Theoretical Justification for Change in Prosecutorial Discretion 
The dominant theoretical approach taken by studies on the effects of determinate 
sentencing emphasizes the transference of discretionary power across several domains of 
criminal case processing. According to the “hydraulic displacement” or “zero sum” 
thesis, discretion constrained at one stage of the criminal process simply resurfaces at a 
different stage of the process (Alschuler, 1978, Clear et al., 1978; Nagel and Schulhofer, 
1992; Packer, 1968). Because they were premised on neutrality and uniformity in 
sentencing outcomes, primarily restraining judicial discretion and thus reducing 
unwarranted disparity (see 19 U.S.C. § 3553 [b]), it has been argued that sentencing 
reforms largely “ignored” the enormous discretion associated with prosecutors’ charge 
and plea bargaining practices (Miethe, 1987: 156; see also Blumstein et al., 1983; 
Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2012; Hartley, Maddan, and Spohn, 2007; Spohn and 
Fornango, 2009). In terms of modern sentencing innovations, the assumption is that the 
determinate provisions have gradually shifted discretion from judges toward prosecutors, 
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who exercise relatively unconstrained decision-making power from post-arrest to final 
sentencing outcomes. Unlike the decisions rendered by judges, prosecutors’ charging and 
plea bargaining practices are characterized by limited pubic visibility (Forst and 
Bushway, 2010; Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Kramer and Ulmer, 2009) and are, for the 
most part, absent of checks and balances as decisions are rarely subject to appellate 
review or any other form of external legal oversight (Alschuler, 1978; Forst, 1999; Frase, 
2000; Stith and Cabranes, 1998; Tonry, 1996). Prosecutors, who exercise “independence 
and discretionary privilege unmatched in the world” (Albonetti, 1987: 292), determine 
whether initial charges will be sought, whether pending charges are dismissed or reduced, 
and whether specific charges stand as a result of plea bargaining. Their unconstrained 
power extends to other domains of the criminal process, for instance, the presentence 
detention decision, the punishment phase in capital cases, and grand jury proceedings 
(Free, 2002). In fact, researchers have overwhelmingly concluded that significant 
changes in sentencing outcomes and disparities linked to charging and plea bargaining 
capture “displacement effects or that a backward transference of discretion to prosecutors 
and other officials is simply an inevitable consequence of determinate sentencing” 
(Miethe, 1987: 156-157). 
Although the “hydraulic displacement” thesis has garnered considerable backing 
in the legal and criminal justice literature, empirical assessments of the discretion 
hypothesis are sparse, implying that “most researchers begin with the assumption that the 
displacement of discretion exists” (Miethe, 1987: 155; see also Engen, 2009; Johnson, 
2014). Due in part to the limited accessibility of data on charging and plea bargaining, 
investigations of the transference of discretion from judges to prosecutors have, by and 
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large, focused on judicial sentencing outcomes (Ulmer, 2012). The few systematic 
assessments of prosecutorial discretion under guidelines schemes have shown little 
evidence of heightened disparities in charging decisions (Miethe, 1987; Wooldredge and 
Griffin, 2005).   
The dearth in the literature on the shift in discretion amid sentencing reforms 
underscores the complexity in the coexistence of sentencing laws and sentencing 
structures (guidelines schemes and mandatory statutes). Legislative sentencing reforms 
passed during the 1980s led the way for new and more powerful avenues of prosecutorial 
discretion beyond traditional charging practices, for instance, the invocation of 
mandatory minimum penalties, substantial assistance motions (5K.1 departures), and 
other government-sponsored downward departures in the federal justice system. 
Theoretically, these prosecutor-controlled provisions should have remained relatively 
unaffected by the “liberation” of judicial discretion. But this is not the case according to 
the recent empirical literature on the effects of sentencing reforms on unwarranted 
disparities. Consequently, the expansion of prosecutor-led disparity in the modern era 
may reflect a partial hydraulic displacement effect, as AUSAs maintain and enhance their 
thorough grasp of a large number of cases unaffected by the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 
rulings (i.e., mandatory minimum cases). The general lack of support for a full-scale 
displacement effect, coupled with the recent research that effectively shows a modest rise 
in racial and ethnic disparity in the exercise of judicial discretion in the wake of U.S. v. 
Booker and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S., demonstrates that the redistribution of discretion 
among legal actors and their domains is not absolute. This points to a nonuniform 
distribution of discretion among legal actors. As Engen (2009: 328-329) noted, “Laws 
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that limit judicial discretion do not literally increase prosecutorial discretion; instead, they 
affect prosecutors’ ability to control sentencing indirectly by manipulating the factors 
that determine presumptive sentences” (see also Reitz, 1998: 390; Ulmer et al., 2011b: 
1108). 
In line with the theoretical limitation, conceptual issues emerge from studies that 
have examined disparity prior and subsequent to the implementation of the federal 
guidelines. First, earlier studies that have attributed the dramatic reduction in extralegal 
disparities to the federal guidelines may have simply captured alterations to charge and 
plea bargaining practices by prosecutors or effects from the abolition of parole or the 
reduction in the number of federal trials in wake of the dramatic changes to sentencing 
policies (Frase, 1993; Schulhofer and Nagel, 1997; Stith, 2008; Stith and Cabranes, 1998; 
Tonry, 1996; USSC, 1991; Wright, 2005). Similarly, the federal guidelines’ fact finding 
and “real-offense” sentencing provisions make an accurate pre- and post-assessment of 
disparity unlikely (the “real offense” sentencing structure will be discussed in Chapter 2) 
(Schulhofer and Nagel, 1997; Stith, 2008). Therefore, traditional pre-guideline and post-
guideline assessments might simply constitute “apples and oranges comparisons” (Tonry, 
1996: 40). The new wave of sentencing reform evaluations must take into account 
explicitly the transformation in punishment policies, as well as prosecutors’ response to 
those changes.  
In addition, the federal sentencing literature has yet to fully capture the effect that 
the punishment setting exhibits on charging and imprisonment outcomes—whether the 
defendant was convicted of an offense subject to the federal guidelines or a mandatory 
minimum statute. Thus, parsing out the effects between the two sentencing schemes is 
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especially important as judges and AUSAs’ guidelines departures, coupled with the type 
of sentencing provision, are qualitatively diverse. To show more clearly, prosecutor-
enacted guidelines departures are most prevalent among defendants facing mandatory 
minimum penalties (Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992; USSC, 2011d), while judicial 
downward departures are most pronounced in cases that fall within the federal guidelines 
(Hofer, 2007). Courts and sentencing researchers have failed to examine punishment 
outcomes across settings (see, however, Everett and Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Hartley, 2008; 
Hartley et al., 2007; Kautt and Spohn, 2002; Kautt and DeLone, 2006; Lacasse and 
Payne, 1999). This reality was highlighted by Nagel and Schulhofer (1992: 557), 
suggesting that “because circumvention is particularly pronounced in cases involving a 
mandatory minimum sentence, one must take care to distinguish between circumvention 
prompted by a desire to evade the guidelines and that promoted by a desire to avoid 
mandatory minimums” (see also Anderson et al., 1999; Engen. 2009; Schulhofer and 
Nagel, 1997).  
Temporal Effects of Unwarranted Punishment Disparities 
The second research gap in the pre-guideline and post-guideline research turns 
attention to the temporal effects of discretion and legal and extralegal disparity. Largely 
absent from this growing body of work is a focus on the immediate and enduring effects 
of recent policy reforms on punishment outcomes. Although researchers have examined 
and confirmed the salience of guidelines schemes in reducing sentencing disparities in 
state and federal jurisdictions, investigations on the long-term impact of such reforms, 
however, are scarce. The limited research on the trajectory of extralegal disparities 
following sentencing reforms has yielded mixed and inconsistent findings.  
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In fact, the extant work on the long-term effects of sentencing guideline schemes 
is restricted to one recent analysis of U.S. District Courts and studies of final sentencing 
outcomes in two states. Starr and Rehavi’s (2013) month-to-month assessment of 
charging, plea bargaining, judicial departure, and imprisonment decisions in federal 
district courts found a sharp and continuing elevation in guidelines offense levels (offense 
severity) of all defendants sentenced post-Booker. More importantly, they observed that 
the stark increase in unwarranted disparity after the Booker decision was confined to 
AUSAs’ charging practices, in that mandatory minimum penalty rates were significantly 
higher for Black defendants in relation to White defendants. Nevertheless, the disparity 
effect failed to exert a long-term influence, as racial disparities in mandatory sentencing 
reverted to previous trends three months into the advisory guidelines era (Starr and 
Rehavi, 2013: 64). To date, three known studies have investigated the stability and 
change of extralegal disparity in light of determinate sentencing reforms in two states. 
Assessments of the long-term impact of Minnesota’s rigid and inflexible sentencing 
structure found that the decline in disparity—that is, a lesser likelihood of imprisonment 
for White defendants and female defendants with dependent children—subsequent to the 
implementation of guidelines schemes diminished gradually over time (Koons-Witt, 
2002; Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 1994). Stolzenberg and D’Alessio’s (1994: 304) time 
series analysis of imprisonment decisions, for instance, concluded that “inequality levels 
began to revert to pre-guideline levels as time passed.” In contrast, the reduction in 
disparity under Ohio’s more relaxed sentencing structure assumed relative stability over 
time (Wooldredge, 2009).  
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Empirical research that has assessed the effects of sentencing reforms on 
unwarranted disparity has relied heavily on designs with limited observation periods—
before and after policy changes—making comparisons and strong conclusions based on 
averages between extensive periods of time, like year-by-year or time frames between 
reforms (e.g., Kramer and Ulmer, 2009; Myers, 1989; Peterson and Hagan, 1984; 
Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 1994; Ulmer et al., 2011a, 2011b; USSC, 2010b). This 
strategy may prove misleading as it has the potential to produce a biased estimation that 
fails to capture abrupt and continuing trends (or events) following the intervention 
(Anderson et al., 1999; Hofer et al., 1999; Scott, 2010; Tonry, 2006; for discussion on 
immediate changes, see Hofer, 2006, 2007). To illustrate, a steady increase in 
unwarranted disparity after 2005 would exert a higher average of disparity in the post-
Booker (2005) and post-Gall/Kimbrough (2007) eras relative to any time period prior to 
2005, whether or not the rise in disparity was attributed to the High Court’s rulings. 
Thirty years earlier, Blumstein and colleagues (1983: 221-222) voiced their concern with 
this type of experimental design, charging that, “Such designs do not permit 
distinguishing discrete changes or effects associated with a reform from the continuation 
of preexisting trends” (see also Starr and Rehavi, 2013; Tonry, 1996).  
Although innovative, Starr and Rehavi’s (2013) analysis of the short-term and 
long-term disparity impact on federal sentencing outcomes after the dramatic policy 
changes has several shortcomings. First, despite evidence that shows AUSAs’ motions 
for substantial assistance comprise the leading source of disparity in district courts, 
analyses of downward departures following sentencing reforms are limited to judge-
initiated sentencing departures (see, however, USSC, 2006). Second, even though the 
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study period extended through fiscal year 2009, the study failed to capture potential 
disparity in sentencing decisions beyond U.S. v. Booker (2005), overlooking the 
significance of the Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) decisions—a series of consecutive 
rulings which ultimately affirmed the federal guidelines’ “advisory” status, including 
judicial downward departures stemming from disagreements with sentencing policies. 
Third, addressed by Rahavi and Starr (2013) as a limitation due to a lack of initial case 
processing data on offenders’ ethnicity (see also Johnson, 2014), analyses of extralegal 
inconsistencies are restricted to racial disparity, focusing explicitly on White-Black 
defendant comparisons. An investigation of ethnic disparity is important, as recent 
studies have shown that sentencing decisions are especially punitive toward Hispanic 
defendants, in some circumstances, to a greater extent than Black defendants (Demuth, 
2003; Demuth and Steffensmeier, 2004; Feldmeyer and Ulmer, 2011; Spohn and 
Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000, 2001; Ulmer et al., 2007; see also 
Light, 2014; Light, Massoglia, and King, 2014). The final limitation of Starr and 
Rehavi’s study, lack of attention to social contextual variation, encompasses the last 
major research gap addressed in this dissertation. 
Contextual Variation in Courts and Sentencing Outcomes 
In theory, punishment in the federal justice system, aside from the federal 
guidelines being rendered advisory, embodies a uniform scheme of procedures and 
policies—a criminal code uniformly implemented across 94 federal districts. It has long 
been argued, however, that far from being uniform, the criminal process is shaped by 
courts’ local structure, cultural norms, and courtroom workgroup (Eisenstein and Jacob, 
1977; Eisenstein, Flemming, and Nardulli 1988; Nardulli, Eisenstein, and Flemming, 
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1988; see also Dixon, 1995; Ulmer, 1997). Charging and imprisonment decisions, then, 
are meted out based on courts’ and court jurisdictions’ social context, for instance, 
federal districts’ racial and ethnic minority population, caseload, crime rate, political 
climate, or level of concentrated disadvantage.   
Researchers have indeed amassed evidence of jurisdictional variation, showing 
that substantial assistance departures and imprisonment decisions vary across federal 
districts (Feldmeyer and Ulmer, 2011; Hartley et al., 2007; Johnson, 2014; Johnson et al., 
2008; Kautt, 2002; Ulmer, 2005; Ulmer et al., 2010; Ward, Farrell, and Rousseau, 2009a, 
2009b) and between courtroom actors, specifically judges and ASUAs (Anderson and 
Spohn, 2010; Kim, Spohn, and Hedberg, forthcoming; Scott, 2010; Spohn and Fornango, 
2009). Earlier pre-assessments and post-assessments of the federal guidelines and 
unwarranted disparity were limited to no more than three federal districts or circuits (e.g., 
Karle and Sager, 1991; Kempf-Leonard and Sample, 2001; Payne, 1997; Wolfagel, 
1991). And, with few exceptions (Farrell and Ward, 2011; Fischman and Schanzenbach, 
2012; Scott, 2010; Ulmer et al., 2011b; USSC, 2006), recent studies on the impact of 
Booker and Gall/Kimbrough have ignored the role that social context may exhibit on 
federal sentencing practices, relying on large aggregated data sets—at times, nationwide 
data sources—that ignore the nested nature of cases. What is more, the few pre-guideline 
and post-guideline comparisons looked at judicial departures and imprisonment outcomes 
but have yet to fully capture the contextual effects of substantial assistance motions 
across federal courts. This is a major challenge to the empirical status of research on 
disparity and Booker and Gall/Kimbrough and corresponds with Ulmer’s (2005: 275) 
argument that, “Analyses that continue to pool jurisdictions into nationwide statistical 
21 
 
models, without attending to their potential variation, obscure important knowledge about 
criminal justice in context…Understanding local variation in court community contexts is 
essential for understanding federal sentencing and sentencing in general.” And equally 
notable, earlier works have emphasized that the mass aggregation of data over extensive 
timespans may “mask” significant trends in sentencing practices (Blumstein et al., 1983: 
17; Hagan and Burnstein, 1979).    
Overall, what is absent from the courts and sentencing literature is whether these 
game-changing reforms—the definite restoration of judicial sentencing discretion, 
including the realignment of downward departure policies—have influenced AUSAs and 
their districts’ treatment of defendants subjected to punishment under mandatory 
minimums and the federal guidelines. The next section advances to a discussion of the 
current study, including the research objectives that will be addressed in this dissertation. 
 
THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is to test whether the recent federal punishment reforms 
that resulted from decisions handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court have contributed to 
racial and ethnic disparities. More specifically, the purpose is to assess the impact of U.S. 
v. Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) on AUSAs’ decisions to petition the 
court for substantial assistance downward departures. The primary focus is the trajectory 
of unwarranted disparities—in the short term and in the long term—subsequent to legal 
innovations in the federal criminal process.  This is accomplished by exploring whether 
racial and ethnic inequality effects are driven by the type of punishment domain—
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sentences under the federal guidelines or mandatory minimums—and to what degree 
prosecutors’ decisions vary across federal district courts.  
Research hypotheses on prosecutorial discretion and unwarranted punishment 
disparity are drawn from contemporary organizational and social-psychological 
perspectives, namely uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution and focal concerns 
theories, and conflict perspectives. Data for this study come from the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission (USSC) for FY 2000 to FY 2009, which consist of 465,476 convicted cases 
across 89 U.S. District Courts. To investigate social context, the USSC data are linked 
with measures compiled from the U.S. Census Bureau, Uniform Crime Reports, National 
Judicial Center, and the County Characteristics, 2000-2007 data set compiled by the 
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). A hierarchical 
regression discontinuity design (Singer and Willett, 2003) is used to examine the 
immediate and enduring effects of AUSAs’ use of substantial assistance guidelines 
departures following Booker and Gall/Kimbrough within and between federal districts.  
This dissertation has four core research objectives. First, the study examines 
whether there were changes in the prevalence of AUSAs’ motions for substantial 
assistance downward departures following the Booker and Gall/Kimbrough decisions—
changes in the short term and long term. The second objective encompasses an analysis 
of change in racial and ethnic disparities in prosecutors’ decision making. If changes are 
present in AUSAs’ likelihood to file motions for substantial assistance guidelines 
departures following Booker and Gall/Kimbrough, did the changes disadvantage Black 
and Hispanic defendants? Thus, this study examines whether substantial assistance 
departure decisions are conditioned by defendants’ race and ethnicity—in the short term 
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and long term. Specifically, the analyses test whether reductions in substantial assistance 
motions are greater for Black and Hispanic defendants than for White defendants 
following the High Court decisions. The third objective assesses the potential influence 
of Booker and Gall/Kimbrough on AUSAs’ substantial assistance decisions based on the 
punishment setting. The analyses determine whether overall change and change in 
disparities for Black and Hispanic defendants relative to White defendants in the 
likelihood for substantial assistance departures are more pronounced in cases guided by 
the federal guidelines or mandatory minimum statutes. Substantial assistance decisions 
are therefore estimated separately in models distinguished by mandatory minimum cases 
and guidelines cases. The fourth research objective controls for whether AUSAs’ 
likelihood for motions for substantial assistance departures varies across federal districts 
and whether the likelihood of a substantial assistance departure is influenced by federal 
districts’ organizational and social contexts. Overall, this study responds to Ulmer, Light, 
and Kramer’s call for future research to “evaluate sentencing outcomes post-Booker and 
Gall for specific types of offenders and specific offenses” (2011b: 832) and to “explore 
how prosecutorial and defense practices have adapted to the post-Booker regime” (2011b: 
833; see also Engen, 2009; Hofer, 2007). 
 
ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION  
 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 develops a 
historical perspective of sentencing practices by reviewing the advent of and alterations 
in significant federal sentencing reforms enacted from the early 1980s to 2011. Then, the 
second part of the chapter turns attention to the empirical status of sentencing outcomes, 
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primarily the extralegal predictors of mandatory sentences and substantial assistance 
departures, across sentencing reforms, within and between court jurisdictions. Chapter 3 
lays out the theoretical framework on which the research hypotheses are based, with a 
focus on the role of prosecutorial discretion. Chapter 4 draws out the methodology, that 
is, the data, empirical measures, and analytic strategies employed to test for change in 
unwarranted disparity in motions for substantial assistance departures across sentencing 
reforms. Chapter 5 is organized into three sets of analyses. The first set examines whether 
the likelihood of substantial assistance departures has been altered in cases processed 
subsequent to U.S. v. Booker and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. The next set examines whether 
racial and ethnic disparities in motions for substantial assistance departures have been 
altered in cases processed subsequent to Booker and Gall/Kimbrough. The influence of 
contextual differences is also examined. Chapter 6 discusses the overall findings, 
implications for courts and sentencing theory, research, and policy, caveats, and lays out 
the course for future research.     
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CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
A succinct review of punishment policies and legal developments is important, as 
it is difficult to understand the extent of unwarranted disparity in incarceration and 
incarceration severity without first understanding the varying legal roles that prosecutors’ 
discretion has played in the federal criminal justice system during the last thirty years. As 
demonstrated by the past and emerging research, the evolutionary changes in the 
determinate sentencing approach has the potential to reshape punishment in U.S. District 
Courts. The next section commences with a discussion of punishment practices in the 
1970s.   
 
THIRTY YEARS OF FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORMS 
 
Determinate Sentencing Era 
 
Characterized by the “nothing works” rhetoric promoted during the 1970s 
(Martinson, 1974), which called into question the efficacy of the rehabilitative model of 
punishment (Beckett and Sasson, 2004; Casper, 1984), an indeterminate sentencing 
system, operating in full force across state and federal court systems, faced relentless 
criticism from the public, political pundits, and researchers at both ends of the political 
spectrum. On the one hand, conservatives expressed concern over leniency in sentencing 
procedures, parole authorities’ ineffectiveness in assessing defendants’ amenability to 
rehabilitation and predicting recidivism, and judges’ reluctance to sentence “marginal” or 
borderline defendants to prison terms (defendants whose offense, coupled with criminal 
history, fluctuated between a jail or prison sentence; Casper, 1984: 236-237; Hatch, 1993, 
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Zimring, 2005). On the other hand, liberals expressed concern over the declining status of 
rehabilitation, the extent of “uncertainty” in custodial detention, variation in punishments 
imposed on similarly situated defendants, and the threat that discrepancies in sentencing 
outcomes posed to the principles of fairness and equality in punishment and 
administration of law (Stith and Kohl, 1993: 227; Tonry, 1996).   
Among the most vocal and influential opponents of indeterminacy or 
“lawlessness” in sentencing was the late federal judge and law professor, Marvin E. 
Frankel. According to Judge Frankel (1972: 49), legal decisions should be applied in a 
uniform fashion using a system structured by legislators, not subjected to the “varying 
tastes” of judges (see also Frankel, 1973). As he argued, “Given the sure combination of 
substantially unbounded discretion and decision-makers unrestrained by shared 
professional standards, it is not astonishing that the commonplace worry in any 
discussion of sentencing concerns ‘disparity’” (Frankel, 1972: 7). In his proposal for a 
determinate punishment scheme, Judge Frankel envisioned the establishment of a federal 
commission on sentencing. More specifically, he called for the creation of an 
administrative body of government comprised of experts in sentencing who were not 
subjected to external political pressure. The anticipated sentencing commission would 
serve three primary functions: conduct research on sentencing, corrections, and parole 
practices; design laws and regulations that reflect the results of the aforementioned 
research; and adopt presumptive sentencing guidelines that were subject to congressional 
approval (Frankel, 1972: 51, see also Reitz, 2001).   
Accordingly, public sentiment and a bipartisan initiative by members of Congress, 
led by late Senators Edward Kennedy and Strom Thurmond, channeled the passage of the 
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Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984, a key piece of legislation that emerged from the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (for a complete history of sentencing reform 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, see Froyd, 1999; Sterling, 1995). The SRA established 
the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) and directed the independent 
commission to design guidelines that would ensure certainty and fairness in sentencing, 
and therefore, reduce unwarranted disparity (28 U.S.C. § 991 (a)). The objectives of the 
newly-adopted U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (or federal guidelines) were to: reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for 
the offense; afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant; and provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective 
manner (18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)).  
The federal guidelines scheme was formally adopted on November 1, 1987 and 
ultimately implemented in 1989 (Stith and Cabranes, 1998). Despite the inclusion of 
rehabilitation as a “purpose” of punishment, penalties under the guidelines are 
exceptionally stiffer relative to sentencing policies and patterns preceding their enactment 
and explicitly preclude deferment to judges in most circumstances. What is more, the 
determinate sentencing structure is largely founded on philosophies of deterrence and 
incapacitation. Indeed, this led Tonry (2005: 41-42) to opine that the federal guidelines 
were crafted for “an era of technocratic and rationalistic policymaking” and “a time when 
people in positions of political influence doubted that changes in punishment could have 
much effect on crime,” but, in contrast, were enforced “in an era of politicized and 
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symbolic policymaking…a world in which many people believed that tougher penalties 
could reduce crime rates.”  
The demise of the rehabilitation model, a driving force of the indeterminate 
punishment approach, is emphasized in the federal guidelines in a number of ways. The 
guidelines’ “real-offense sentencing” structure, or the recommended sentence, is shaped 
by the seriousness of the offense or base offense level (Stith, 2008). The base offense 
level is calculated alongside criminal history, adjustments for “acceptance of 
responsibility” (when a defendant enters a plea of guilty or plays a mitigating or 
aggravating role), “relevant conduct” (discussed below), and downward departures (see 
Stith and Cabranes, 1998: 66-77). Sentencing ranges are reflected in a matrix of 43 levels 
of offenses delineated by severity that correspond to one of 6 criminal history categories 
(Stith and Cabranes, 1998). Until the High Court’s decision in U.S. v. Booker (2005), the 
presumptive sentencing structure prevented judges from doling out sentences that fit the 
characteristics of a particular defendant (Alschuler, 1991, Simon, 2012); rather, sentences 
under the federal guidelines “reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the 
education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and 
community ties of the defendant” (18 U.S.C. § 994 (e)). More specifically, circumvention 
from the federal guidelines is prohibited “unless the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken 
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines” (18 
U.S.C. § 3553 (b)).   
The criminal process governed by the federal guidelines has been characterized as 
rigid, inflexible, and exceptionally punitive (Alschuler, 1991; Tonry, 1996). What has 
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generated the most discourse is that judges are compelled to frame sentences based on 
defendants’ “relevant conduct,” behavior beyond that prescribed in the present charge(s) 
or conviction (U.S.S.G. §1B1.3, USSC, 2011b; see also Lowenthal, 1993: 65-66). The 
“relevant conduct” rule encompasses countless mechanisms by which legal facts may be 
applicable to the commission of an offense, including acts the defendant personally 
committed or in which the defendant aided, abetted, or counseled. Moreover, the 
directive on “relevant conduct” requires judges during the sentencing phase to consider 
conduct for which the defendant was never charged or convicted, or was acquitted for at 
trial (U.S.S.G. §1B1.3, USSC, 2011b). With the exclusion of plea agreements, “relevant 
conduct” frames the base offense level and adjustment in sentences. These elements, 
fundamental to the guidelines scheme, the “relevant conduct” rule in particular, have 
been significantly altered in the wake of U.S. Supreme Court case law that is the 
following section.  
The shift to a determinate sentencing approach during the 1980s and 1990s 
spawned three major policy innovations in sentencing beyond presumptive guideline 
schemes—mandatory minimum statutes, chronic offending statutes or “three strike” 
statutes, and truth-in-sentencing statutes (Tonry, 2011: 23; see also Beckett and Sasson, 
2004; Zimring, 2005). Arguably the most important discussion on the inception of 
mandatory sentencing legislation concerns the penalties provided for drug offenses. As 
Beckett and Sasson (2004: 166) noted, “Mandatory minimums aimed at drugs have had 
the most impact on the ‘nature and scope’ of criminal punishment.” For instance, legal 
scholars contend that while mandatory minimum laws for violent and drug crimes are 
more prevalent in state jurisdictions (Lowenthal, 1993: Miller, 1996; Tonry, 1996), 
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federal mandatory minimums have gained notoriety for their excessively harsh 
punishments that have doubled in the last 20 years (USSC, 2011a: 71-72). 
The process that characterized the passage of the mandatory sentencing schemes 
was unprecedented. The heightened media fury and public uneasiness concerning violent 
crime and drug use during the 1980s, coupled with the highly-publicized, cocaine-related 
death of NCAA basketball player, Len Bias (e.g., Inciardi, James, Pottieger, and Surrat, 
1996; Lockwood, Pottieger, and Inciardi, 1995), led Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. to announce that Democratic members of the 
House would sponsor anti-drug legislation (Sterling, 1995: 408).3 The anticipated bill 
                                                          
3 As observed by a number of crime and punishment scholars (e.g., Garland, 2001: 132; Mauer, 2006; 
Tonry, 1995: 81), the escalating rate of drug use from the early 1980s began to decline by the end of the 
decade. The “moral panic” of drug abuse spiraling out of control was bolstered by associating crack 
cocaine use with other ills of society, for example, crack cocaine and the AIDS virus (Musto, 1987: 274-
275). This included the heightened public visibility of addiction among “dangerous” groups of individuals 
of a lower socioeconomic status, including expecting mothers, all residing in deteriorating urban ghettos 
(Beckett, 1997; Lockwood et al., 1995; Provine, 2007; Reinarman and Levine, 1997; USSC, 1995a). For 
instance, an analysis by Vincent and Hofer (1994: 14) found that, “Trends in criminal victimization rates 
and drug availability for the periods before and after the mandatory minimums took effect fail to 
demonstrate any reduction in crime that can be attributed to the mandatory minimums.” To be sure, a series 
of trend studies suggest that the prevalence of drug use has considerably fallen over the last two decades. 
The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, encompassed by analyses of a birth cohort, uncovered a 
“declining trend” in cocaine use from 1985 to 1990, and estimated that the use of cocaine peaked in 1982 
(SAMHSA, 2006: 21); the prevalence of cocaine use had fallen from 5.7 million users in 1985 to 1.5 
million users in 1995 (SAMHSA, 2008). A household survey of Americans aged 12 and older, conducted 
by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), reported that, in 2002, 
one quarter of the estimated individuals who consumed cocaine were specifically crack cocaine users 
(SAMHSA, 2011; see also SAMHSA. 2003a). During the period between 2002 and 2010, the survey found 
that the perceived availability of crack cocaine had declined over time, and the estimated number of 
individuals who initiate the use of crack cocaine also dropped from 337,000 to 83,000 (SAMHSA, 2011: 
52). Results from Monitoring the Future (MTF), a survey conducted among 8th, 10th, and 12th graders, 
showed a reduction in crack cocaine use in all respondents, 12th graders in particular (Johnston, O’Malley, 
Bachman, and Schulenberg, 2012). Interestingly, when compared to trends during the early 1980s, the MTF 
survey found a “precipitous drop” in crack cocaine use among 12 graders following 1986 (Johnston, 
O’Malley, Bachman, and Schulenberg, 2012: 20; see also Mieczkowski, 1996: 373). Despite the steep 
decline in drug use over the last two decades, the use of cocaine in particular, cocaine-related incidents 
continue to dominate admissions for drug emergency and treatment services (USSC, 2002a). For instance, 
the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), a survey that collects data on emergency room admissions 
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garnered extensive support among members from both houses of Congress, including a 
large majority of African American legislators (Kennedy, 1997: 372; Provine, 2007). The 
legislation was expected to target mid-level dealers and key players or “kingpins” in the 
drug distribution network by designating 5-year and 10-year minimum penalties for drug 
trafficking (USSC, 2002a).4  
In contrast to the comprehensive process that typically characterizes the 
enactment of such game-changing legislation, passage of the anti-drug bill was expedited. 
In fact, lawmakers failed to appoint more than one subcommittee to discuss the bill, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
nationwide, estimated that cocaine-related emergencies—the most widely reported illicit drug in substance 
abuse episodes—increased by approximately 30 percent between 1995 and 2002 (SAMHSA, 2003b: 50). 
Furthermore, slightly more than one fifth of cocaine incidents were specifically associated with crack 
cocaine (SAMHSA, 2003b: 26). Researchers, however, note the difficulty in differentiating between 
accounts involving powder cocaine or crack cocaine. More recently, Dawn reports indicated that substance 
abuse incidents involving cocaine continue to be at the forefront of emergency room admissions 
(SAMHSA, 2010, 2012). In a similar vein, cocaine abuse represents the primary reason for admission into 
residential treatment programs. A survey conducted by SAMHSA (2007: 3-4), for example, showed that 
among admissions to substance abuse treatment, from 1995 to 2005, smoking of cocaine modestly 
declined, while inhalation of the cocaine increased at an accelerated rate. Researchers who conducted the 
surveys (Mieczkowski, 1996; USSC, 2007) caution that the estimates on drug use may be 
underrepresented, in that participation in the majority of surveys discussed above was extended to 
individuals who reside in a household, attended school, or were members of a research cohort.  
4 Scholars argue that the swift process that characterized the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was 
embedded with racial and ethnic undertones (Provine, 2006, 2007; Sklansky, 1995). Provine (2007) 
encapsulated a series of themes drawn from the racial- and ethnic-explicit information in news articles 
introduced before the Congressional Record, subsequently leading to the prompt, uncontested passage of 
the anti-drug bill. The first theme emphasizes the threat to neighborhoods and personal safety, as the 
increasing accessibility and consumption of crack cocaine by Whites suggests that the distribution of crack 
is “moving from the Black ghetto to the White suburbs of America” (Provine, 2007: 113-114). The second 
theme reflects that the crack distribution network is comprised predominantly of young, Black or Hispanic, 
unemployed males, alluding to crack dealing as the most common profession in the urban ghetto. Lastly, a 
recount of the detrimental effects that crack cocaine use has on the social capital of productive citizens 
leads to the conclusion that, “Promising (white) individuals are at risk” (Provine, 2007: 114).   
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conduct an amendment and reintroduction process of the proposed bill, consult with the 
executive branch, and hold hearings or seek the guidance of experts, such as the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Parole Commission, the Judicial Conference, or the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission (Sterling, 1995; USSC, 2002b; Mauer, 2006). The subcommittee 
proceedings failed to take into account the “relative harmfulness” of crack cocaine 
compared to other types of drugs and drug distribution patterns (Sterling, 1995). What is 
more, the membership of the committee held the inaccurate assumption that judicial 
discretion remained unrestrained and that the practice of parole persisted in the federal 
justice system, although parole and judicial discretion, for the most part, had been 
abolished by the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Sterling, 1995: 410).    
In light of overwhelming support from members of Congress, public furor over a 
violent crime wave, the reemergence of cocaine as crack in a form that could be smoked 
and thus produce a more rapid and potent physiological effect than other forms of cocaine 
(Musto, 1987: 274; Reinarman and Levine, 1997: 19), and an approaching bid for 
reelection, President Ronald Regan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) into law in 
1986. The law was designed to incapacitate serious offenders, deter individuals sentenced 
under the minimum as well as potential offenders, eradicate sentencing disparity, and 
induce cooperation and guilty pleas among defendants (USSC, 1991: 15-16). As 
previously noted, the ADAA of 1986 prescribed a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence 
for defendants convicted of trafficking in 5 grams of crack cocaine or 100 grams of 
heroin, whereas distribution of at least 500 grams of powder cocaine was required to 
trigger the same mandatory penalty (21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)).   
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A moral panic fueled by a relentless media and ongoing public discourse on drug 
use and escalating urban violence during the late 1980s (Provine, 2007: 115-116; see also 
Hartley and Miller, 2010; Tonry, 1995, 2001; Zimring, 2005) led to the passage of the 
Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1998, hardline legislation focused on crack cocaine 
offenses. The anti-drug legislation mandated a 5-year statutory minimum for simple 
possession of five grams or more of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 844 (a)) and introduced 
an enhanced sentence for engaging in a “continuing drug enterprise,” increasing the 
statutory minimum from 10 to 20 years (21 U.S.C. § 848). The law established a 10-year 
minimum sentence for simple possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 5,000 
grams or more of powder cocaine, or 1,000 grams or more of heroin (21 U.S.C. § 841 
(b)). Moreover, the unparalleled legislative directive places conspiracy of drug 
distribution within the scope of the mandatory sentencing scheme (21 U.S.C. § 846), 
which accounts for the largest fraction of mandatory convictions in federal courts (USSC, 
2011a: 74). 
The discernible disparity between polices designated by Congress for crack 
cocaine and powder cocaine offenses has led the USSC (1991, 1995a, 1997, 2002b, 2007; 
see also Spohn, 2009), lawmakers (Hatch, 1993), and members of the federal judiciary 
(Breyer, 1999; Rehnquist, 1993) to publicly advocate for the streamlining of mandatory 
minimum sentencing legislation. Despite the dismay expressed by the public, politicians, 
and members of the judiciary, until 2010 Congress unanimously upheld the disparate 
penalties for crack and powder defendants and had been reluctant to reform the 
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mandatory punishment scheme on several grounds (Tison, 2003).5 First, because of its 
method of ingestion—consumed by smoking, not intranasally as powder cocaine—crack 
cocaine is elevated to a higher level of “dangerousness,” as its physiological potency is 
associated with a higher risk of addiction, prenatal exposure, and death (USSC, 2002a: 9-
10). Second, the consumption and distribution of crack cocaine relative to other 
controlled substances has been closely associated with young individuals engaging in 
drug crime as well as other violent criminal behavior (USSC, 2002a: 10). Third, the 
purity of crack cocaine enables inexpensive and efficient distribution, which in turn leads 
to widespread consumption (USSC, 2002a: 10, see also Kennedy, 1997), which is 
concentrated among individuals in urban ghettos and barrios with “fewer bonds to 
conventional society, less to lose, and far fewer resources to cope with or shield 
themselves from drug-related problems” (Reinarman and Levine, 1997: 19; Sklansky, 
1995). For instance, legal scholar Randall Kennedy (1997: 383-384) noted, “One of the 
                                                          
5 Inquests on public opinion have led to the conclusion that the majority of the American citizenry and 
courtroom actors, independent of political affiliation, disapprove of stringent mandatory minimum penalties 
designated for drug offenders, especially penalties for crack cocaine offenses (Families Against Mandatory 
Minimums, 2008; Lock, Timberlake, and Rasinski, 2002). For instance, a nationwide survey conducted by 
Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) (2008: 4) revealed that approximately 60 percent of 
Americans oppose mandatory minimum penalties for nonviolent offenses (see also Pew, 2012). Moreover, 
78 percent of respondents agreed that the judicial system, not the legislature, is “best qualified” to account 
for the defendant’s role in the offense, including the prediction of future criminality (FAMM, 2008: 9). 
Most recently, and consistent with previous studies of opinion on mandatory minimums among courtroom 
officials (e.g., Johnson and Gilbert, 1997; Maxfield, 2003; Maxfield, Martin, and Kitchens, 1997; Rossi and 
Berk, 1997; USSC, 1995b), a survey of federal judges undertaken by the USSC (2010a: 5) found that 
whereas current mandatory minimum penalties for powder cocaine and methamphetamine distribution were 
supported by 52 percent and 53 percent of respondents, respectfully, only 23 percent of respondents 
approved of the current minimum penalty for crack cocaine distribution. Furthermore, more than half of the 
respondents agreed that judges should be permitted to depart from mandatory minimums when defendants 
provide substantial assistance, independent of whether a motion is filed by the AUSA (USSC, 2010a: 18). 
Most notably, one third of respondents (or judges) branded charging practices and mandatory minimums as 
the foremost contributors to sentencing disparities (USSC, 2010a: 19; see also Ulmer and Light, 2010).  
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strongest reasons favoring the crack-powder distinction is precisely that crack is more 
accessible and, for that reason alone, more dangerous…Because it is relatively 
inexpensive, crack helped tremendously to democratize cocaine use, a dubious 
‘achievement’ that the government should surely be able to ‘reward’ with a punitive 
response without eliciting the charge that doing so is racially discriminatory” (for further 
discussion on crime control policies and race politics, see Kennedy, 1994). 
 In a similar vein, the executive branch’s unwillingness to intervene and support 
reform of mandatory minimum legislation during the 1990s and the inception of the Bush 
Administration was made patently clear. Testimony by former Deputy Attorney General 
Larry D. Thompson (2002) before the USSC affirmed that cocaine sentences—most 
salient, the 1-to-100 distinction between powder and crack cocaine penalties—were 
“proper,” as crack cocaine is more psychologically addictive and generates more 
emergency room visits than powder cocaine, can be manufactured and distributed at a 
low cost, and disproportionally affects the most vulnerable members of society. 
Furthermore, Thompson’s testimony suggested elevating the penalty for offenses 
involving powder cocaine and charged that the U.S. Department of Justice would 
“oppose any effort by the Commission to issue guidelines that do not adhere to the 
congressionally enacted statutes that define and prescribe penalties for federal cocaine 
offenses.”  
Legislative Directives and Case Law in Federal Sentencing  
 
Measures carried out by the USSC to reform mandatory sentencing legislation 
throughout the 1990s and most of the following decade proved fruitless. In 1995, at the 
request of Congress, as directed by the Omnibus Violent Crime Control and Law 
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Enforcement Act of 1994, the USSC (1995a) issued a report with recommendations on 
federal cocaine sentencing policies. Contrary to its prior stance on the “harmful” effects 
of crack and powder cocaine and the disparity between sanctions for the two drugs 
(USSC, 1991), the USSCs’ new report charged that, “Penalties clearly must be racially 
neutral on their face and by design” (1995a: xii). In line with its conclusions, the USSC 
ratified amendments to the federal guidelines (embedded within the mandatory minimum 
statutes) that established a 5-year mandatory minimum for the distribution of 500 grams 
or more of both powder and crack cocaine and abolished the 5-year mandatory minimum 
for simple possession of crack cocaine. The amendments, however, were subsequently 
rejected by Congress in legislation signed by former President Bill Clinton (see Tonry, 
2011: 79).  
More recently, and without an amendment process, a report by the USSC (2007: 
8), yet again, recommended that Congress elevate the 5-year and 10-year mandatory 
minimums to reflect penalties for “serious and major traffickers,” abolish the mandatory 
minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine, and reject the 1-to-100 cocaine penalty 
differential. Despite opposition to mandatory sentencing schemes from conservative 
leaders (Hatch, 1993; Rehnquist, 1993), vocal but inactive support for reform from 
Congress, President George W. Bush’s administration (Luna and Cassell, 2010), and 
USSC initiatives, reform efforts were largely ineffective during the first seven years of 
the 21st century (changes to these policies discussed in the section that follows).  
Although the federal guidelines passed constitutional muster soon after their 
implementation (Mistretta v. United States, 1989), a series of recent legal developments 
that took place from 1996 to 2007 significantly altered sentencing in U.S District Courts, 
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in due course leading to the downfall of the federal guidelines’ mandatory status. The 
discretion of federal judges to depart from the presumptive guidelines scheme ebbed and 
flowed amid the intervention of Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court. In Koon v. United 
States (518 U.S. 81, 1996), the High Court, in a modest attempt to restore the discretion 
removed from federal judges with the passage of the guidelines scheme and a plethora of 
mandatory minimum statutes, established an “abuse of discretion” standard to be used in 
the appellate review of judges’ decisions to depart from the guidelines.  
Congress subsequently responded with the enactment of the Feeney Amendment 
to the PROTECT Act (Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation 
of Children Today) (Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650) of 2003. The Feeney Amendment 
reinstated a “de novo” standard for appellate review (18 U.S.C. § 3742 (e)), which had 
been momentarily stamped out by Koon v. U.S., and again provided Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys’ with greater oversight of judges’ sentencing decisions. More importantly, the 
PROTECT Act, specifically designed to reduce the ascending rate of judicial downward 
departures (see however, Bailey, 2004; Freeborn and Hartmann, 2010), directed judges to 
specify the reasons that justified departures from the federal guidelines and directed the 
federal government (AUSAs) to specify the reasons for failing to pursue cases that may 
have resulted in a successful appellate review (18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(g)). All considered, the legislation was “aimed at reinvigorating the role of the 
appellate process in sentencing and enhancing appellate oversight of the use of departures 
by lower courts” (USSC, 2003: 56). 
The legislative victory, demonstrated by the passage of the Feeney Amendment 
(2003), however, was relatively brief. This was due to the fact that constitutional scrutiny 
38 
 
of Washington State’s sentencing guidelines scheme—eventually declared 
unconstitutional for its “relevant conduct” provisions—was slowly moving through the 
appellate review process, in route to the U.S. Supreme Court (Blakely v. Washington, 
2004). Accordingly, with Blakely v. Washington serving as precedent, the High Court’s 
landmark decision in U.S. v. Booker (2005), and its companion case, U.S. v. Fanfan 
(2005) (hereinafter, U.S. v. Booker), rendered the federal guidelines “effectively 
advisory” rather than mandatory. In its reasoning, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
jury’s role in the sentencing process and held that sentence enhancements based on facts 
not considered by a jury at trial were in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. The Booker decision, to a certain extent, conserved enforcement of the 
federal guidelines. Specifically, the Court invalidated the “de novo” provision in the 
federal sentencing code that had been applied to the appellate review of sentences that 
depart from the guidelines. The ruling introduced an unclear standard of “reasonableness” 
and “abuse of discretion” for review of criminal sentences that failed to conform to the 
guidelines. Although U.S. v. Booker reinstated federal courts’ appellate jurisdiction over 
sentences imposed below the guidelines, what is of greater significance is that the 
decision dismantled key components of the federal guidelines scheme that had been in 
practice for approximately 18 years. That is, judges were no longer bound by but would 
simply seek guidance from the federal guidelines.        
A series of U.S. Supreme Court rulings since 2005 has more clearly defined the 
meaning of “advisory” and “reasonableness” of the “abuse  of discretion” doctrine 
specified for the appellate review of sentences that deviate from the federal guidelines 
range (for a complete review of federal guidelines case law, see Cassidy, 2009). An 
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assessment of the advisory guidelines scheme in Rita v. U.S. (2007) somewhat clarified 
the doctrine of “reasonableness.” The Supreme Court compelled federal appellate courts 
to apply a presumption of “reasonableness” to any sentence that conforms to the 
guidelines, but clearly articulated that, “A nonbinding appellate presumption that a 
Guidelines sentence is reasonable does not require the sentencing judge to impose that 
sentence.” That is, a sentence that falls within the federal guidelines range may be 
presumed to be reasonable.  
The affirmative interpretation of U.S. v. Booker—judges’ discretion to defect 
from the federal guidelines—was again confirmed in the Court’s ruling in Gall v. U.S. 
(2007), in which the Court reasoned that, “Assuming that the district court’s sentencing 
decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” The 
Court essentially ruled that appellate courts should not consider sentences unreasonable 
simply because they fall outside of the federal guidelines. Finally, in Kimbrough v. U.S. 
(2007), the High Court further expanded judicial discretion by holding that departing 
from the federal guidelines scheme was permissible on grounds of a policy disagreement. 
In this case, the Court ruled that a sentence could be designated as “unreasonable” as a 
result of disagreement with the disparity in federal mandatory minimum penalties 
situated for powder cocaine and crack cocaine offenses. The Court made clear that, “It 
would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a 
particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than 
necessary.’” Thus, the series of High Court decisions further restricted AUSAs’ 
discretion to appeal sentences where judges’ departed from the federal guidelines.  
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To date, the U.S. Supreme Court’s standing on the expansion of judicial 
discretion has remained static. Preliminary analyses of sentencing outcomes in the 
aftermath of the Court’s rulings, however, found a modest increase in judicial decisions 
outside of the federal guidelines (USSC, 2006, 2010b). What is more, as previously 
noted, the series of landmark rulings has heightened concerns about unwarranted 
disparity in certain sentencing outcomes, in particular Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ motions 
for substantial assistance downward departures (e.g., Ulmer and Light, 2010; Ulmer, 
Light, and Kramer, 2011a, 2011b).   
As the succession of legal mandates ultimately confirmed the federal guidelines 
as advisory, streamlining of the draconian mandatory minimum penalties long prescribed 
for crack cocaine offenses was underway through the USSC guidelines’ amendment 
process, culminating in comprehensive legislative action. In May 2007—invoking a 
process that proved unsuccessful in 1995—the USSC ratified amendments to federal 
crack cocaine penalties (see 28 U.S.C. § 994 (a) (p)), that, absent of legislative action for 
repeal, took effect on November 1, 2007 (USSC, 2011e). The Crack Cocaine 
Amendment, which was formally adopted as Amendment 706, restructured the base 
offense level for the distribution of crack cocaine by adjusting the quantity threshold 
downward by two levels. Accordingly, first-time offenders convicted of distributing at 
least 5 grams of crack cocaine faced an amended guidelines sentence of 51 to 63 months 
that had previously corresponded to a 63- to 78-month sentence. Similarly, the amended 
guidelines range reduced the penalty for first-time offenders convicted of the distribution 
of at least 50 grams of crack cocaine from 121 to 151 months to 97 to 121 months. 
Moreover, the USSC ratified Amendment 713 in December 2007, which rendered the 
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application of the Crack Cocaine Amendment retroactive on March 3, 2008 (USSC: 
2011e). As of June 29, 2011, 25,736 defendants had petitioned the district courts for a 
sentence reduction of which 64.2 percent of motions for retroactive application were 
approved (USSC, 2014: 2).  
That same year, in a widely-noted speech delivered at Howard University’s 
convocation, then-Senator Barack Obama (2007) explicitly stated, “Let’s not make the 
punishment for crack cocaine that much more severe than the punishment for powder 
cocaine when the real difference between the two is the skin color of the people using 
them.” A major overhaul of mandatory sentencing legislation for crack cocaine drug 
offenses soon pursued in the wake of new congressional leadership (a Democratic 
majority) and presidential administration, which symbolized a “tipping point” for 
mandatory minimum penalties (Luna, 2010). For instance, newly-appointed Attorney 
General Eric Holder (2009) remarked that, “This Administration firmly believes that the 
disparity in crack and powder cocaine sentences is unwarranted, creates a perception of 
unfairness, and must be eliminated. This change should be addressed in Congress.”  
Indeed, the Sentencing and Corrections Working Group was convened by the U.S. 
Department of Justice to investigate federal sentencing policies and thus make 
recommendations for policy changes (see Breuer, 2010, 2011). On August 3, 2010, the 
Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) (Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372), authored by Senator Dick 
Durbin and co-sponsored by Senators Patrick Leahy and Jeff Sessions, was signed into 
law by President Barak Obama. The FSA of 2010 abolished the mandatory minimum 
penalty set by the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 for simple possession of crack 
cocaine (21 U.S.C. §801 (3)) and upped the quantity of crack cocaine needed to trigger a 
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mandatory penalty for distribution. Specifically, the FSA elevated the quantity of crack 
cocaine needed for a 5-year mandatory penalty from 5 grams to 28 grams and the 
quantity of crack cocaine needed for a 10-year mandatory penalty from 50 grams to 280 
grams, consequently reducing the 1-to-100 quantity distinction between powder and 
cocaine penalties to a 18-to-1 quantity distinction (21 U.S.C. §801 (2) (a) (b)). After 
careful deliberation, the USSC voted unanimously to render the FSA provisions 
retroactive (sentence reductions for crack cocaine offenses). A press release by the USSC 
(2011c) estimated that the average sentence reduction under the FSA, taking into 
consideration the amendment for retroactivity, is 37 months, which is expected to remain 
constant for approximately 10 years. And most importantly, members of the USSC 
(2011e) emphasized that the retroactivity of the FSA was based on “significant 
deliberation and many years of research on federal cocaine sentencing policy.” The 
following section includes a discussion on how mandatory minimum penalties and 
substantial assistance departures have exacerbated unwarranted disparities in the federal 
criminal process. 
 
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE 
DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, AND RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES   
 
To understand the salient role of mandatory minimum penalties in the federal 
criminal justice system, it is important to discuss the impact mandatory sentences have on 
legal and extralegal disproportionality, the prison population, and sentencing practices in 
general. Punishment under two competing legal structures—U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
and statutory mandatory minimums—is complicated. As previously noted, mandatory 
minimum sentences trump the federal guidelines. 
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Mandatory minimum legislation has elicited legitimate criticism on several 
dimensions. From a theoretical stance, mandatory sentencing is incompatible with the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ expressed goals that are premised on uniformity, 
proportionality, and consistency (Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992; Oliss, 1994; Schwarzer, 
1992; Tonry, 1996, 2005; USSC, 2004, 2011a). In a similar vein, legal researchers and 
policy makers argue that mandatory sentences obstruct individualized sentencing 
practices, as judges are precluded from taking into consideration mitigating 
circumstances concerning the offense or defendant, and thus perpetuate sentences that are 
“excessively harsh” (USSC, 2011a: 90-103; Cassell, 2004; Hatch, 1993; Sculhofer, 1993; 
Weinstein, 2003). The criticism is more relentless for penalties instituted for drug 
trafficking, drug trafficking conspiracy, and simple drug possession. As discussed further 
below, mandatory minimums for drug offenses—the epitome of the federal government’s 
war on drugs and violent crime during the 1980s—are fashioned exclusively on the 
“weight” or “mixture” of the drug (e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)).  
From a practical stance, critics charge that mandatory penalties exert no deterrent 
effect on crime and drug use (Caulkins, Rydell, Schwabe, and Chisea, 1997; Tonry, 1996; 
Vincent and Hofer, 1994). In addition, they contend that drug minimums focus on 
offenders who play a relatively minor role in the drug trafficking network (Froyd, 1999; 
Sevigny and Caulkins, 2004; Vincent and Hofer, 1994). Indeed, mandatory sentencing 
legislation was drafted for violent, serious offenses but is “frequently applied” to non-
violent drug offenses (Beckett and Sasson, 2004: 166-167). For instance, a recent 
government report showed that fewer than 7 percent of convictions under a federal 
mandatory minimum statute were for a violent offense (USSC, 2011a: 73; see also 
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Vincent and Hofer, 1994). Moreover, from the mid-1980s through the 1990s and beyond, 
the imposition of enhanced sentences has exacerbated the growth rate of the federal 
prison population, a trend also witnessed in states’ correctional institutions (Blumstein 
and Beck, 1999; Mauer and Hauling, 1995; Pratt, 2009; USSC, 2004; Zimring, 2005). An 
analysis of sentencing practices under the federal guidelines’ first fifteen years of 
implementation reported that the “major cause” of growth in the federal inmate 
population between the 1984 and 2002 reflects the escalation in sentence severity for 
drug trafficking defendants (USSC, 2004: 48; see also Mauer and Huling, 1995: 5). To 
illustrate this point, from 1990 to 2010, the federal caseload, as well as the number of 
defendants convicted under a mandatory minimum penalty, increased threefold (USSC, 
2011a: 66). 
 Aside from the significant rise in the federal inmate population, the 
overarching concern is that federal mandatory minimum legislation has had unparalleled 
negative consequences for racial and ethnic minority defendants, mainly African 
Americans and Hispanics. Some argue that minimum statutes target specific offenses, 
such as drug possession and trafficking, and enhance penalties for repeat offenses 
disproportionally concentrated among racial and ethnic minority groups (Beckett and 
Sasson, 2004; Massey, 2007; Mauer, 2006; Tonry, 1992, 1995, 2011; Tonry and 
Melewski, 2008; USSC, 2011a: 182; Western, 2006). Mandatory penalties heighten 
inequality at earlier stages of processing and at imprisonment between White, Black, and 
Hispanic defendants (Beckett and Sasson, 2004; McDonald and Carlson, 1994: 225; 
Tonry; 1996, 2011; USSC, 2007, 2011a), reflecting the war on drugs’ “malign neglect of 
its implications for Black [and Hispanic] Americans” (Tonry, 1995:105). 
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Crime and justice scholars have found that unwarranted disparities—especially 
racial, ethnic, and gender inconsistencies—occur more frequently and are more 
pronounced in non-violent drug cases when compared to other non-violent offenses 
(Albonetti, 1997; Chiricos and Bales, 1991; Crawford, Chiricos, and Kleck, 1998; 
Johnson et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2005; Myers, 1989; Spohn and DeLone, 2000; Spohn and 
Fornango, 2009; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000; USSC, 2004). The bulk of the 
attention garnered by drug mandatory sentencing is centered on the conspicuous 
punishment disparities for cocaine-related offenses. As discussed earlier, this is reflected 
in the 1-to-100 quantity distinction, that until the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act in 
2010, guided sentences prescribed for the trafficking of powder cocaine and crack 
cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)).6 In addition, passage of the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988 broadened the applicability of mandatory minimums. In fact, mandatory 
penalties were extended to offenses involving conspiracy to distribute drugs. 
Furthermore, as previously discussed, crack cocaine offenses were singled out for more 
punitive punishment, as the revamped mandatory minimum statute of 1988 prescribed a 
5-year minimum sentence of imprisonment for possession of more than 5 grams of crack 
cocaine, whereas the penalty for possession of any other controlled substance (e.g., 
powder cocaine or heroin) triggers a punishment of no more than one year of 
imprisonment (21 U.S.C. § 844 (a)). Further insight into the contentious debate 
                                                          
6 As of 1993, the USSC (2007: 2), to apply the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines consistently with the drug 
mandatory minimum statutes, defines “cocaine base” as crack cocaine, generated by processing cocaine 
hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate into a “rocklike” substance. Consequently, as stipulated by the 
federal guidelines, the remaining forms of cocaine, for example, cocaine paste, are officially classified as 
powder cocaine (USSC, 2007: 2-3). 
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concerning disparity in federal drug policies can be gleaned in that crack cocaine, until 
2010, was the only drug that carried a mandatory minimum penalty for first-time simple 
possession.  
In addition to the stark penalty differences between crack cocaine offenses and all 
other drug offenses, the coexistence of the guidelines scheme with statutory mandatory 
minimums fostered sentencing disparity between similarly situated defendants by 
producing a “cliff effect” (Luna and Cassell, 2010: 15; Schulhofer, 1993; Tonry, 1996). 
Schulhofer (1993: 209), for example, demonstrates the impact of the “cliff effect” by 
showing that a conviction for trafficking 495 grams of powder cocaine may result in a 2-
year to 4-year prison sentence, as the volume of drugs, slightly below the applicable 
mandatory minimum, fails to trigger a stricter penalty (see also Tonry, 1996). 
Conversely, a conviction for trafficking 500 grams of powder cocaine would trigger a 5-
year mandatory minimum penalty. 
To emphasize the offense type and racial and ethnic disparities encompassing 
mandatory sentences, in 2010, 51 percent of the 209,771 inmates under federal 
jurisdiction were convicted of a drug offense (Guerino, Harrison, and Sabol, 2011: 1; see 
also Simon, 1993). And, as of 1998, defendants convicted of trafficking in or possession 
of crack cocaine comprise the largest group of drug offenders housed in federal 
correctional institutions (USSC, 2011a: 185; see also King and Mauer, 2006). 
Furthermore, during fiscal year 2010, while rates of incarceration have gradually declined 
for African Americans and risen abruptly for Hispanics (Guerino, Harrison, and Sabol, 
2011; Tonry, 2011), 82 percent of crack cocaine defendants, of which almost four fifths 
were African American, were convicted of an offense that carried a mandatory penalty 
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(USSC, 2011a: 191-192). Likewise, 80 percent of powder cocaine defendants, of which 
approximately three fifths were Hispanic, were convicted of an offense that triggered a 
mandatory minimum penalty (USSC, 2011a: 173).  
Prior research on drug punishment outcomes has shown greater inequities in 
mandatory minimum cases, cocaine offenses in particular, relative to cases sentenced 
strictly under the federal guidelines (Hartley, et al., 2007; Kautt and DeLone, 2006; 
Lacasse and Payne, 1999; Payne, 1997). Assessing a recent survey of federal judges 
(USSC, 2010a) and a report to Congress by the USSC (2011a) on mandatory minimums 
and inequity in sentencing, Law Professor Douglas Berman’s (2012) written statement to 
the USSC contended that disparities in federal courts are “principally attributable to the 
operation of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions as impacted by the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.” In support of this position, U.S. Supreme Court Associate 
Justice Stephen Breyer (1999: 32) pointedly argued that, although the federal guidelines 
were designed by the USSC to constrain judicial discretion and promote fairness and 
consistency in the criminal process, prosecutors’ discretion, the primary contributor to 
unwarranted disparity, is deeply rooted in two “nonessential” and “peripheral” features of 
the federal sentencing scheme—mandatory minimums and substantial assistance 
downward departures.  
Similar to mandatory sentences, the application of downward departures (sentence 
discounts), particularly substantial assistance or 5K.1 departures initiated by AUSAs, has 
stirred debate. Like the “cliff effect,” the use of substantial assistance downward 
departures has been associated with extralegal punishment disparities. To be sure, the use 
of substantial assistance, granted for cooperation with the government in the prosecution 
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of other defendants, comprises the leading source of disparity in federal sentencing 
outcomes (Albonetti, 1997, Farrell, 2004; Kempf-Leonard and Sample, 2001; Mustard, 
2001; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000; USSC, 2004). What is more, the disparity effect 
is more pronounced in cases where defendants are granted substantial assistance 
specifically from mandatory penalties, not the federal guidelines (Fischman and 
Schanzenbach, 2012; USSC, 2004; 2011a). Consider, for example, when immigration 
offenses are excluded, drug convictions collectively account for 46 percent of the 
caseload before federal district courts (USSC, 2010c). In fiscal year 2010, two thirds of 
drug defendants were convicted of offenses that carried a statutory mandatory minimum 
(USSC, 2011a: 153), while 28 percent of drug defendants were granted relief from the 
mandatory penalty at the request of the prosecution, in that they provided “substantial 
assistance” to the government (USSC, 2011a: 196).  
The impact of mass imprisonment, to a greater degree for racial minorities who 
are incarcerated at disproportionate rates, transcends the American criminal justice 
system. The punitive incarceration boom stemming from the determinate sentencing era 
has served as a catalyst for creating and sustaining racial and ethnic stratification with 
dramatic economic and personal costs (Pettit and Western, 2004; Wakefield and Uggen, 
2010; Western, 2006). Specifically, incarceration diminishes prospects for meaningful 
employment, and employment opportunities in general (Massey, 2007; Pager, 2003, 
2007; Pettit and Lyons, 2009; Western, 2006; Western, Kling, and Weiman, 2001), 
fosters family disruption and social disenfranchisement, predominantly in minority 
neighborhoods (Clear, 2007; Western, 2006; Turanovic et al., 2012), and leads to higher 
rates of crime and neighborhood deterioration (Rose and Clear, 1998; Tonry, 2011).  
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Evidence of racial and ethnic stratification is found when looking at federal 
sentences meted out during the first decade of the 21st century. Using data from the USSC 
from FY 2001 to FY 2010, descriptive analyses conducted for this dissertation highlight 
the significant role that substantial assistance departures play in engendering racial and 
ethnic disparities in mandatory minimum drug trafficking cases in U.S. District Courts. 
The first trend displayed in Figure 1 shows a significant decline in between-group racial 
and ethnic disparities over time in the distribution of substantial assistance departures for 
all drug trafficking defendants—defendants convicted under the federal guidelines or a 
mandatory minimum penalty. The second trend analysis presented in Figure 2 is 
restricted to the distribution of substantial assistance departures in cases where drug 
trafficking defendants were facing a mandatory minimum penalty. Unlike the assessment 
presented in Figure 1, the data in Figure 2 show that between-group racial and ethnic 
inequality remains stable over time. Although the prevalence of substantial assistance 
motions is substantially lower for Black and Hispanic defendants relative to White 
defendants, the use of substantial assistance is even lower for Hispanic defendants. The 
trends uncovered reveal that whereas the overall use of motions for substantial assistance 
departures has exerted relative stability over time, the extent of racial and ethnic 
disparities varies across sentencing schemes—while racial and ethnic disparities have 
declined across all drug trafficking cases, racial and ethnic disparities have increased over 
time and become more aggravated in drug trafficking mandatory minimum cases. 
....The reality and intersection of these two dynamics—laws that require a 
mandatory sentence for drug trafficking or possession and AUSAs’ capacity to seek a 
downward departure to remove a mandatory minimum penalty—assume a pivotal role in 
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the prosecution of cases, as they aggravate sentencing outcomes for non-violent 
offending, racial and ethnic minority defendants. Thus, it is important to examine 
mandatory minimum cases separately from federal guidelines cases. Building on the 
descriptive findings presented above, the following section more broadly outlines a 
discussion of the empirical literature on prosecutors’ discretion, the circumvention of 
mandatory penalties, recent sentencing policy reforms, and the social contexts of courts 
and sentencing.    
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Figure 1. Substantial Assistance Departures, All Cases 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Substantial Assistance Departures, Mandatory Minimum Cases 
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SENTENCING RESEARCH 
 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Circumvention of Mandatory Sentences 
 
In the past four decades, research has clearly documented that racial and ethnic 
disparities exist in prosecutors’ discretion to file initial charges (Albonetti, 1987; 
Beichner and Spohn, 2005; Frohmann, 1991, 1997; Henning and Feder, 2005; Johnson, 
2014; Pyrooz, Wolfe, and Spohn, 2011; Spohn, Beichner, and Davis-Frenzel, 2001; 
Spohn and Holleran, 2000; Spears and Spohn, 1997; Spohn, Gruhl, and Welch, 1987; 
Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2004), dismiss pending charges (Albonetti, 1992; 
Farnworth and Teske, 1995; Kingsnorth and MacIntosh, 2007; Spohn et al., 1987; 
Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2004), and engage in charge reductions (Albonetti, 1992; 
Holmes, Daudistel, and Farrell, 1987; Johnson, 2014; Kingsnorth and MacIntosh, 2007; 
Wright and Engen, 2006). Moreover, Kutateladze, Lynn, and Liang (2012) recently 
reviewed 34 empirical studies on prosecutors’ initial charge, presentence detention, and 
charge dismissal and reduction decisions across state, federal, and juvenile court 
jurisdictions. The review of the literature provided compelling evidence of extralegal 
disparity in all stages of the criminal process, as two-thirds of studies on initial charging 
decisions and an overwhelming majority of all other studies reported significant race and 
ethnicity effects. The authors noted that in the bulk of analyses they examined, 
“Defendants’ or victims’ race directly or indirectly influence case outcomes, even when a 
host of other legal and extra-legal factors are taken into account” (Kutateladze et al., 
2012: 17; see also Free, 2002; Johnson, 2014).  
Although research on prosecutors’ charging decisions is relatively limited when 
compared to empirical investigations of judicial decision making (Chiricos and Crawford, 
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1995; Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 2000), even less attention has been devoted to prosecuting 
attorneys’ charging behaviors associated with mandatory sentencing schemes (Ulmer et 
al., 2007). This is especially important, as legal and criminology literature asserts that 
mandatory minimum penalties, coupled with the unbridled prosecutorial power that 
characterizes their application, encompasses a primary source of unwarranted disparity 
(Mustard, 2001; Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992; Stith and Cabranes, 1998; USSC, 2004; 
2011a; Weinstein, 2003). An early review of empirical evaluations of mandatory 
sentencing schemes in Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York reported a significant 
decline in prosecutions and thus convictions, suggesting that, “officials attempted to 
shelter some defendants from the law’s effects” (Blumstein et al., 1983: 188; see also 
Bynum, 1982; Loftin, Heumann, and McDowall, 1983). The evidence, however, revealed 
that racial and ethnic disparities persist regardless of prosecutors’ unwillingness to file 
charges carrying a mandatory sentence. A decade later, Nagel and Schulhofer’s (1992) 
qualitative analysis of three federal district courts similarly found that U.S. Attorneys 
engage in charge manipulation to circumvent punitive sanctions for deserving defendants 
who appear as “salvageable” or “sympathetic,” particularly in cases that warrant a 
mandatory minimum penalty. This led the authors to conclude that, “prosecutorial 
behavior may reproduce unwarranted disparity or, worse, discrimination based on race, 
gender, social class, thereby compromising the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act” 
(Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992: 560). 
Contemporary scholarship on criminal prosecutions has clearly demonstrated that 
prosecutors in state courts invoke mandatory sentences in a marginal number of eligible 
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cases,7 which in turn may aggravate extralegal disparities in the criminal punishment 
process. For instance, Crawford, Chiricos, and Kleck’s (1998) investigation on male 
defendants in Florida courts found that, net of offense severity and criminal history 
considerations, prosecutors, in collaboration with judges, were more likely to seek the 
application of habitual offender provisions for Black defendants. Further research 
uncovered that the race effect was not confined to male habitual offenders. In a parallel 
line of research, Crawford (2000) found higher odds of habitual offender prosecutions for 
eligible Black females, especially for drug offenses. The study, however, confirmed that, 
for the most part, the race effects for female defendants were restricted to one judicial 
circuit.  
Research focused explicitly on prosecutors’ decision making shows racial and 
ethnic disparities in cases involving mandatory minimum sentencing. Farrell (2003) 
found that prosecutors in Maryland used mandatory firearm penalties in only 37 percent 
of convicted cases that carried a mandatory sentence and were more likely to apply a 
firearm minimum to young, male, and Black defendants. Similarly, using a national 
sample of defendants, Bjerk (2005) found that the probability of a charge reduction was 
higher for defendants whose initial charges triggered punishment under a three-strike 
statute. Although prosecutors were twice as likely to exercise charge reductions in 
mandatory cases, the probability of a reduction was considerably less for male, Black, 
and Hispanic defendants. Ulmer, Kurlychek, and Kramer (2007) examined the 
                                                          
7 This is not necessarily the case in the federal justice system, as mandatory minimum prosecutions are 
ultimately faced by a slight majority of defendants initially charged with offenses that carry mandatory 
sentences (USSC, 1991, 2011).  
 
55 
 
application of mandatory minimum and three-strike penalties in Pennsylvania courts. 
Consistent with previous research on prosecutors’ charging decisions, the results revealed 
that mandatory minimum and three-strike provisions were applied in 29 percent and 18.4 
percent of eligible cases, respectively. Furthermore, male defendants faced a higher 
likelihood of a mandatory minimum, and Hispanic defendants were almost twice as likely 
to receive a mandatory minimum and four times more likely to receive a three-strike 
sentence. Most noteworthy, the results ultimately showed that young Hispanic males 
were singled out for more punitive punishment under the mandatory minimum scheme. 
In short, the findings emphasize the significant role that extralegal defendant 
considerations exert on mandatory minimum sentencing practices.   
A developing wave of research has investigated an array of decision points in the 
charging process in the federal justice system (Johnson, 2014; Rehavi and Starr, 2012, 
2014; Starr, 2012; Starr and Rehavi, 2013). The assessment of punishment outcomes 
beyond judge-controlled decisions has been facilitated by the recent accessibility of 
federal law enforcement data from the U.S. Marshals’ Service (USMS) and a wide range 
of prosecution data from the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) and 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC). For instance, a notable study by 
O’Neill Shermer and Johnson (2009) assessed charge reductions from the federal 
guidelines but found no direct evidence of racial or ethnic disparity. An analysis of 
charging decisions by Johnson (2014) found that although the probability of a charge 
reduction was marginally higher for Black and Hispanic defendants, analyses that 
attempted to capture the conditioning effects of age and gender with race and ethnicity 
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revealed that both charge reductions and cases where initial charges were never filed 
were less likely for young male minority defendants. 
More relevant to the current study is a focus on federal prosecutors’ discretion 
and unwarranted disparities associated with cases governed by mandatory minimum 
sentencing statutes. Rehavi and Starr (2012) examined disparities in initial charging and 
final imprisonment decisions across federal district courts. Taking into account the post-
arrest process and legal case characteristics, Assistant U.S. Attorneys were twice as likely 
to file charges that carry mandatory minimums for Black defendants, which led the 
authors to conclude that, “Much of that disparity appears to be driven by decisions at the 
initial charging stage, especially by prosecutors’ filing of ‘mandatory minimum’ charges” 
(Rehvi and Starr, 2012: 24). In addition, a companion study found that, on average, Black 
male defendants faced odds of being charged with and thus convicted under a mandatory 
minimum provision that were approximately one and three-fourths higher than the odds 
for similarly situated non-Black males (for further gender-specific analyses, see Starr, 
2012). These findings led the authors to the conclusion that, “Charges carrying statutory 
mandatory minimum sentences are prosecutors’ most powerful tool to constrain 
sentences, and disparities in the use of that tool can translate powerfully into sentence 
disparities” (Starr and Rehavi, 2014: 1323). A study by Fischman and Schanzenbach 
(2012) also reported a higher likelihood of a statutory minimum for Black defendants, but 
the study failed to capture whether the race effect was driven by the arrest and charging 
process. These studies found that federal prosecutors’ charging decisions, most salient 
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being the application of mandatory minimums, were influenced by defendants’ gender 
and race.8  
A set of studies on final imprisonment decisions also points out that punitive 
sanctions and extralegal disparities, particularly those related to gender more than race 
and ethnicity, have a more pronounced effect on mandatory minimum cases relative to 
cases sentenced under the federal guidelines (Farrell, 2004; Hartley, 2008; Hartley et al., 
2007; Kautt and DeLone, 2006; Lacasse and Payne, 1999; Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992). 
Engen (2009: 328) stressed that research on recent modifications to the determinate 
sentencing approach “must explore more broadly how judges and prosecutors exercise 
their discretion under various types of laws.” To be sure, a series of studies have 
demonstrated the salience of parsing out the effects case and defendant predictors on 
punishment outcomes between the two federal sentencing structures—federal guidelines 
and mandatory minimum schemes. Lacasse and Payne’s (1999) analysis of plea 
negotiations and sentencing outcomes in two New York district courts found that charge 
bargaining and disparity was more prevalent in cases marked by a mandatory minimum. 
Likewise, Kautt and Spohn’s (2002) comprehensive study of drug sentencing 
outcomes—cases sentenced under the federal guidelines, cases sentenced under a 
mandatory minimum, and cases where a mandatory minimum was circumvented—found 
that most racial inconsistencies derived from mandatory minimum cases. In a similar 
investigation of federal drug trafficking defendants, Farrell (2004) found that female 
                                                          
8 The authors of this new wave of research note that conclusions on extralegal disparity should be drawn 
with caution, as the USMS data, which provide federal arrest information, do not capture a measure for 
suspects’ ethnicity,  and thus collapses White Hispanic and White non-Hispanic arrestees into the “White” 
category (Johnson, 2014: 92; see also Rehavi and Starr, 2013; Starr, 2012).  
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defendants who were granted relief from a mandatory minimum penalty by means of the 
safety valve amendment exhibited higher odds of receiving a downward departure. In 
particular, she reported that whereas Black and Hispanic females benefited from a judge-
controlled sentence discount, the odds of a motion for a sentence reduction from federal 
prosecutors were considerably less for minority female defendants, concluding that 
“Discretion does not disappear under the sentencing guidelines, rather it shifts around 
among legal actors” (Farrell, 2004: 72).  
Alongside assessments of federal prosecuting attorneys’ initial charging decisions 
and subsequent charge reductions stands a separate established literature on AUSA’s 
discretion that is focused on the final sentencing phase—motions for substantial 
assistance downward departures. Hartley, Maddan, and Spohn (2007) estimated separate 
models to predict the odds of AUSAs’ motions for substantial assistance departures for 
powder cocaine and crack cocaine offenses, delineated by whether cases were subjected 
to prosecution under the federal guidelines or mandatory minimum drug statutes. The 
authors unexpectedly found that prosecutor-controlled sentence discounts, for the most 
part, were advantageous toward Black defendants (see also Kautt and Spohn, 2002). 
Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer (2008) found that, among other extralegal defendant 
considerations, downward departures for providing substantial assistance were less likely 
for Black and Hispanic defendants. Similarly, Spohn and Fornango (2009) found that 
AUSAs were more likely to petition the court for substantial assistance relief for 
defendants who were female, younger, college educated, U.S citizens, had dependent 
children, and were under the influence of drugs during the commission of their offense. A 
noteworthy study by Johnson and Betsinger (2009) expanded focus on racial and ethnic 
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inequity to Asian defendants and found that substantial assistance departures were more 
likely for Asians, the “model minority,” when compared to all other groups, to a certainly 
greater extent than Black and Hispanic defendants.  
Additional work has uncovered that racial and ethnic disparities in substantial 
assistance departure outcomes are conditioned by gender (Albonetti, 2002; Cano and 
Spohn, 2012; Farrell, 2004; Kautt and Spohn, 2002; Spohn and Brennan, 2011), drug use 
(Ortiz and Spohn, 2014), parenting status (Farrell, 2004; Stacey and Spohn, 2006), and 
contextual variations across federal court jurisdictions (Johnson et al., 2008; Nagel and 
Schulhofer, 1992; Spohn, 2005; Ulmer, 2005). For instance, Cano and Spohn’s (2012) 
study on drug trafficking defendants facing a mandatory minimum penalty in three 
federal district courts in the Midwest found that race effects were masked by gender, as 
the prevalence of a substantial assistance guidelines departure was considerably lower for 
Black and Hispanic male defendants. Because of the mixed race findings presented, 
emphasis is placed on the importance of exploring further the intersectionality of well-
known legal and extralegal predictors of AUSAs’ motions for substantial assistance. The 
next section advances to a discussion of the empirical literature on the degree to which 
the race and ethnicity effects in criminal case processing has been shaped by the most 
recent federal sentencing policy changes. 
Federal Sentencing Reforms and Unwarranted Disparities 
 
As previously discussed, nearly eighteen years after determinate punishment 
reforms were set into place, the stage of federal sentencing was yet again altered by 
passage of the PROTECT Act and a series of rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court—
most salient, U.S. v. Booker (hereafter Booker) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (hereafter 
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Gall/Kimbrough)—which rendered and subsequently reaffirmed the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines as “effectively advisory.” Thus, scholarship has examined the extent to which 
judges have embraced their newfound freedom to deviate from the federal guidelines. 
With relatively few exceptions, inequality in relation to defendants’ race and ethnicity, 
among other extralegal considerations, has not changed dramatically in wake of the 
Court’s Booker and Gall decisions (Farrell and Ward, 2011; Fischman and 
Schanzenbach, 2012; Hofer, 2007, 2011; Rehavi and Starr, 2013; Scott, 2010; Starr and 
Rehavi, 2012; Tiede, 2009a, 2009b; Ulmer and Light, 2010; Ulmer et al., 2011a, 2011b; 
USSC, 2006). However, comparativley few asessments have tested whether extralegal 
disparities amid the policy reforms are more prounced in discretionary decisions 
associated with Assistant U.S. Attorneys (Starr and Rehavi, 2013; Ulmer et al., 2011a) or 
whether the scope of disparity is conditioned by extralegal characteristics, such as gender 
(Ulmer et al., 2011a; USSC, 2010b), or contextual variation across district courts (Farrell 
and Ward, 2011; Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2012; Kim, Cano, Kim, and Spohn, 
forthcoming; Ulmer et al., 2011b).   
In 2006, the U.S. Sentencing Commission issued a report that investigated 
criminal punishment practices across three periods of key changes in sentencing policy—
before and after passage of the PROTECT Act and in the post-Booker period. In relation 
to extralegal predictors of incarceration severity, the analyses uncovered that although 
young, male, non-U.S. citizen defendants faced more severe sentences in the wake of the 
PROTECT Act and Booker, race effects were confined to the cases adjudicated in the 
post-Booker era, in that Blacks on average received sentences 4.9 percent higher than 
White defendants under the advisory guidelines scheme. Moreover, evidence of ethnic 
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disparity as a result of sentencing reforms was not observed for Hispanic defendants. 
Four years later, a second USSC report (2010b) estimated a set of “refined models” to re-
examine whether shifts in unwarranted disparity were associated with the Court’s ruling 
in Booker, as well as convictions rendered subsequent to Gall.9 Findings from the 
analysis on racial disparity somewhat departed from the USSC’s (2006) previous report, 
as Black male defendants received substantially higher sentences than White male 
defendants subsequent to Booker that were about 15 percent longer, which then increased 
rapidly in the aftermath of Gall with sentences that were about 21 percent longer, 
although the upward shift in incarceration severity for Hispanic males was restricted to 
the post-Gall period.  
Conclusions regarding the USSC’s (2010b; see also USSC, 2012) report of stark 
unwarranted disparities in the post-Booker and post-Gall periods reached were called into 
question by researchers, particularly for their departure from the long-established 
methodology used in the punishment literature. In one of a series of subsequent studies 
that separately modeled incarceration and incarceration severity outcomes, Ulmer, Light 
and Kramer (2011a) compared a series of judicial and prosecutorial decisions across four 
periods of sentencing innovations—pre-PROTECT, post-PROTECT, post-Booker, and 
post-Gall periods. Although disparity in imprisonment decisions was disadvantageous 
solely toward Black males in the post-Gall era relative to cases leading up to the 
                                                          
9 The “refined model’s” methodological design contrasts with the previous Booker report, as the analyses 
collapsed imprisonment and non-imprisonment cases (with a value of 0 months of incarceration) into one 
single measure to predict sentence length (see Albonetti, 1997; Bushway and Piehl, 2001), included 
immigration offenses, estimated interaction models of defendants’ gender, race, and ethnicity, controlled 
for defendants’ presentence detention status, and excluded explanatory variables that capture criminal 
history and sentence enhancements (USSC, 2010: 17-21).  
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PROTECT Act, Black and Hispanic male defendants were slightly less likely than their 
White male counterparts to receive judge-controlled downward departures in punishment 
phases governed by the Booker and Gall/Kimbrough decisions. Alternatively, they 
observed a steady increase in disparity related to prosecutors’ decisions, as Black and 
Hispanic male defendants were less likely to receive substantial assistance guidelines 
departures in the post-Gall period. Aside from the racial disparity that was witnessed 
primarily in the analyses of prosecutor-controlled sentence discounts, the authors 
concluded that, “Put simply racial and gender sentence-length disparities are less today, 
under advisory Guidelines, than they were when the Guidelines were arguably their most 
rigid and constraining” (Ulmer et al., 2011a: 1100).  
A second analysis by Ulmer and associates (2011b) looked at whether 
unwarranted disparities in imprisonment outcomes across federal districts had been 
altered in the Booker and Gall sentencing landscape, controlling for inter-district 
variation. The findings showed that although disparities in sentence length, for the most 
part, remained stable, the odds of imprisonment were higher for Hispanic defendants than 
similarly situated Whites convicted in the Gall era. Aside from the disparity effect for 
Hispanic defendants, the authors eluded to the fact that “the liberalization of judicial 
discretion has resulted in significantly less racial disparity when compared to the pre-
PROTECT era” (Ulmer et al., 2011b: 822). Essentially, with few exceptions, the analyses 
that sought to replicate the USSC (2010b) report contradictorily uncovered a lower 
incidence of judge-led disparity in the post-Booker and post-Gall sentencing 
establishment.   
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Consistent with the USSC’s current methodological stance, a second wave of 
investigations of racial and ethnic sentencing inequities in the Booker and 
Gall/Kimbrough regime have relied heavily on modeling strategies that exclude key case 
characteristics, such as the presumptive sentence, mandatory minimum status, and 
downward departure status (e.g., Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2212; Kim, Cano, Kim, 
and Spohn, forthcoming; Kim, Spohn, and Hedberg, forthcoming; Starr, 2012; Starr and 
Rehavi, 2013).10 For instance, Fischman and Schanzenbach (2012: 257) found that racial 
disparities associated with sentence length and judicial downward departure decisions 
were relatively stable post-Booker but were substantially heightened in the post-
Gall/Kimbrough period, cautioning, however, that the disparity effects may have been 
driven by cases explicitly governed by a mandatory minimum. Using a regression 
discontinuity research design, Starr and Rehavi (2013) looked at the immediate and 
lasting effects of Booker on charging, plea bargaining, judicial departure, and 
imprisonment decisions in district courts. The authors found that Black defendants faced 
harsher charging outcomes relative to Whites, although the disadvantage effect was 
restricted to a limited number of months following the guidelines’ advisory status. 
Despite finding no evidence of change in racial or ethnic disparity in the long term, the 
                                                          
10 Analyses on the effects of recent changes in federal sentencing policies have confronted criticism 
concerning methodological choices, in particular, when employing control measures for the presumptive 
sentence, judicial downward departures, and mandatory minimums in models aimed to predict 
incarceration severity. This strategy has been branded problematic. More specifically, it has been stressed 
that these explanatory variables embody disparity as they attempt to explain variation in final sentences but 
are simultaneously influenced by judicial (and prosecutorial) discretion and the sentencing reforms, and 
thus introduce the risk of an endogenous relationship (Engen, 2011; Fischman and Schanzenback, 2012; 
Starr and Rehavi, 2013). Fischman and Schanzenback (2012: 9) noted that models that employ judicial 
downward departures as controls “are only measuring the impact of post-departure discretion on racial 
disparity,” such that “they fail to capture the impact of the primary channel by which Booker and RGK 
[Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough] affect sentences.”  
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analyses demonstrated a sharp and continuing escalation in incarceration severity 
(guidelines offense levels) in all cases processed in the post-Booker period.  
Several innovative research endeavors have attemtped to capture the relationship 
between legal actor’s discreiton and disparity after the inception of the advisoy guidelines 
era. Using judge-specific sentencing data from the Distirct of Massachusetts, Scott (2010) 
examined whether overall incarceration severity varied across judges in cases not bound by 
a mandatory minimum penalty. Consistent with the highly contested USSC (2010b) 
report, the study found that the average sentence increased from 15 months prior to 
Booker, to roughly 30 months following Booker, and to approximately 40 months 
following Gall. His innovative analysis also reported a “spike” in inter-judge disparity, as 
the average sentence length prior to Booker reflected between 25.9 months and 40 
months, whereas in the post-Gall reform era, three judges rendered sentences that 
averaged 25.5 months and two judges rendered sentences that averaged 51.4 months 
(Scott, 2010: 25). On the contrary, and more recently, Kim, Cano, Kim, and Spohn 
(forthcoming) found that in addition to varying significantly across federal districts and 
across guidelines reforms, average sentence lengths were substantially lower in light of 
the Booker and Gall Court rulings. Moreover, they found that sentence severity was 
shaped by districts’ social-environmental characteristics in cases adjudicated subsequent 
to the Gall decision, in that an increase in districts’ level of socioeconomic disadvantage 
and percent Black population was associated with a more lenient sentence. 
Some argue—as is discussed in-depth in the introductory chapter of this study—
that the conclusions garnered by the new wave of sentencing reform impact studies, of 
which a large majority report stability or a decline in racial and ethnic disparities relative 
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to the practices in the past, may be attributable to marked variability in methodological 
design (Engen, 2009, 2011; Paternoster, 2011; Spohn, 2011). What has yet to be 
examined is whether immediate and gradual changes in unwarranted disparity stemming 
from prosecutors’ decisions are influenced by differences across reforms and across court 
jurisdictions. The next section shifts focus to the empirical literature on the 
organizational- and social-contextual contours of criminal court outcomes.    
Social Contexts of Sentencing and Substantial Assistance Downward Departures 
 
A speech delivered by former Attorney General Eric Holder (2009) condemned 
disparities under the federal guidelines and the mandatory minimum scheme following 
the transition to advisory guidelines, urging researchers to “assess whether current 
sentencing practices show an increase in unwarranted sentencing disparities based upon 
regional differences.” Social scientists indeed argue that beyond legal factors and within-
court variability, criminal punishment outcomes are characterized by courts’ unique 
organizational processes and surrounding social environment (e.g., Dixon, 1995; 
Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Eisenstein et al., 1988; Nardulli et al., 1988; Sampson and 
Lauritsen, 1997; Ulmer, 1997). Despite the absence of literature on contextual disparities 
post-U.S. v. Booker (2005) and post-Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) (see however, Farrell 
and Ward, 2011; Kim, Cano, Kim, and Spohn, forthcoming; Ulmer et al., 2011b), an 
enormous body of work highlights the influence local social context bears on sentencing 
outcomes in state courts (e.g., Britt, 2000; Crawford, Chiricos, and Kleck, 1998; Fearn, 
2005; Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Johnson, 2005; Myers and Talarico, 1987; Ulmer and 
Bradley, 2006; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Ulmer et al., 2007; Wang and Mears, 2010a, 
2010b; Wooldredge, 2007; Weidner, Frase, and Schultz, 2005; Wooldredge and 
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Thistlethwaite, 2004) and federal district courts to a lesser degree (Farrell and Ward, 
2011; Feldmeyer and Ulmer, 2011; Johnson, 2014; Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt, 2002; 
Kim et al., forthcoming; Ulmer et al., 2010, 2011b; Ward, Farrell, and Rousseau, 2009a, 
2009b). Furthermore, scholars have pointed out that explanations of sentencing 
disparities extend to inconsistencies across courtroom participants, especially between-
court actor variation among judges and prosecutors (Anderson and Spohn, 2010; 
Johnson, 2006; Kim, Spohn, and Hedberg, forthcoming; Scott, 2010; Spohn and 
Fornango, 2009, Wooldredge, 2010).  
The existing literature on extralegal disparity and the surrounding social contexts 
of state court jurisdictions has focused on several key decision points of criminal case 
processing—charging and charge reduction, presentence detention, and imprisonment 
decisions. Britt’s (2000) multilevel analysis of sentencing decisions in Pennsylvania 
courts revealed that an increase in the percent black population increased the likelihood 
of incarceration for all defendants. D’Alessio and Stolzenberg’s (2002) study of 12 urban 
court jurisdictions reported that presentence detention was conditioned by the level of 
unemployment, as the probability of confinement before trial was higher among 
unemployed defendants charged in cities with escalating rates of unemployment (see also 
Levin, 2008; Pinchevsky and Steiner, 2013). Johnson (2005) examined judicial 
departures in Pennsylvania rural and urban courts and found that the probability of a 
sentence discount was higher for defendants in counties with larger courts and caseloads, 
while increases in a county’s Hispanic population size reduced the likelihood of a 
sentence reduction. Ulmer, Kurlychek, and Kramer (2007) found that although 
mandatory sentence outcomes in Pennsylvania state courts were noticeably advantageous 
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toward White defendants, in general, mandatory minimum penalties were less likely for 
White and Black defendants processed in counties with higher Black populations. Wang 
and Mears’ (2010a) racial and ethnic threat study of felons convicted across 60 large 
urban counties found that counties’ percent Black population and level of Black political 
threat (i.e., Black-to-White voting ratio) were positively associated with receiving a 
prison sentence relative to a jail or non-custodial sentence. Inconsistent with the racial 
threat results, they found that increases in the percent Hispanic and Hispanic political 
threat (i.e., Hispanic-to-White voting ratio) led to a higher probability of receiving a jail 
sentence and a lower probability of a prison or non-custodial sentence (see also Wang 
and Mears, 2010b).  
Despite the recent availability of charging and imprisonment information for a 
large number of districts, coupled with new advances in contemporary theoretical and 
empirical research (e.g., multilevel modeling strategies), very little is known about the 
contextual effects of imprisonment decisions in U.S. District Courts (e.g., Hartley, 2008; 
Kautt, 2002; Spohn, 2005; Ulmer, 2005, 2012). We know relatively little about how the 
association between defendant and case characteristics and legal actors’ decisions is 
shaped by districts’ social environments (Ulmer, 2012). That said, there is some research 
that addresses this issue. For instance, Feldmeyer and Ulmer’s (2011) racial and ethnic 
threat analysis concluded that Hispanic defendants relative to similarly situated White 
defendants face longer imprisonment in districts with a smaller Hispanic population. 
Ward, Farrell, and Rousseau’s (2009a) examination of the effects of court workforce 
composition on disparity reported that the probability of imprisonment for Black 
defendants was lower in federal districts with a higher representation of Black 
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prosecutors, and, to a lesser extent, Black judges (see also Ward et al., 2009b). More 
recently, a comprehensive investigation of charging decisions across federal district 
courts by Johnson (2014) reported that although increases in districts’ caseload pressure 
reduced the odds of having charges declined by AUSAs, increases in the size of 
prosecutors’ workforce and the level of socioeconomic disadvantage led to higher odds of 
initial charges never being filed. With respect to charge reductions, he found that 
increases in districts’ caseload pressure and size of prosecutors’ workforce increased the 
probability of having pending charges lowered. Furthermore, the analyses showed that 
charge reductions were less likely in districts with larger Black populations and higher 
crime rates.    
A considerably smaller but highly relevant collection of empirical work has 
assessed inter-district variation in AUSAs’ motions for substantial assistance downward 
departures. Nagel and Schulhofer’s (1992) notable analysis uncovered that the standards 
used to evaluate what the government qualified as “substantial assistance”—based on 
cooperation in the form of information or testimony among other non-legal 
considerations such as defendants’ who appeared as “deserving” of a downward 
departure—varied significantly across the three federal districts observed in their study. 
For instance, deviation from the guidelines by means of substantial assistance in two 
districts more than doubled the national average, whereas the rate of sentence discounts 
in the third district closely reflected the national average (Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992: 
553).   
Investigations conducted by government institutions have produced support for 
Nagel and Schulhofer’s (1992) conclusions concerning jurisdictional variation (General 
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Accounting Office, 1993, 2003; USSC, 2004, 2006, 2011). An early study by the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (1993) reported that, similar to the imposition of mandatory 
minimum penalties, AUSAs’ circumvention of recommended sentences for defendants 
who provide substantial assistance fluctuated across federal districts, in that the 
requirements that triggered a motion for substantial assistance departures were 
characterized as “stringent” in some districts but “liberal” in other districts. To illustrate, 
defendants in the Central District of California were compelled to provide the court 
“assistance” that encompassed an admission of guilt, testimony, or information leading to 
the apprehension of other offenders, whereas substantial assistance granted in the 
Southern District of New York required minimal effort (see also, U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 2003). More recently, the USSC (2011a: 110-111) reported that 
substantial assistance sentence discounts from mandatory minimum penalties for similar 
types of cooperation with the government across districts ranged between 30 percent and 
50 percent below the prescribed guidelines’ recommendation, suggesting that, “there 
appears to be no nationwide Department of Justice practice concerning the extent of the 
reduction that should be recommended for any particular type of cooperation.” 
A closely related literature has investigated the social contexts of substantial 
assistance downward departures more extensively (Hartley, 2008; Johnson, Ulmer, and 
Kramer, 2008; Maxfield and Kramer, 1998; Spohn, 2005; Spohn and Fornango, 2009; 
Weinstein, 1999; Wu and Spohn, 2010; see also Johnson, 2005). Few assessments, 
however, have fully examined variability across federal districts, instead accounting for 
contextual differences simply as a control measure (e.g., Albonetti, 1997; Steffensmeier 
and Demuth, 2000). Among the limited systematic investigations of inter-district 
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variation in downward departures, Spohn’s (2005) study of three federal districts situated 
in the Midwest—Nebraska, Minnesota, and Southern Iowa—found that the probability of 
a substantial assistance departure was higher among defendants convicted in the district 
of Southern Iowa relative to the other two districts. This led Spohn (2005: 23) to 
articulate that, “Members of the courtroom workgroups in Minnesota and Nebraska have 
established different—that is, more generous—standards for rewarding defendants who 
provide this type of assistance.” Further analyses confirmed that, independent of legal 
and extralegal factors, defendants in Nebraska and Minnesota were granted sentence 
discounts roughly 20 months shorter when compared to sentence discounts granted in the 
District of Southern Iowa. In a parallel line of research, when cases were specifically 
parsed out by district, Wu and Spohn (2010) found that that substantial assistance relief 
was less likely for defendants convicted in the district of Minnesota than defendants 
convicted in the districts of Nebraska and Southern Iowa.   
A mixed-methods approach undertaken by Ulmer (2005) looked at downward 
departures across four federal districts diverse in court size and geographic location 
(Northeast, Midwest, Southern, and Western). When compared to the other two districts 
in the South and West, substantial assistance departures were more prevalent in the two 
federal districts situated in the Northeast and Midwest regions. Moreover, interviews with 
attorneys from the two districts where substantial assistance departures were widespread, 
the Northeast district in particular, revealed a relaxed court environment where guidelines 
departures for provident substantial assistance were awarded for information of 
“questionable value” (Ulmer, 2005: 263). Substantial assistance relief in the Southern and 
Western districts, however, was quite uncommon. Although prosecutors in the Western 
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district subjected defendants to risky situations leading to information on drug 
distribution networks, prosecutors in the Southern district evaded filing motions for 
substantial assistance altogether. 
By and large, assessments of the social contexts of substantial assistance 
downward departures have generally examined decisions across a small number of 
federal districts (e.g., Cano and Spohn, 2012; Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992; Ortiz and 
Spohn, 2014; Wu and Spohn, 2010), and have not tested the direct or indirect influence of 
contextual-level predictors on prosecutor-controlled departures beyond that of district-to-
district comparisons (e.g., Hartley et al., 2007). In a recent development in the research, 
Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer’s (2008) multilevel analysis of guidelines departures across 
all U.S. federal districts found that whereas an increase in the district’s caseload pressure 
and racial and ethnic minority composition heightened the probability of a substantial 
assistance departure, an increase in the district’s court size (captured by the number of 
judges) and crime rate heightened the magnitude of the sentence discount. Moreover, 
cross-level interaction models revealed that an increase in districts’ percent Hispanic 
population reduced the probability of substantial assistance relief for Hispanic defendants 
relative to White defendants, leading to the conclusion that, “The legal contours of 
federal sentencing, therefore, are likely to be shaped by district-specific social 
environments” (Johnson et al., 2008: 767; see also Ulmer et al., 2011b). Lastly, a 
breakthrough study by Spohn and Fornango (2009) examined inter-prosecutor variation 
in Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ decisions to seek substantial assistance downward departures 
across three federal district courts and found that motions for substantial assistance varied 
significantly across prosecutors. Although most of the variation in sentence discounts was 
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explained by legal factors, the findings showed that prosecutors did not conform to 
“identical views of the circumstances that justify a substantial assistance departure” 
(Spohn and Fornango, 2009: 835). These works imply that independent of case and 
defendant considerations, criminal punishment outcomes are influenced by court 
jurisdictions’ organizational and structural characteristics.  
Collectively, empirical examinations of Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ administration 
of substantial assistance motions across defendants, legal structures, sentencing reforms, 
and court jurisdictions offer compelling evidence of nonuniformity in the federal criminal 
punishment process. Chapter 3 elaborates on the theoretical explanations of prosecutors’ 
decision making, as well as the research propositions that frame this study.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
Although legal case factors such as offense severity and criminal history 
characterize the bulk of the variation captured in punishment outcomes (Blumstein et al., 
1983; Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1987; Mitchell, 2005; Pratt, 1998; Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 
2000), contemporary theoretical perspectives argue that harsher treatment of minority 
defendants stems from legal actors’ negative attributions or stereotypes of criminal 
responsibility and dangerousness (Albonetti, 1986, 1991; Albonetti and Hepburn, 1996; 
Bridges and Steen, 1998; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998; Spohn and Holleran, 
2000). Beyond defendant-based characteristics as the key causal mechanism for 
extralegal disparities in criminal punishments, a separate line of theoretical propositions 
asserts that outcomes vary across legal jurisdictions, and that decision makers’ 
assessments of culpability and public safety are tied to considerations of case processing 
efficiency (Dixon, 1995; Engen and Steen, 2000; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Ulmer, 
1997), racial and ethnic group threat (Bridges and Crutchfield, 1988; Britt, 2000; 
Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz, 2004; Fearn, 2005; Feldmeyer and Ulmer, 2011; Wang and 
Mears, 2010a, 2010b), and criminal threat (Bontranger, Bales, and Chiricos, 2005; 
Quillian and Pager, 2001). Taken together, these perspectives inform us on the impact 
that race and ethnicity exert on sentencing decisions within and between court domains—
at the individual level and at the organizational and community level.   
Substantially less theoretical and empirical attention, however, has been devoted 
to investigating potential shifts in the disparate treatment of defendants in wake of 
sentencing policy reforms—principally, disparity derived from prosecutors’ decisions. 
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The sentencing reform literature has explicitly focused on the trajectory of extralegal 
effects on a reform-to-reform or year-to-year basis, potentially overlooking a smaller 
window of extralegal disparities in punishment outcomes. Moreover, in most research, 
theoretical explanations of the relationship between race and ethnicity and federal 
sentencing outcomes have not been demarcated by type of punishment scheme (i.e., 
federal guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes). Recently, Peterson (2012:308) 
reiterated her early appeal to researchers to “examine racial differences in sentencing in 
ways that take into account the varying meanings attached to race across settings and 
overtime” (see also Myers, 1989; Peterson and Hagan, 1984).   
Chapter 3 develops the theoretical framework and research propositions that will 
be tested in this study. The remainder of the chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first section is designed to explain anticipated changes in AUSAs’ substantial assistance 
departures motions in the short term and long term in the aftermath of Booker v. U.S. 
(2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007). Emphasis is also drawn to the qualitative 
differences between guidelines cases and mandatory minimum cases. In the same 
context, the next section discusses theories based on the intersection of defendants’ race 
and ethnicity with recent sentencing reforms to explain change in AUSAs’ motions for 
substantial assistance departures. The final framework focuses on the effects of social 
context on criminal punishments, especially the influence of federal districts’ minority 
population, crime rate, and caseload pressure on AUSAs’ substantial assistance motions. 
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ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEYS’ DECISION MAKING ACROSS REFORMS 
 
Criminal punishment in the federal criminal justice system, in theory, reflects a 
uniform scheme of policies and statutes. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory 
minimum statutes, then, embody formalized legal rationality to the extent that decisions 
are based exclusively on legal case considerations, not concerns for the root causes of 
criminal behavior and the collateral consequences of imprisonment (Engen and Steen, 
2000: 1361; Stith and Cabranes, 1998). In modern society, however, formal rationality is 
subverted by substantive rationality (Ulmer and Kramer, 1996), in that the determinate 
sentencing approach is “systematically related to the sociostructural, cultural, and 
organizational forces that are the bases for substantial rationalization” (Savelsberg, 1992: 
1364). The federal criminal process by its very nature—that is, the availability of a wide 
range of guidelines penalties for similarly situated defendants, sentence adjustments, 
downward departures, and innovations in sentencing policies—stands at odds with 
uniformity and consistency, and instead embodies a system that conforms to complexity, 
resource constraints, and local and cultural norms.   
As discussed in previous chapters, empirical evaluations of the existence of 
extralegal disparities subsequent to the establishment of presumptive guidelines in 
Minnesota and Ohio came to somewhat different conclusions. Although the extralegal 
disparity observed under Minnesota’s rigid guidelines scheme fluctuated over time, the 
reduction in disparity under Ohio’s less-structured guidelines scheme assumed a long-
enduring, stable effect. An explanation for this glaring contrast implies that legal actors 
might respond more favorably—with less disparate treatment of defendants and certain 
types of cases—to a less-restrictive punishment scheme (Wooldredge, 2009; see, 
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however, Bushway and Piehl, 2007). For instance, Wooldredge, Griffin, and 
Rauschenberg’s (2005: 862) study on the legal and extralegal effects of charging and 
imprisonment outcomes before and immediately after Ohio’s transition from presumptive 
to advisory guidelines stressed that “decision making processes are somewhat resilient to 
formal change, at least when a certain level of discretion in decisionmaking is retained.” 
Wooldredge and colleagues’ (2005) interpretation of their findings may resonate well 
with federal judges as demonstrated in the literature that essentially shows enhanced 
uniformity in imprisonment outcomes after the guidelines’ advisory status, but this is 
certainly not the case for Assistant U.S. Attorneys.  
As the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Booker (2005) “liberated” judges 
from the federal guidelines, a succession of legal directives, notably the rulings in Gall v. 
U.S. (2007) and Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007), repeatedly affirmed and further broadened 
judges’ discretion to deviate from the guidelines. What is more, although AUSAs’ 
discretionary power in cases carrying mandatory minimum charges remained untouched, 
the case law allowed judges to deviate from standing charges during the sentencing phase 
and significantly constrained prosecutors’ discretion to initiate appellate review of 
sentences falling outside of the guidelines range. At the same time, the U.S. Department 
of Justice’s highly-centralized regime (Eisenstein, 2007; Richman, 2008) emphasized a 
“pretend nothing happened” (Richman, 2008: 1394) orientation, thus directing federal 
prosecuting attorneys to exercise and preserve adherence to the federal guidelines 
scheme. In fact, then-U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales (2005: 324) stressed that 
the new advisory guidelines system “threatens the progress we [U.S. Department of 
Justice] have made in ensuring tough and fair sentences for federal offenders.”  
77 
 
The wave of legal contingencies that ultimately led to the downfall of the federal 
guidelines structure and federal prosecutors’ diminished authority in those respective 
cases, coupled with the Department of Justice’s defiant stance against the guidelines’ 
advisory status, may have led AUSAs to respond by executing greater control over cases 
under their complete control—statutory mandatory minimum cases in which in most 
circumstances charges may only be circumvented by motions for a substantial assistance 
downward departure. Then, federal prosecutors’ loss of discretion and perceptions of 
heightened judicial freedom and leniency for defendants might have been exacerbated in 
the post-Booker era, potentially leading to a disruption in the granting of downward 
departures for providing substantial assistance. In a related argument, AUSAs may have 
reacted even more aggressively following Gall and Kimbrough relative to the Booker 
decision, as these legal mandates placed broader limitations on their charging and 
appellate authority in guidelines cases—thus being more reluctant to file motions for 
substantial assistance departures.   
Taken together, in each of the contexts discussed above, based on the theoretical 
expectations and empirical evidence, it is expected that federal prosecuting attorneys will 
attempt to maintain a strong grasp on their discretionary power, which will become more 
enhanced as greater restrictions are placed on their authority. The following research 
hypotheses are derived to test these theoretical expectations:   
Hypothesis 1a: AUSAs will be less likely to file motions for substantial assistance 
downward departures, immediately and in the long term in cases sentenced after 
U.S. v. Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007). 
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Hypothesis 1b: Changes in AUSAs’ use of substantial assistance departures will 
be conditioned by the time period. The reduction in AUSAs’ likelihood of filing 
motions for substantial assistance downward departures will be greater in cases 
sentenced after Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) than cases sentenced after U.S. v. 
Booker (2005), immediately and in the long term. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Changes in AUSAs’ use of substantial assistance departures will 
be conditioned by the type of case. The reduction in AUSAs’ likelihood of filing 
motions for substantial assistance downward departures will be greater in 
mandatory minimum cases than federal guidelines cases, immediately and in the 
long term after U.S. v. Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007).  
 
 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
DECISION MAKING  
 
Causal explanations of unwarranted disparities in criminal case processing within 
court jurisdictions have emerged from several social psychological and organizational 
perspectives. Theoretical positions on extralegal inconsistencies in charging practices 
focus on prosecuting attorneys who exercise unfettered discretion in most situations and 
prioritize managing uncertainty (Albonetti, 1986; Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977). This is an 
especially important concern in the federal justice system. Because Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys, like the majority of state prosecuting attorneys, do not enjoy lifetime tenure, 
assessments of their performance and accountability are, for the most part, based on 
records of case processing efficiency, criminal convictions, and organizational 
expectations, which may exert a more significant role when prosecutors have political 
aspirations (Kessler and Piehl, 1997; O’Neill Shermer and Johnson, 2010; Ulmer, 2012). 
Consistent with the “hydraulic displacement” effect, some scholars argue that whereas 
extralegal variation in jurisdictions with rigid presumptive guidelines is most pronounced 
during the entry stages of criminal case processing, extralegal variation in jurisdictions 
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with less-restrictive, advisory guidelines schemes will be most likely present at the 
imprisonment phase (e.g., Bushway and Piehl, 2007; Wooldredge, 2009).  
Uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution theory posits that courtroom actors rarely 
possess the information and resources to make accurate, rational predictions of 
defendants’ culpability, criminality, and future criminal involvement. As a result, these 
decision makers, including those who are focused on securing convictions, face great 
uncertainty (Albonetti, 1987, 1991; see also Albonetti and Hepburn, 1996; Bridges and 
Steen, 1998; Farrell and Holmes, 1991; Kramer and Ulmer, 2002). Decision makers then 
seek rationality by developing “patterned responses” (March and Simon, 1958); these 
responses are founded and framed on a limited search for “‘satisficing’ rather than 
optimizing solutions” (Albonetti, 1991: 249). In light of the dearth of information on 
defendants’ criminality and relative harm to the community gathered under time 
constraints, courtroom actors develop a “perceptual shorthand” (Hawkins, 1981), which 
is bounded by stereotypes that tap into defendants’ personal characteristics like race and 
ethnicity (Bridges and Steen, 1998; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Streifel, 1993). As a 
response to organizational constraints, courtroom participants “resort to stereotypes of 
deviance and dangerousness that rest on considerations of race, ethnicity, gender, age, 
and unemployment” (Spohn and Holleran, 2000: 301).    
Premised on Albonetti’s (1991) causal attribution framework, Steffensmeier, 
Ulmer, and Kramer (1998) suggest that the discretion of legal actors is embedded in three 
focal concerns of punishment—defendants’ blameworthiness, a desire to protect 
community safety, and concerns about the practical constraints and social costs of 
punishment. Blameworthiness reflects the defendant’s culpability in relation to the 
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offense severity and criminal history, whereas concerns for public safety determine 
whether incapacitation reduces threat to victims, witnesses, and members of the 
community. Concerns for practical constraints and the social costs of legal actors’ 
decisions reflect the justice system’s resources, such as court caseload pressure and jail 
overcrowding, and the potential effects of imprisonment on defendants’ personal well 
being and familial ties. Extensive research supports Steffensmeier et al.’s (1998) 
conclusion that prosecutors, judges, and other court officials initially draw on legally 
relevant case factors but their focal concerns are eventually complemented by extralegal 
considerations directly and indirectly related to race and ethnicity, which in turn 
contribute to unwarranted punishment disparities (e.g., Chiricos and Bales, 1991; 
Demuth, 2003; Doerner and Demuth, 2009; Huebner and Bynum, 2008; Kaiser and 
Spohn, 2014; Spohn and Holleran, 2000, 2001).  
The legal and criminological literature on criminal prosecution confirms the 
salience of the three focal concerns in the charging process and the decision to 
circumvent the federal guidelines and statutory minimums. For instance, there is support 
for the arguments that to preserve court resources, promote efficiency, or simply secure a 
conviction, AUSAs collaborate with judges to invoke substantial assistance downward 
departures as leverage to induce guilty pleas (Bibas, 2004; Cano and Spohn, 2012; 
Schulhofer and Nagel, 1989). This is important as defendants facing mandatory 
minimums, long criticized for being unduly harsh (Mauer, 2006; Schulhofer, 1992; 
Schwarzer, 1992), in particular for drug offenses, may exhibit a “nothing to lose” 
position, having little incentive to waive their right to trial. Prosecuting attorneys’ access 
to motions for assistance and charge reductions in general take the form of a “bargaining 
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chip in the plea-bargaining process” (Stith and Cabranes, 1998: 130). In this context, 
racial and ethnic disparities are linked to the fact that substantial assistance motions are 
granted as a result of plea negotiations, a process in which minority defendants are more 
reluctant and overall less likely to engage (Lee and Derdowski, 1998: 84; see also 
Kramer and Steffensmeier, 1993).  
At the same time, downward departures for providing assistance may be 
situational, that is, used to evade federal guidelines and mandatory sentences for 
“deserving” defendants who elicit sympathy from federal prosecutors (Nagel and 
Schulhofer, 1992; see also Albonetti, 2002; Cano and Spohn, 2012; Schulhofer and 
Nagel, 1997; Spohn and Fornango, 2009), being more prevalent in “drug cases in which 
guidelines sentences are anchored by mandatory minimum sentence levels” (Nagel and 
Schulhofer, 1992: 535; Hartley et al., 2007; Kautt and Spohn, 2002). Although 
prosecutors ultimately circumvent mandatory sentences perceived as excessively harsh or 
unfair in a large portion of cases, penalty reductions are applied selectively and are 
considerably disadvantageous toward Black and Hispanic defendants (Albonetti, 2002; 
Cano and Spohn, 2012; Stacey and Spohn, 2006; see also Ulmer et al., 2007).  
The extent to which federal prosecutors’ decision making is racially neutral may 
be defendants’ racial and ethnic minority group membership. According to several legal 
scholars, public discourse and social perceptions define African Americans and Hispanics 
in a negative light which permeates the criminal justice system (e.g., Kennedy, 1997; 
Tonry, 2011). Considerations for taming case processing uncertainty lead prosecuting 
attorneys to apply stereotypes that illustrate African Americans as more threatening and 
dangerous than other groups and thus convey a public perception that “Blackness and 
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criminality are inextricably related” (Welch, 2007: 280, see also Mauer, 1999; Russell-
Brown, 2009). For instance, judges and prosecutors’ distinctions between dangerous 
offenders and non-threatening offenders single out Black defendants for harsher penalties 
relative to their Hispanic and non-Hispanic White counterparts with similar criminal 
backgrounds (Spohn, 2008; Spohn and Sample, 2008; Tonry, 2011; see, however, Steen, 
Engen, and Gainey, 2005).   
Aside from the theoretical work that is focused on African American criminal 
stereotypes, research theorizes that Hispanics are perceived as irresponsible, more 
culpable, and prone to violence (Hagan, Levi, and Dinovitzer, 2008; Martinez, 2002; 
Martinez and Lee, 2000; Massey, 2007; Wolfe, Pyrooz, and Spohn, 2011), which 
becomes elevated for those of immigrant status (Light, Massoglia, and King, 2014; 
Ousey and Kubrin, 2009; Wang, 2012). Similar arguments suggest that Hispanics elicit 
far greater perceptions of fear and dangerousness as they are associated with the war on 
drugs and identified as “a drain on their communities, and a threat to a way of life many 
believe to be under siege” (Mata and Herrerias, 2006: 151; Portillos, 2006). Important to 
this line of reasoning is the notion that negative ethnic perceptions may be propelled by 
the escalating presence of Hispanics in the U.S. (see Demuth, 2003; Feldmeyer and 
Ulmer, 2011). Compared with other minority groups, the Hispanic population has 
undergone enormous growth from 1970 through the 1990s (Pew Center, 2005), a 
development that is projected to triple by 2050 (Passel and Cohn, 2008). In the late 
1980s, Wilson (1987: 35) wrote, “The rapid growth of the urban Hispanic population, 
accompanied by the opposite trend for the urban black population, could contribute 
significantly to different outcomes for these two groups in the next several decades.” This 
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dramatic transformation may have enhanced unfavorable judgments of Hispanics in 
contrast to other minority groups facing criminal prosecution. Indeed, the weight of 
evidence suggests that charging and imprisonment decisions are notably punitive for 
Hispanic defendants (e.g., Demuth, 2003; Demuth and Steffensmeier, 2004; Spohn and 
Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000, 2001; Ulmer et al., 2007), emphasizing 
that, “The behavior of Hispanic defendants may be perceived as more dissimilar and 
threatening than the behavior of White and Black defendants and hence most deserving 
of punishment” (Demuth, 2003: 901).  
Building from the first set of theoretical predictions, the approach taken in this 
dissertation assumes that federal prosecutors will be more reluctant to engage in 
substantial assistance motions in mandatory minimum cases after the Booker and 
Kimbrough/Gall decisions. It is anticipated, however, that sentence reductions for 
substantial assistance will produce racial and ethnic disparities, and greater race effects 
will be masked unless federal guidelines and statutory minimum cases are examined 
separately. These predictions are assessed with the following theoretical expectations:  
Hypothesis 2a: Changes in AUSAs’ use of substantial assistance departures will 
be conditioned by the race and ethnicity of the defendant. The reduction in 
AUSAs’ likelihood of filing motions for substantial assistance downward 
departures will be greater for Black and Hispanic defendants than for White 
defendants, immediately and in the long term after U.S. v. Booker (2005) and 
Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007). 
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Hypothesis 2b: Changes in AUSAs’ use of substantial assistance departures will 
be conditioned by the race and ethnicity of the defendant and time period. The 
reduction in AUSAs’ likelihood of filing motions for substantial assistance 
downward departures experienced by minority defendants relative to White 
defendants will be greater in cases sentenced after Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) 
than cases sentenced after U.S. v. Booker (2005), immediately and in the long 
term. 
 
Hypothesis 2c: Changes in AUSAs’ use of substantial assistance departures will 
be conditioned by the race and ethnicity of the defendant and the type of case. The 
reduction in AUSAs’ likelihood of filing motions for substantial assistance 
downward departures experienced by minority defendants relative to White 
defendants will be greater in mandatory minimum cases than  in mandatory 
minimum cases, immediately and in the long term after U.S. v. Booker (2005) and 
Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007). 
 
 
CONTEXTUAL VARIATION IN ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEYS’ DECISION 
MAKING 
 
Beyond theoretical perspectives related to extralegal disparities within court 
jurisdictions, there is reason to anticipate inter-district variation in federal prosecutors’ 
discretion amid the punishment policy reforms. Central to this argument is the notion that 
the focal concerns emphasized by decision makers are situational from an organizational 
stance, thus prioritized and formed by substantive rationality at the localized level 
(Savelsberg, 1992; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). As Ulmer and 
Johnson (2004: 142) noted, “Reliance on the three concerns is said to be universal, but 
the meaning, emphasis and interpretation of them is local.”  
Proponents of the “courts as communities” perspective articulate that sentencing 
decisions and outcomes correspond to a manifestation of values and perceptions 
emphasized by key players in the courtroom workgroup and court community (Eisenstein 
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and Jacob, 1977; Eisenstein, Flemming, and Nardulli 1988). In contrast to resembling an 
adversarial process, court organizations’ overarching goal of case processing efficiency 
(Dixon, 1995; Engen and Steen, 2000) is achieved by engendering relationships that 
reflect a “subculture of cooperation” between judges, defense attorneys and prosecutors 
(Bowen, 2009: 15). Accordingly, charges and sentences meted out in criminal courts 
translate into “going rates” (Rosett and Cressey, 1976; Feeley, 1979; Sudnow, 1965) that 
conform to “normal” crimes, victims, and defendants (Sudnow, 1965: 260; see also Hill, 
Harris, and Miller, 1985; Swigert and Farrell, 1977). The case processing approach is 
echoed by Eisenstein and Jacob’s (1977: 297) influential assertion that: 
Courtroom organizations seek to control uncertainty; they all claim to be pursuing 
the goals of justice and efficient disposition of cases…Each is influenced by 
techniques as its disposal and each depends on sponsoring organizations. Each 
responds to a task environment that includes the police, prisons, appellate courts, 
local legislative bodies, and the media. 
 
Federal district courts then are interpreted as “social worlds” or “segmented 
subworlds within the large community” (Ulmer, 1997: 26) where rationality in decision 
making is influenced by court organizational forces such as caseload pressure, court size, 
and trial rate (Britt, 2000; Fearn, 2005; Johnson, 2006; Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt, 2002; 
Ulmer, 1997; Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2004).  
Independent of the focal concerns underscored in the legal decision making 
process, conflict and minority threat theories contend that the etiology of discriminatory 
punishment outcomes is not situated at the individual level but instead reflects a 
collective process shaped by “the definition of the respective positions of racial groups” 
(Blumer, 1958: 5; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Racial and ethnic disparities in the 
86 
 
adjudication process emanate from a class-based structure where a threatened dominant 
group exerts power over a subordinate group (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Quinney, 
1970; Spitzer, 1975; Turk, 1966). Blalock’s (1967) elaboration of minority threat 
theory—in the form of political and economic threat—argues that an increase in 
“competition” and “power” threat among the minority group (i.e., racial and ethnic 
minorities) prompts enhanced measures of social control from the dominant group (see 
also Liska, 1992; Stults and Baumer, 2007). More specifically, as members of the 
disadvantaged group achieve higher status, captured by entrance to the primary labor 
market, political ascendency, and elevated spending potential, the elite group will revert 
to the criminal justice system to employ punitive punishment mechanisms to reestablish 
the previous social order—in this study’s context, a greater reluctance from Assistant 
U.S. Attorneys to file substantial assistance motions for defendants from “threatening” 
minority groups. With these issues at mind, Kramer and Ulmer (2009: 89) suggest that 
formal social control functions under a “racialized social system” in which minorities 
face enhanced punishment under a regime in which “Racially motivated behavior, 
whether or not the actors are conscious of it, is regarded as ‘rational’” (Bonilla-Silva, 
1997: 475). The extant research on the minority threat perspective has uncovered that 
imprisonment decisions are associated with court jurisdictions’ proportion of minorities 
(e.g., Bridges and Crutchfield, 1988; Myers and Talarico, 1987; Quillian and Pager, 
2001; Wang and Mears, 2010a, 2010b), socioeconomic disadvantage (e.g., Bridges and 
Crutchfield, 1988; Britt, 2000; Jacobs and Kleban, 2003), crime rates (Crawford et al., 
1998), and political contexts (e.g., Jacobs and Carmichael, 2002; Kim, Cano, Kim, and 
Spohn, forthcoming).   
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The primary theoretical focus of this study is on race and ethnicity effects in the 
aftermath of the sentencing policy reforms at the individual and time level. Thus, the 
following theoretical propositions are derived to control for inter-district variation in 
general, and the influence of well-established, contextual-level predictors of charging and 
imprisonment outcomes:    
Hypothesis 3a: The likelihood that AUSAs will file motions for substantial 
assistance downward departures will vary significantly across time periods 
(months) and across federal district courts. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The likelihood that AUSAs will file motions for substantial 
assistance downward departures will be lower in districts with a higher proportion 
of Blacks and Hispanics, elevated crime rates, reduced caseload pressure, larger 
courts, higher levels socioeconomic disadvantage, and a higher magnitude of 
political conservatism.    
 
As previously mentioned the key objective of this study is to contribute to the 
courts and sentencing literature by investigating the relationship between punishment 
policy reforms and unwarranted disparities. This objective is accomplished by examining 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ discretion in motions for downward departures for substantial 
assistance at the defendant level, looking at the short-term and long-term effects in the 
post-reform era, and across punishment settings (i.e., federal guidelines and statutory 
mandatory minimums). Chapter 4 proceeds to a discussion on the data, measures, and 
analytic plan that will test the aforementioned theoretical propositions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
This chapter lays out the data and methods carried out in this study. The first part 
of the chapter discusses the numerous sources of the multilevel data employed in the 
study, as well as a discussion on the deletion of certain cases and issues with missing 
information. The next section provides a detailed discussion of the outcome measure and 
individual-level, time-level, and district-level measures used in the multilevel study. The 
following section specifies the analytic strategy used to test the research hypotheses. The 
final section of the chapter includes an outline of the diagnostic tests and specific 
statistical analyses that will be performed.  
 
DATA 
 
The research hypotheses in this study are tested using individual-level punishment 
data that are then merged with time-sensitive and district-level contextual measures. The 
punishment data to be analyzed come from the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s (USSC) 
Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences Offender Datafile. The data include 465,476 
convicted criminal cases in 89 U.S. District Courts during fiscal years 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, which is delineated by 117 months.11 The 
                                                          
11 Although the original sentencing data set consisted of 709,646 cases, concerns encompassing theoretical 
relevance, conceptual clarity, and missing information warranted the exclusion of cases from the study. 
First, given this study’s explicit focus on AUSAs’ circumvention of imprisonment terms from the federal 
guidelines and mandatory minimums, cases from guidelines’ cells where the presumptive sentence 
stipulates a non-custodial sanction or zero months of incarceration (i.e., Zone A) were removed (see 
Johnson et al., 2008; Spohn, Kim, Belenko, and Brennan, 2014). Second, cases sentenced during the first 
quarter of FY2001, from October 1, 2000 through December 31, 2000, were excluded from the analyses to 
account for a temporal order issue associated with the measure for districts’ crime rate (N = 11,768), which 
is discussed in the section on time-level predictors. Third, because of missing information and marked 
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data set consists of all White, Black, and Hispanic defendants convicted of non-
immigration offenses in federal district courts between January 1, 2001 and September 
30, 2010. The USSC data are highly suitable for this study as they provide in-depth 
information on key defendant- and case-prescribed factors, for example, the legal 
outcome of each case and defendants’ primary offense, criminal history, recommended 
sentence under the federal guidelines, gender, age, U.S. citizenship status, and race and 
ethnicity (see Feldmeyer and Ulmer, 2011; Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt, 2002; 
Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000). An additional strength is that the USSC data cover 
punishment practices over extensive periods of time and all federal districts. This allows 
a comprehensive investigation of the immediate and enduring effects of unwarranted 
disparities in Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ decision making in the aftermath of sentencing 
reforms, while accounting for the punishment setting.  
The study also examines the effects of time, organizational characteristics, and 
structural characteristics on AUSAs’ substantial assistance departures decisions. Thus, 
data gathered from supplementary sources are used to compile control measures beyond 
                                                                                                                                                                             
differences in case processing and legal authority relative to the other 89 federal districts, cases from the 
District of Columbia, Guam, Marianna Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which account for 
slightly less than 2 percent of convictions, were omitted from the study (N = 13,522). Fourth, the complex, 
legal nature of immigration cases precludes an accurate assessment of AUSAs’ use of substantial assistance 
departures and unwarranted disparity in these types of cases. Despite representing one quarter of all 
convictions, immigration cases comprise less than two percent of motions for substantial assistance relief, 
as fast track departures may be more common in these types of cases. Furthermore, Hispanic defendants 
account for 88 percent of immigration cases. As a result, cases that involve immigration offenses are 
excluded from the analyses (N = 179,036). Finally, even though contemporary research on sentencing 
disparities has expanded focus to Asian (Johnson and Betsinger, 2009; Kutateladze et al., 2014) and Native 
American defendants (Everett and Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Franklin, 2013), cases where defendants’ race and 
ethnicity is identified as other than White, Black, or non-White Hispanic account for less than 4 percent of 
federal convictions and are thus not analyzed in the study (N = 25,955). 
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the defendant level, at the second and third levels of analysis—that is, across time epochs 
and federal district courts. Predictors at the time level (level 2), which is captured in 
months, are computed by extracting data from the USSC data set and the Uniform Crime 
Reports (UCR). In addition to using data from the USSC and the National Judicial 
Center, contextual measures at the district level of analysis (level 3)—county-based 
measures aggregated to federal districts—are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau and the 
County Characteristics, 2000-2007 data set from the Interuniversity Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR).  
Issues concerning selection bias emerge as not all defendants facing criminal 
charges were convicted and thus faced the probability of being granted a substantial 
assistance downward departure (see Berk, 1983). Because the USSC data files exclude 
cases that do not result in a conviction, this study only examined criminal cases where 
defendants who faced prosecution were convicted and subsequently sentenced. For this 
reason, this study is unable to control for sample selection bias. There is, however, a 
minimal threat of biased estimates in the analyses. In general, convictions were obtained 
in over 90 percent of criminal cases processed in federal district courts (Administrative 
Office of the U.S Courts, 2007, 2008, 2009). What is more, it has been recommended that 
researchers proceed with caution when controlling for sample selection bias, in that the 
inclusion of a correction term may produce unstable standard errors and may introduce 
collinearity between predictors and the correction term, particularly in models with 
dichotomous case processing outcome measures (Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum 2007; 
Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997).  
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Missing values for key individual-level predictors in the current analyses present 
a probable threat to the generalizability of findings. Thus, missing values are addressed 
using listwise deletion for several reasons. First, the extant multilevel analyses that 
employed federal sentencing data have addressed missing values by implementing an 
alternative coding scheme or listwise deletion (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt, 2002; 
Spohn and Fornango, 2009). Second, in relation to the dependent variable, only 11,595 
cases or 2.5 percent of the convicted population had missing information on defendants’ 
substantial assistance downward departure status. In fact, the highest incidence of absent 
values among the independent variables was observed in the predictor that captured 
defendants’ dependents status, missing only 13,846 cases or 3 percent of the population. 
Second, data imputation is not a suitable solution because values may not be missing at 
random (MAR) but rather an artifact of time-level or district-level characteristics, 
although missing values appear to be well distributed across time periods and districts. As 
Allison (2001: 7) had argued, “Logistic regression with listwise deletion is problematic 
only when the probability of any missing data depends on both the dependent and 
independent variables. 
 
EMPIRICAL MEASURES 
 
Dependent Variable  
 
In line with Blumstein et al. (1983:273-274) and Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode’s 
(1982) call to differentiate between sentence type and sentence magnitude outcomes, 
comprehensive reviews of the sentencing literature have uncovered that in some 
jurisdictions and punishment contexts, unwarranted sentencing disparities are more 
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pronounced in imprisonment outcomes when compared to imprisonment severity 
outcomes (Chiricos and Crawford; 1995; Spohn, 2000; Ulmer et al., 2011b; Zatz, 2000; 
see also Baumer, 2012). This conclusion is also echoed in contemporary research on the 
probability and magnitude of substantial assistance departures, in that male minorities 
face harsher treatment in AUSAs’ decision to grant a downward departure relative to the 
degree of the sentence discount (Cano and Spohn, 2012; Maxfield and Kramer, 1998). 
Thus, this study examines a single dependent variable—a binary outcome measure that 
captures whether the defendant received a substantial assistance downward departure (1 = 
yes, 0 = no). 
Defendant-Level and Case-Level Variables  
 
At the individual level, using data compiled by the USSC, a series of defendant- 
and case-prescribed characteristics considered long-established, robust predictors of 
federal sentencing outcomes are incorporated into the analyses. A measure for gender 
determines whether the defendant is female (1 = yes, 0 = no). A predictor for race and 
ethnicity makes a distinction between a defendant being White (1 = yes, 0 = no), Black (1 
= yes, 0 = no), or non-White Hispanic (1 = yes, 0 = no), with White serving as the 
reference category. Citizenship status is captured using a dummy measure for U.S. 
citizenship (1 = yes, 0 = no). A continuous measure for age accounts for the defendant’s 
age at the time of the offense. A dummy variable for dependent status reflects whether 
the defendant is financially supporting dependents (1 = yes, 0 = no). A control for 
education status indicates whether the defendant has an education (1 = yes, 0 = no). To 
ensure parsimony, measures for this variable distinguish between defendants without a 
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high school diploma or equivalent and those having a high school diploma or equivalent 
or any type of college attendance or college completion (see Johnson et al., 2008).   
With respect to case-prescribed factors at the individual level, the presumptive 
sentence is a continuous measure that depicts the sentence recommended under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines (and mandatory minimum statute). The presumptive sentence is 
compiled by calculating defendants’ offense severity (1 to 43 points) and criminal history 
score (1 to 6 points), taking into consideration sentencing provisions or adjustments that 
may trump the federal guidelines such as “acceptance of responsibility” or a statutory 
mandatory minimum (see Engen and Gainey, 2000). Presumptive sentences with 
sanctions beyond 470 months were capped at 470 months to capture a “more accurate” 
measure of imprisonment in relation to life expectancy (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
2010). Diagnostics tests revealed that the presumptive sentence measure was highly and 
positively skewed. Therefore, a natural log transformation was employed to approximate 
a normal distribution (skewness = -1.727; Kennedy, 2003). Beyond comprising a major 
component of the recommended sentence, the defendant’s criminal history score, 
calculated by a six-point scale ranging from 1 to 6 in severity, is used to capture any 
effects the score may exert beyond the presumptive sentence (see Johnson et al., 2008; 
Ulmer et al., 2010).12 The criminal history score was adjusted to account for statutory 
sentencing enhancements such as the application of “career offender” status.  
In addition to the USSC’s recommended sentence and criminal history, other legal 
characteristics have emerged as strong predictors of federal punishment outcomes. A 
                                                          
12 Measures for the presumptive sentence and criminal history score were moderately correlated with one 
another (r = .344), significantly below the recommended threshold of .70 (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2012). 
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measure for the primary type of offense is reflected in a series of dummy measures that 
include a drug-related offense (1 = yes, 0 = no), violent offense (1 = yes, 0 = no), firearm 
offense (1 = yes, 0 = no), fraud or white-collar offense (1 = yes, 0 = no), and other 
offense (1 = yes, 0 = no), with drug offense representing the reference category.13 A 
dichotomous measure indicates whether the defendant entered a plea or exercised the 
right to trial (1 = plea, 0 = trial). A dummy measure for counts reflects whether the 
offender is facing only one charge (1 = yes, 0 = no). The defendant’s presentence 
detention status prior to conviction is captured by a dummy indicator (1 = detained, 0 = 
released).  
Time-Level and District-Level Measures  
 
As discussed throughout the study, the punishment literature has by and large 
suggested that court jurisdictions’ organizational and social contours influence legal 
decision making. For this reason, contextual predictors are incorporated at the second and 
third levels of the multilevel analyses. In addition to the time-sensitive predictors that 
attempt to capture discontinuities in elevation and slope (i.e., immediate and gradual 
shifts) in the trajectory of substantial assistance departures following the U.S. v. Booker 
and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. decisions (discussed in detail in the analytic strategy 
section), two time-varying measures are included at the second level (months) of the 
three-level model. A control for changes in the case processing rate is generated using 
data from the USSC (e.g., Dixon, 1995; Johnson, 2005). A measure for case rate is 
computed as the average number of cases processed in a district court for a given quarter 
                                                          
13 Cases in the “other” category include property, regulatory, or traffic offenses that triggered federal 
charges and a federal conviction.    
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(3 months), divided by the number of active judges, and then divided by 10 for ease of 
interpretation (Johnson, 2005). A measure for crime rate determines whether changes in 
the prevalence of crime might influence federal prosecutors’ level of concern for public 
safety and thus their decision making (e.g., Britt, 2000; Crawford et al., 1998). Using 
county-level data extracted from the UCR and merged to federal districts, crime rate is an 
annual rate captured by the total number of index crimes per 1,000 citizens.  
A series of time-invariant, established predictors of federal charging and 
imprisonment decisions are included as control measures at the district level or third level 
of analysis. A predictor for court size is accounted for by the number of authorized 
judgeships in each federal district (Johnson et al., 2008). Control measures for minority 
threat capture the size of the Black and Hispanic population (Fearn, 2005; Feldmeyer and 
Ulmer, 2011; Wang and Mears, 2010a, 2010b). County-based data from the 2000 
decennial census are aggregated to the district level to compile measures for percent 
Black and percent Hispanic.14 Data from the 2000 decennial census are also utilized to 
compute a predictor for economic disadvantage (Bridges and Crutchfield, 1988; 
Rodriguez, 2007). A measure for disadvantage is calculated using a standardized factor 
score derived from four well-established, highly-correlated indicators of disadvantage: 
percent female-headed families with children, male unemployment rate, poverty rate, and 
percent of people without a high school diploma or equivalent (Eigenvalue = 2.867, 
Factor loadings: minimum = .722 and maximum = .929, α = .85). An indicator for federal 
districts’ magnitude of political conservatism (e.g., Jacobs and Carmichael, 2002; Kim et 
                                                          
14 An indicator for whether the district was situated alongside the Mexican border was included to account 
for regional differences. The measure for border district was subsequently removed due extremely high 
collinearity with the measure for percent Hispanic (greater than .8).   
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al., forthcoming) is compiled from county-level data which represents the percentage of 
votes for George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential election (ICPSR, 2007).15 For a 
meaningful interpretation of results, all of the time-level and district-level variables were 
standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Bivariate associations 
calculated for defendants’ race/ethnicity and all time-level (level 2) and district-level 
(level 3) contextual measures, separated by the type of case (all cases, guidelines cases, 
and mandatory minimum cases), are presented in Table 1A, Table 1B, and Table 1C.16 
The analytic strategy proposed in this study is discussed in the following section. 
 
                                                          
15 Diagnostics tests of variance inflation factors (VIF) and condition indices for all time-level and district-
level predictors demonstrated appropriate levels of collinearity (Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 
2003:423-424).  
16 In regard to harmful collinearity, the highest bivariate association emerged between the district-level 
measures of case rate and percent Hispanic (all cases, r = .68, p < .01; guidelines cases, r = .68, p < .01; 
mandatory minimum cases, r = .69, p < .69), slightly below the recommended threshold.  
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X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9
X1     Black Defendant ___
X2     Hispanic Defendant -.44** ___
X3     Case Rate -.22** .37** ___
X4     Crime Rate .03** .02** -.11** ___
X5     Court Size -.06** .24** .07** .09** ___
X6     Percent Black     .25** -.16** -.18** .15** -.02** ___
X7     Percent Hispanic -.27** .44** .68** .07** .52** -.25** ___
X8     Disadvantage -.05** .14** .44** .12** -.08** .38** .38** ___
X9     Conservatism -.05** .02** .29** -.11** -.38** -.16** -.01** .21** ___
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9
X1     Black Defendant ___
X2     Hispanic Defendant -.37** ___
X3     Case Rate -.21** .44** ___
X4     Crime Rate .02** .02** -.11** ___
X5     Court Size -.04** .22** .06** .08** ___
X6     Percent Black     .24** -.15** -.18** .15** -.04** ___
X7     Percent Hispanic -.24** .48** .68** .07** .51** -.26** ___
X8     Disadvantage -.05** .19** .44** .11** -.12** .38** .36** ___
X9     Conservatism -.05** .04** .29** -.11** -.38** -.15** -.01 .23** ___
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9
X1     Black Defendant ___
X2     Hispanic Defendant -.58** ___
X3     Case Rate -.23** .27** ___
X4     Crime Rate .04** .02** -.12** ___
X5     Court Size -.09** .28** .07** .11** ___
X6     Percent Black     .28** -.19** -.18** .16** .01** ___
X7     Percent Hispanic -.30** .41** .69** .07** .53** -.23** ___
X8     Disadvantage -.04** .07** .44** .14** -.01** .38** .42** ___
X9     Conservatism -.06** -.02** .28** -.11** -.40** -.18** -.02** .18** ___
                 Guidelines Cases
                 Mandatory Minimum Cases
Table 1A. Correlation Matrix, Key Defendant-Level, Time-Level, and District-Level Variables,   
Table 1B. Correlation Matrix, Key Defendant-Level, Time-Level, and District-Level Variables,   
Note: Bivariate associations (Pearson's r ); p  < .01 
                 All Cases
Note: Bivariate associations (Pearson's r ); p  < .01 
Note: Bivariate associations (Pearson's r ); p  < .01 
Table 1C. Correlation Matrix, Key Defendant-Level, Time-Level, and District-Level Variables,   
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ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
This study examines sudden and enduring effects in the trajectory of federal 
prosecutors’ decision making in wake of recent legal developments in punishment 
policies. Accordingly, multilevel discontinuity regression models are estimated to explore 
immediate shifts (elevation) and long-term effects (slope) in AUSAs’ motions for a 
substantial assistance downward departure following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions 
in U.S. v. Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) (Singer and Willett, 2003; 
see also Melde and Esbensen, 2013; for discussion on discontinuity regression modeling, 
see Berk, 2010). Moreover, Singer and Willett’s (2003: 206-208) discontinuity estimation 
approach allows investigators to account for “breaks” or discontinuities in elevation and 
slope in discrete epochs and at common points in time. Thus, this method is used to 
investigate the abrupt and subsequent impact of both Booker and Gall/Kimbrough on the 
substantial assistance departure outcomes. As illustrated in Figure 3, the analyses employ 
a three-level multilevel structure, with cases nested within time and federal district courts 
(see DiPrete and Grusky, 1990; Xie, Lauristen, and Heimer, 2012).17  
                                                          
17 Hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLM), the modeling strategy employed in this study, are 
ideally suited when compared to a traditional single level logistic regression modeling strategy 
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Using a hierarchical modeling structure accounts for the underestimation of 
standard errors of regression coefficients stemming from a lack of dependence in the data—in the proposed 
analyses specifically, the clustering of substantial assistance departure outcomes with the corresponding 
time (months) and district. This is to be expected as the analyses employ repeated cross-sectional data that 
extend across extensive periods of time and many districts, increasing the likelihood of similarities between 
individual cases processed at close epochs of time and within the same district. In addition, a multilevel 
approach corrects for the misestimation of error terms, producing more robust standard errors by 
“incorporating into the statistical model a unique random effect for each organizational unit” (Raudenbush 
and Bryk, 2002:100). Furthermore, a hierarchal linear strategy models heterogeneity in regression 
coefficients. As Raudenbush and Bryk (2002:100) noted, researchers are enabled to “estimate a separate set 
of regression coefficients for each organizational unit, and then to model variation among the organizations 
in their sets of coefficients.” A unique random effect therefore is included in the model for each time point 
and district.  
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Figure 3. Multilevel Hierarchical Nature of Sentencing Data 
 
Aside from leading to no change in the trajectory, discontinuities in AUSAs’ 
substantial assistance departure decisions in the wake of the High Court’s decisions in 
Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough (2007) may be associated with the following 
outcomes (see Singer and Willett, 2003: 193-194): An immediate shift in elevation and 
slope would imply that the likelihood of a substantial assistance departure abruptly 
changed in wake of the Booker decision and its slope in the pre-Booker and post-Booker 
epochs varies. An immediate shift in elevation but not in slope would suggest an abrupt 
change in the likelihood of a substantial assistance departure and no difference in its 
slope in the pre-Booker and post-Booker epochs. Lastly, an immediate shift in slope but 
not in elevation suggests the likelihood of a substantial assistance departure was constant 
upon the Booker decision and a distinction in its slope in the pre-Booker and post-Booker 
epochs. In this context, the analyses in this study separately capture the elevation of the 
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Booker and Gall/Kimbrough decisions and slope of each of the following four legal 
punishment policy reform eras: 
Pre-PROTECT Act of 2003 (January 2001 to March, 2003)  
PROTECT Act of 2003 (April 2003 to December 2004) 
U.S. v. Booker (January 2005 to November 2007) 
Kimbrough/Gall v. U.S. (December 2007 to September 2010)18 
 
Parameters for discontinuities in each of the sentencing reform eras are specified at the 
time level of analysis. 
To address the research hypotheses associated with simple change in the 
likelihood of motions for substantial assistance (Hypotheses 1a., 1b., and 1c.), the 
baseline model takes the following form: 
Yitj = β0tj + β1X itj  
 
where at the individual level or level 1, Yitj is the average log odds of a substantial 
assistance downward departure associated with case i, at time t, in district j. β0tj in this 
equation is the intercept, and Xitj denotes the defendant and case variables at time t, in 
district j. The model at the time level or level 2, captured in months, is denoted as: 
β0tj = π0j + π1jBooker1tj + π2jGall/Kimbrough1tj + π3jBooker2tj +  
π4jGall/Kimbrough2tj + π5j(Ztj) + rtj 
 
where β0tj accounts for the log odds of a AUSA filing a motion for a substantial assistance 
departure, Booker1 and Gall/Kimbrough1 capture discontinuities in elevation in the first 
month of each Court decision and Booker2 and Gall/Kimbrough2 capture discontinuities 
in slope of AUSAs’ likelihood of filing motions for substantial assistance at time t, in 
                                                          
18 Because of their theoretical and methodological relevance, and consistent with the recent empirical 
literature on the impact of U.S. v. Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) on federal sentencing 
outcomes, the pre-PROTECT and post-PROTECT Act periods serve only as control measures. 
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district j. Ztj represents the time-varying predictors at time t, in district j. rtj in this 
equation is the random effect for time and district, assumed to be normally distributed 
with means of zero and variances of σ2μ and σ2v. The district-level or level 3 model is 
denoted as: 
π0j = γ00 + γ01j(Wj) + u0j    
 
where Wj represents the time-invariant predictors associated with district j. u0j in this 
equation is the random effect for time and district, assumed to be normally distributed 
with means of zero and variances of σ2μ and σ2v.  
Research hypotheses associated with the trajectory of racial/ethnic disparities in 
the likelihood of motions for substantial assistance (Hypotheses 2a., 2b., and 2c.) are 
investigated by the estimating the following three-level model: 
Yitj = β0tj + β1Blackitj + β2Hispanicitj + β3Xitj 
 
where at level 1 or at the case level of analysis, Yitj represents the average log odds of a 
substantial assistance downward departure associated with case i, at time t, in district j. 
β0tj in this equation is the intercept. Explanatory variables of theoretical interest account 
for defendants’ race/ethnicity (Black, Hispanic), and Xitj represents parameters for a 
vector of defendant and case variables at time t, in district j. The model at the time level 
or level 2 is denoted as: 
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β0tj = π0j + π1jBooker1tj + π2jGall/Kimbrough1tj + π3jBooker2tj +  
π4jGall/Kimbrough2tj + π5j(Booker1tj x Blackitj) + π6j(Gall/Kimbrough1tj x 
Blackitj) + π7j(Booker2tj x Blackitj) + π8j(Gall/Kimbrough2tj x Blackitj) + 
π9j(Booker1tj x Hispanicitj) + π10j(Gall/Kimbrough1tj x Hispanicitj) + 
π11j(Booker2tj x Hispanicitj) + π12j(Gall/Kimbrough2tj x Hispanicitj) + 
π13j(Ztj) + rtj 
 
where β0tj accounts for the average likelihood of a substantial assistance departure. 
Beyond identifying discontinuities in elevation in the first month and slope of the High 
Court’s decisions in Booker and Gall/Kimbrough, this equation includes parameters that 
capture the intersectionality of defendants’ race/ethnicity with discontinuities in elevation 
(Booker1 x Black, Booker1 x Hispanic, Gall/Kimbrough1 x Black, Gall/Kimbrough1 x 
Hispanic) and slope (Booker2 x Black, Booker2 x Hispanic, Gall/Kimbrough2 x Black, 
Gall/Kimbrough2 x Hispanic) in the trajectory of AUSAs’ motions for substantial 
assistance departures at time t, in district j. Ztj represents time-varying predictors at time t, 
in district j. rtj in this equation is the random effect for time and district, assumed to be 
normally distributed with means of zero and variances of σ2μ and σ2v. The district-level or 
level 3 model takes the form: 
π0j = γ00 + γ01j (Wj) + u0j    
 
where Wj denotes a vector of time-invariant predictors in district j. u0j in this equation is 
the random effect for time and district, assumed to be normally distributed with means of 
zero and variances of σ2μ and σ2v. All predictors are centered at their grand means to 
approximate a better interpretation of the intercept, and the intercept is allowed to vary 
across districts (Raudenbush and Byrk, 2002). The HLM 7.0 software (Raudenbush, 
Bryk, Cheong, and Congdon, 2011) is used for all analyses, and all models are estimated 
with robust standard errors. The next section discusses the specific analyses performed in 
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this dissertation.   
 
PLAN OF ANALYSES 
 
This study proceeds with the following series of analytic techniques. First, 
descriptive statistics are presented for empirical measures at all three levels of analysis. 
Four sets of multilevel discontinuity regressions with random effects for defendants’ 
race/ethnicity are estimated. The first set of models estimates the likelihood of a 
substantial assistance departure by only including defendant and case predictors at the 
individual-level. To address the first series of research hypotheses (Hypotheses 1a., 1b., 
and 1c.), the second set of models looks at abrupt and long-term effects in the likelihood 
of substantial assistance departures in the post-Booker and post-Gall/Kimbrough eras. 
These models include predictors at the individual level of analysis and time-varying 
predictors at the second level of analysis that capture the elevation and slope of the 
Booker and Gall decisions. Measures for elevation and slope of Booker and 
Gall/Kimbrough are allowed to vary across federal districts in these and all subsequent 
models. In the third set, which addresses the second series of research hypotheses 
(Hypotheses 2a., 2b., and 2c.), cross-level interactions models are estimated to determine 
whether the immediate and long-term effects of Booker and Gall/Kimbrough on AUSAs’ 
substantial assistance departure decisions, if observed, are conditioned by defendants’ 
race/ethnicity. The final set of models, examining the final series of research hypotheses 
(Hypotheses 3a. and 3b.), introduces time-varying and time-invariant organizational and 
social contextual measures at the second and third levels of analysis. Unconditional 
models are estimated to predict the probability of a substantial assistance downward 
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departure across months and across federal districts. This final set of models does not 
capture change, as only the effects of social and organizational context on AUSAs’ 
motions for substantial assistance departures are examined. Lastly, a series of 
supplementary models that account for variation in substantial assistance departures 
across U.S. Courts of Appeal are estimated. All analyses are performed separately in 
models that include all cases, guidelines cases, and mandatory minimum cases. The next 
chapter turns to a discussion of the results.     
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESULTS 
 
This dissertation’s primary research objective is to evaluate whether the High 
Court’s decisions in U.S. v. Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) altered 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ motions for substantial assistance downward departures, with a 
particular focus on determining whether the decisions result in changes in unwarranted 
disparities, controlling for the punishment setting and organizational and social contexts. 
First, descriptive statistics are compared for all cases, guidelines cases, and mandatory 
minimum cases. Next, the predicted probabilities of receiving a substantial assistance 
departure are presented. Then, the effects of case-level variables on AUSAs’ motions for 
substantial assistance are assessed. Drawing from the theoretical predictions, this study 
investigates change in substantial assistance relief for defendants after Booker and 
Kimbrough. Similarly, this study examines the trajectory of racial and ethnic disparities 
in substantial assistance departures decisions post-Booker and post-Gall/Kimbrough. 
Finally, analyses that control for inter-district variation and the influence of time-level 
and district-level variables on federal prosecutors’ substantial assistance decisions.   
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
 The distribution of all case-level, time-level, and district-level variables—
demarcated by the guidelines and mandatory minimum punishment schemes—is 
presented in Table 2. The descriptive statistics show that slightly less than one-fifth of 
defendants are granted a downward departure from an Assistant U.S. Attorney for 
providing substantial assistance to the government. The results also reveal that the use of 
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substantial assistance departures varies considerably across the type of cases, as 13.5 
percent of defendants in guidelines cases and 28.5 percent of defendants in mandatory 
minimum cases receive a sentence discount. In terms of defendant characteristics, fifteen 
percent of defendants are female, although the distribution is higher in guidelines cases 
(18.5 percent) when compared to mandatory minimum cases (9.4 percent). Most 
defendants convicted in federal district courts are White (38.8 percent), followed by 
Black (31.8 percent) and Hispanic (29.4 percent) defendants. When cases are partitioned 
by the sentencing scheme, the representation of White defendants (46 percent) in 
guidelines cases substantially increases, and Hispanic defendants emerge as the leading 
racial/ethnic group facing a mandatory minimum sentence (37.4 percent). The average 
age of defendants at the time of the offense is 35 years, which, for the most part, is 
consistent between defendants facing punishment under the guidelines or mandatory 
minimum statutes. Twenty percent of defendants are non-U.S. citizens, but the 
percentage of noncitizens is somewhat lower in guidelines cases (16.3 percent) and is 
elevated in mandatory minimum cases (26 percent). Approximately two-thirds of 
defendants in all cases and guidelines cases have dependents, with the number slightly 
higher for defendants facing a mandatory sentence (66.3 percent). Two-fifths of 
defendants do not have at least a high school education or equivalent, whereas roughly 
one-third of defendants in the guidelines group and approximately half of defendants in 
the mandatory sentence group do not have a high school education.  
In relation to case characteristics, the presumptive sentence is 71.67 logged 
months for all defendants, 35.52 logged months for defendants in guidelines cases, and 
131.01 logged months for defendants in mandatory minimum cases. As expected, there 
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are notable differences in the presumptive sentence between types of cases, as offenses 
that trigger a mandatory minimum carry substantially higher penalties than offenses that 
trigger punishment under the guidelines. It is important to note that because of natural log 
transformation and sentences capped at 470 months, the measure of presumptive sentence 
is relatively conservative. Alternatively, the criminal history score is similar among all 
types of cases, with a mean of 2.37 in all cases, 2.28 in guideline cases, and 2.52 in 
mandatory minimum cases. Investigation of cases by the type of offense reveals immense 
variation between drug offenses and fraud and white-collar offenses. That is, cases 
involving a drug offense comprise roughly half of all cases and nearly one-third of 
guidelines cases but comprise more than four-fifths of mandatory minimum cases. On the 
other hand, cases involving a fraud or white-collar offense comprise four-fifths of all 
cases, roughly one-third of guidelines cases, and less than 2 percent of mandatory 
minimum cases. An overwhelming majority of defendants in all cases and both 
punishment schemes entered a guilty plea, thus waiving the right to a trial—ninety-five 
percent of all defendants, 96 percent of defendants in guidelines cases, and 93.5 percent 
of defendants in mandatory minimum cases. More than 70 percent of defendants facing 
charges under both the guidelines and a statutory minimum were facing one count. The 
results reveal that compared to all defendants (65.1 percent) and guidelines defendants 
(54.8 percent), a large majority of mandatory minimum defendants (81.7 percent) are 
held in presentence detention prior to conviction. Descriptive statistics for the contextual 
variables are introduced in the bottom half of Table 2.19 Turning to the time-varying 
                                                          
19 Only descriptive statistics from the model that includes all cases are discussed in the section on time-
level and district-level covariates, as the means were virtually similar in all three groups—all cases, 
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predictors at level 2, the measure for case rate has an overall average of 3.93 cases filed 
in each district, which varies between .27 cases and 17.7 cases. The mean crime rate is 
25.29 index crimes per 1,000 citizens, which ranges between a low rate of .76 and a high 
rate of 83.18. With respect to district-level predictors at level 3, the indicator for court 
size shows an average of 11 judges in each district, varying from 1 active judge to 28 
active judges. Measures for racial and ethnic threat also uncover notable variation across 
districts. Whereas the measure for percent Black population has a mean of 9.3 percent 
that ranges from .15 percent to 44.8 percent, the distribution of percent Hispanic is even 
higher, averaging 13 percent and ranging from .53 percent to 49.6 percent. Although it is 
not easily interpreted because it is comprised of four constructs (percent female-headed 
families with children, male unemployment rate, property rate, and percent of people 
without a high school diploma), the magnitude of districts’ concentrated disadvantage 
fluctuates from -1.97 to 2.33. With a mean of 57.1 percent, the level of political 
conservatism varies considerably between districts, with the percentage of votes for 
George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential election ranging from 34.6 percent to 77.5 
percent. The next section advances to a discussion of the hierarchical generalized linear 
models estimated with theoretically relevant and robust individual-level predictors of 
AUSAs’ motions for substantial assistance departures.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
guidelines cases, and mandatory minimum cases. Complete statistics for all three groups of cases are 
presented in Table 2. 
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Figure 4. Predicted Probabilities of Receiving a Substantial Assistance Depature, All 
    Cases 
 
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES 
 
The predicted probabilities of being granted a substantial assistance departure 
from an AUSA across months, which capture discontinuities in the elevation and slope in 
the wake of U.S. v. Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007), are presented in 
Figure 4. The figure implies that the overall likelihood of substantial assistance varies 
considerably over time, and is particularly influenced by the High Court’s rulings in U.S. 
v. Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007). That is, the probability of a 
downward departure substantially declines in the first month after the Booker decision. A 
gradual decline in the probability of substantial assistance is observed in the months in 
the post-Booker period. On the contrary, the overall likelihood AUSAs’ use of substantial 
assistance downward departures slightly increases the first month following the 
Gall/Kimbrough decisions, but then demonstrates a modest decline in the long term. 
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Overall, the figure suggests that the abrupt and long-term shifts in AUSAs’ substantial 
assistance decisions are far greater in the Booker period.        
 
CASE-LEVEL EFFECTS 
 
Table 3 provides results related to the three-level hierarchical generalized linear 
models (HGLMs) estimated with individual-level variables. Given the salience of 
defendant and case characteristics in predicting substantial assistance departure outcomes 
(e.g., Cano and Spohn, 2012; Hartley et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2008; Spohn and 
Fornango, 2009), an exploratory investigation of case–level effects is warranted.20 The 
results are consistent with the empirical literature on federal sentencing outcomes, as all 
defendant characteristics and the majority of case characteristics are associated with the 
odds of a substantial assistance departure. Whereas female defendants are 51 percent 
more likely to receive a substantial assistance departure, the odds are less likely for Black 
and Hispanic defendants relative to White defendants (.79 times as likely and .75 times as 
likely, respectively).21 The probability of substantial assistance relief is higher for 
defendants with dependents but is significantly lower for defendants who are older, are 
non-U.S. citizens, and have no high school education. Inspection of the case 
characteristics reveals that although a higher presumptive sentence slightly increases the  
                                                          
20 Because results from the models estimated with case-level variables only were relatively similar across 
both guidelines and mandatory minimum schemes, the discussion of effects is limited to the model 
estimated with all cases. Complete results for all three groups of cases are presented in Table 3. 
21 In these exploratory three-level models, the slopes of Black (all cases, s2 = .20, SD = .45, χ2 = 9627.50; 
guidelines cases, s2 = .27, SD = .52, χ2 = 6882.30; mandatory minimum cases, s2 = .26, SD = .51, χ2 = 
6606.86) and Hispanic (all cases, s2 = .23, SD = .48, χ2 = 10505.45; guidelines cases, s2 = .35, SD = .59, χ2 
= 7116.81; mandatory minimum cases, s2 = .26, SD = .51, χ2 = 7361.54) varied significantly across months 
at level 2. Thus, the slopes were allowed to vary across months in the current and all subsequent models. In 
addition, this provides an empirical foundation for the estimation of cross-level interactions to test whether 
the association between Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough (2007) and AUSAs’ substantial assistance 
decisions is conditioned by defendants’ race/ethnicity.  
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odds of substantial assistance, a higher criminal history score reduces the odds of 
substantial assistance. Defendants convicted of drug offenses are more likely to receive a 
downward departure than defendants convicted of any other offense, as drug defendants 
may be in a better position to provide relevant information to the government or may face 
more stringent penalties, which may elicit sympathy from federal prosecutors (see Nagel 
and Schulhofer, 1992). Plea status emerges as the strongest predictor, such that entering a 
guilty plea significantly increases the probability of substantial assistance relief. The 
probability of substantial assistance is lower for defendants in custody before trial or 
entering a guilty plea. The following section proceeds to the analyses of Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys’ decision making subsequent to changes in federal sentencing policies. 
 
CHANGE IN ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEYS’ DECISION MAKING 
 
 Turning to the results of primary interest, Table 4 presents the findings from 
multilevel discontinuity regression models that examine the effect of U.S. v. Booker 
(2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) on Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ motions for 
substantial assistance downward departures. Although the sentencing reforms are 
strongly associated with AUSUs’ decision making, part of the effects are in a direction 
contradictory to the study’s theoretical predictions. According to Hypothesis 1a, an 
immediate and gradual reduction is anticipated in AUSA’ use of substantial assistance 
departures after Booker and Gall/Kimbrough. The findings reveal an onset and enduring 
reduction in the trajectory of substantial assistance relief following the High Court’s 
decision in Booker. The model estimated with all cases shows a discontinuity in the 
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elevation, suggesting that substantial assistance departures are 11 percent less likely in 
the first month subsequent to the post-Booker period (b = -.11; SE = .04; OR = .89). A 
significant negative change is also observed in the slope, suggesting that the odds of 
substantial assistance are reduced by 1 percent each month after the first month following 
the Booker decision (b = -.02; SE = .00; OR = .99). Although the elevation and slope of 
AUSAs’ substantial assistance decisions in mandatory minimum cases are similar to 
patterns in the pre-Booker period, in the guidelines cases, there is an immediate reduction 
in substantial assistance relief of 13 percent during the first month post-Booker (b = -.14; 
SE = .04; OR = .87) and an enduring effect each month afterwards, averaging a 2 percent 
monthly reduction (b = -.02; SE = .00; OR = .98). The reduction in prosecutor-enacted 
downward departures is limited to criminal convictions in the U.S. v. Booker (2005) 
period (February 2005 to December 2007), garnering partial support for Hypothesis 1a.  
The results fail to demonstrate a greater immediate and long-term reduction in 
motions for substantial assistance in criminal convictions after the Gall/Kimbrough 
period (January 2007 to September 2010) when compared to criminal convictions in the 
Booker period. Contrary to expectations, the evidence does not provide support for 
Hypothesis 1b, predicting that the odds of substantial assistance would increase notably 
in the post-Gall/Kimbrough era. Although there is no discontinuity effect in the elevation 
following the ruling in Gall/Kimbrough, the slope in the model that includes all cases 
exerts statistical significance, as the odds of a substantial assistance departure are 
elevated by 1 percent each month following the first month post-Gall/Kimbrough (b = 
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.01; SE = .00; OR = 1.01). The effects of the Gall/Kimbrough decisions are more 
pronounced in guidelines cases, showing positive discontinuities in the elevation and 
slope, such that the odds of substantial assistance are 15 percent higher immediately after 
Gall/Kimbrough (b = .14; SE = .04; OR = 1.15) and 2 percent higher each subsequent 
month (b = .02; SE = .00; OR = 1.02).  
The analysis now focuses on Hypothesis 1c, which predicts a greater reduction in 
substantial assistance departures in mandatory minimum cases immediately and gradually 
post-Booker and post-Gall/Kimbrough. There is no support for Hypothesis 1c. As 
discussed above, the results provide compelling evidence that the trajectory of substantial 
assistance relief for defendants varies depending on the punishment scheme—guidelines 
cases and mandatory minimum cases. In fact, changes in federal prosecutors’ decision 
making subsequent to the Booker and Gall/Kimbrough decisions are limited to tests that 
include all cases and guidelines cases. Z-tests are calculated to determine whether the 
observed effects of Booker and Gall/Kimbrough on the likelihood of substantial 
assistance vary between all cases and guidelines cases (Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou, 
1995; Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and Piquero, 1998). Although coefficients that 
capture the elevation in Booker do not vary between models estimated with all cases and 
guidelines cases (Z =.53, p < .05), effects that capture the slope of Booker (Z = 2.36, p < 
.05) and the slope of Gall/Kimbrough (Z = -2.36, p < .05) significantly vary across both 
types of all cases and guidelines cases. In short, evidence shows that federal prosecutors 
are less likely to file motions for substantial assistance departures immediately and in the 
long term in the post-Booker period. Conversely, the greatest impact of the sentencing 
policy reforms observed is in the post-Gall/Kimbrough period, as federal prosecutors are  
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more likely to file motions for substantial assistance in the long term. This unexpected 
finding suggests that AUSAs may have reverted to their prior decision making patterns as 
it became evident that federal judges’ decisions, for the most part, were not altered by the  
Booker and Gall/Kimbrough decisions. Moreover, further analyses confirm that the 
punishment setting plays a major role in AUSAs’ decision making, as the effects of 
Booker and Gall/Kimbrough are confined to models that include all cases and guidelines 
cases. The following section advances to a series of cross-level interaction models that 
test the effects of defendants’ race/ethnicity on AUSAs’ substantial assistance decisions 
following the reform of federal sentencing policies.  
 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY EFFECTS 
 
The second avenue of particular interest is the extent to which the association 
between U.S. v. Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) and Assistant U.S 
Attorneys’ decisions in relation to substantial assistance departures are conditioned by 
defendants’ race/ethnicity. Findings from the multilevel discontinuity regression models 
estimated without district-level predictors are presented in Table 5.22 The effects of the 
elevation and slope of Booker and Gall/Kimbrough are very similar to the analyses that 
only examined change in AUSAs’ decision making. More importantly, results from the 
cross-level interactions are to a certain degree consistent with Hypothesis 2a, which 
                                                          
22 Inspection of the distribution of defendants’ race and ethncity across districts uncovered substantial 
variation, with convictions of Hispanic defendants virutally non-existant in a few districts. To ensure an 
accurate comparison beween racial and ethnic groups of defendants, supplementary models were estimated 
without 8 federal districts identified as having less than 6 percent of their caseloads comprised of Hispanic 
defendants: Middle District of Georigia, Southern District of Georgia, Middle District of Louisiana, 
Northern District of Mississippi, Western District of Pennsylvania, Western District of Tennessee, Northern 
District of West Virginia, and Southern District of West Virginia. Cross-level interaction effects in the 
supplementary analyses, however, remained relatively identical to those in the original interacton models. 
For this reason, only findings from the original models are reported.  
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anticipates that reductions in motions for substantial assistance will be greater, 
immediately and in the long term, for minority defendants convicted post-Booker and 
post-Gall/Kimbrough. A review of the interaction effects between the elevation and slope 
of Booker and defendants’ race/ethnicity indeed shows a reduction in substantial 
assistance for Hispanic defendants convicted in the post-Booker period. There is a lack of 
evidence to support Hypothesis 2b, as discontinuities in the immediate and enduring 
effects of motions for substantial assistance departures are only observed in cases 
convicted in the post-Booker period (February 2005 to December 2007). The 
conditioning effects of defendants’ race/ethnicity, however, are restricted to Hispanic 
defendants in cases facing a mandatory sentence, drawing considerable support for 
Hypothesis 2c. When compared to White defendants in mandatory minimum cases, the 
odds of substantial assistance for Hispanic defendants facing a mandatory sentence are 20 
percent less likely in the first month subsequent to the Booker decision (b = -.22; SE = 
.10; OR = .80) and 1 percent less likely each month after (b = -.01; SE = .01; OR = .99).  
The assessment of unwarranted disparities in AUSUs’ motions for substantial 
assistance uncovered significant effects in the Booker punishment time period beyond 
cases associated with all defendants and the federal guidelines. When the punishment 
setting is taken into consideration, the results indicate that racial/ethnic disparity is 
especially pronounced for Hispanics in mandatory minimum cases. As expected, the 
interaction tests specifically link the reduction in substantial assistance departure 
decisions immediately and in the long term after the Booker decision to Hispanic 
defendants. The next section proceeds to an investigation of variation between federal 
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districts and organizational- and social-contextual effects of substantial assistance 
departures.   
 
SOCIAL CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS 
  
Results from the three-level unconditional hierarchical generalized linear models 
(HGLMs) estimated without predictors are reported in Table 6. The results generate 
substantial support for Hypothesis 3a, demonstrating that AUSAs’ use of substantial 
assistance departure varies across time periods (months) and districts. The likelihood, 
however, differs depending on the type of case—all cases, guidelines cases, and 
mandatory minimum cases. The variance components for the outcome measure are 
statistically significant between months at level 2 (all cases, s2 = .09, χ2 = 16636.85; 
guidelines cases, s2 = .12, χ2 = 14063.95; mandatory minimum cases, s2 = .13, χ2 = 
14403.53) and between districts at level 3 (all cases, s2 = .30, χ2 = 9895.83; guidelines 
cases, s2 = .24, χ2 = 4991.79; mandatory minimum cases, s2 = .51, χ2 = 7862.83).  
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Predicated probabilities and estimates of the variability of receiving a substantial 
assistance departure were calculated (for equations, see Long, 1997: 50-51; see also 
Johnson et al., 2008: 759). In the model that includes all cases, the overall predicted 
probability of being granted a substantial assistance departure is 19 percent, which varies 
between 14 percent and 24 percent across two-thirds of months. Moreover, across two-
thirds of districts, the probability fluctuates between 12 percent and 28 percent. Thus, the 
average odds of substantial assistance are nearly three-fourths greater in at least one 
month and more than double in at least one district. Compared to the models with all 
cases and mandatory minimum cases, considerably less variability is observed in the 
model specified strictly with guidelines cases. The average likelihood of a substantial 
assistance departure is 12 percent, which varies across two-thirds of months by 9 percent 
to 17 percent and across two-thirds of districts by 8 percent to 19 percent. A greater 
average likelihood of substantial assistance and substantially higher variation is detected 
in cases associated with a mandatory minimum sentence. The estimated probability of a 
motion for substantial assistance in mandatory minimum cases is 29 percent, such that the 
standard deviation fluctuates between 22 percent and 36 percent between months and 17 
percent to 45 percent between districts. In fact, the odds of a sentence discount for 
cooperating with the government is approximately two-thirds greater in some months and 
roughly two and two-thirds higher in some districts. As expected, the variance 
components analyses, especially in the models restricted to mandatory minimum cases, 
provide evidence of variation across time periods and districts in federal prosecutors’ 
decisions related to substantial assistance downward departures.  
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As presented in Table 7, findings from the discontinuity regression models of the 
time-level and district-level effects on AUSAs’ substantial assistance departure decisions 
provide some support for Hypothesis 3b. Districts’ case rate is marginally associated with 
a substantial assistance downward depature. With the exception of the indicator for 
percent Hispanic at the district level, the likelihood of substantial asistance is related to 
time-varying predictors at level 2 rather than time-invariant predictors  at level 3. For 
instance, the probability of substantial assistance relief is more likely in districts with a 
higher case rate (all cases, b = .02; SE = .01; OR = 1.02; mandatory minimum cases, b = 
.03; SE = .01; OR = 1.03). Moreover, districts with a lower crime rate are the most likely 
to grant defendants substantial assistance departures (all cases b = -.01; SE = .00; OR = 
.99; guidelines cases, b = -.00; SE = .01; OR = .99; mandatory minimum cases, b = -.01; 
SE = .00; OR = .99). Whereas the other district-level predictors are not significant, 
support for ethnic threat emerges, as an increase in districts’ proportion of Hispanics 
reduces the likelihood of a downward departure for providing substantial assistance (b = -
.02; SE = .01; OR = .98).  
Because the High Court’s decisions in Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough (2007) 
settled constitutional inquiries between U.S. Courts of Appeals concerning the 
interpretation of the federal guidelines “advisory” status and the “reasonableness” 
doctrine in AUSAs’ appellate authority in sentences outside of the guidelines, variation 
across the 11 appellate circuits in which the 89 federal districts are situated may be 
present. An investigation of change and racial/ethnic effects in AUSAs’ substantial 
assistance departure decisions was conducted, controlling for the circuit in which the 
court is located. In Table 8, with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as the 
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reference category, the analysis reveals that marginal variation exists in substantial 
assistance decisions between federal circuits, and the change and interaction effects in the 
elevation and slope of Booker and Gall/Kimbrough are parallel to those reported in the 
models in Table 7. The results, however, show that when circuit courts are taken into 
account, the elevation effect of Booker in guidelines cases and the district-level predictor 
for percent Hispanic no longer exert statistical significance in the models estimated with 
a control The following chapter begins with a discussion of the research hypotheses and 
overall findings.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In the last three decades, arguably the most significant concerns spawned by 
determinate sentencing reforms in the federal criminal justice system comprise the 
unconstrained discretion rendered to Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) at all stages of 
the criminal process and the potential introduction of unwarranted punishment disparities. 
In fact, legislative reforms enacted during the 1980s paved the way for new domains of 
prosecutor-controlled practices beyond charging and plea bargaining decisions, such as 
the implementation of mandatory minimum penalties and substantial assistance 
downward departures. The proliferation of determinate sentencing reforms, coupled with 
the rise of unregulated prosecutorial discretion, may contribute to extralegal inequities, as 
decision makers seek avenues to circumvent severe penalties for certain defendants 
(Blumstein et al., 1983; Ulmer et al., 2007). An increasing number of legal and empirical 
investigations have indeed established that the federal guidelines (Albonetti, 1997; 
Everett and Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Stith and Cabranes, 1998; Tonry, 1996), and mandatory 
minimums to a greater extent (Mustard, 2001; Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992; USSC, 2004; 
2011a), characterize the foundation of unwarranted disparity in the federal criminal 
process. More importantly, extralegal disparity is especially pronounced in cases in 
which AUSAs invoke the substantial assistance downward departure to evade statutory 
mandatory minimums (Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2012; USSC, 2004, 2011a). In 
regard to the escalating power of the federal prosecutor, O’Neill Shermer and Johnson 
(2009: 2) recently argued that: 
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The initial decision to prosecute, determination of preliminary charges, charge 
reductions, and plea negotiations all precede final sentencing determinations and 
hold the potential to exert powerful influences on criminal punishments…these 
early case processing decisions are not controlled by the sentencing judge, but 
instead fall under the auspices of one of the most powerful and least-researched 
members of the federal courtroom workgroup-the U.S. Attorney.  
 
Punishment in the federal justice system has become muddled as a result of a 
series of legal contingencies, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in U.S. v. 
Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) that have transitioned and broadened 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ status from compulsory to advisory. These game-
changing legal contingencies restored the discretion that federal judges lost over the 
course of almost two decades (1987 to 2005). With the exception of mandatory minimum 
cases, the rulings from the High Court essentially restricted Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ 
discretion to legally challenge judicial decisions that deviate from the federal guidelines. 
Accordingly, contemporary research on the sentencing policy innovations has aimed to 
evaluate whether judges have in fact been liberated from the constraints imposed by the 
law and, as a result, have meted out sentences that depart from the guidelines; research 
has also focused on the extent to which extralegal sentencing disparities persist or have 
been altered in the post-reform era (e.g., Farrell and Ward, 2011; Kim, Cano, Kim, and 
Spohn, forthcoming; Scott, 2010; Starr and Rehavi, 2013; Ulmer et al., 2011a, 2011b; 
USSC, 2006, 2010b, 2012). The research conducted to date reveals that whereas 
disparities emerging from judges’ decisions were relatively static, showing no increase in 
extralegal disparities post-Booker and post-Gall/Kimbrough, prosecuting attorneys’ 
substantial assistance departures comprise the lion’s share of racial and ethnic disparities 
in criminal convictions subsequent to the Booker and Gall/Kimbrough decisions, 
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considerably disadvantaging Black and Hispanic male defendants (Ulmer et al., 2011a, 
2011b; Ulmer and Light, 2010).  
Although a new wave of studies has placed emphasis on the effects of Booker and 
Gall/Kimbrough in the criminal processes, the focus is primarily on judges’ decision 
making, virtually ignoring scientific inquiries into punishment outcomes related to 
federal prosecutors (Engen, 2009). Moreover, relatively little is known about the long-
term effects of change and racial/ethnic disparities associated with sentencing decisions 
in the post-reform era, especially in the federal justice system (Starr and Rehavi, 2013: 
see also Koons-Witt, 2002; Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 1994 Wooldredge, 2009). In 
addition, assessments of the effects of Booker and Gall/Kimbrough have aggregated all 
cases into one analysis, ignoring the qualitative differences between cases guided by the 
federal guidelines and statutory mandatory minimums, particularly variation in the 
motives for circumvention that characterizes each type of case (Anderson et al., 1999; 
Engen. 2009; Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992; Schulhofer and Nagel, 1997). This concern is 
echoed by Engen’s (2009:330) call that:  
Research should also test whether prosecutors have more control when cases are 
subject to mandatory minimums, under presumptive versus voluntary guidelines, 
or under a variety of other conditions. Each of these predictions rests on the 
assumption that discretionary charging decisions (reductions or enhancements) 
affect sentences indirectly because they change the presumptive/recommended 
disposition choices and sentence ranges that limit what judges can do. 
 
Also, empirical research on the federal policy reforms that controls for variability across 
districts and tests whether federal sentencing outcomes are shaped by organizational and 
social characteristics at the contextual level is relatively limited (e.g., Farrell and Ward, 
2011; Kim, Cano, Kim, and Spohn, forthcoming).  
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the trajectory and 
conceptualization of race and ethnicity in punishment outcomes in relation to sentencing 
structure, moving beyond traditional pre-guideline and post-guideline assessments. 
Specifically, this study analyzed the short-term and long-term effects of U.S. v. Booker 
(2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) and defendants’ race/ethnicity on AUSAs’ use 
of substantial assistance departures, accounting for the punishment setting—sentences 
marked by the guidelines scheme and mandatory minimums—and contextual differences 
between federal district courts. Accordingly, the theoretical predictions, guided by focal 
concerns, courts as communities, and conflict perspectives, are primarily examined using 
sentencing data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission for 465,476 defendants convicted 
from FY 2001 to FY 2010, across 117 months and between 89 federal districts. The 
theoretical propositions tested in this dissertation are presented in Table 9.  
The first part of the dissertation investigated stability and change in Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys substantial assistance departure decisions following the High Court’s rulings in 
Booker and Gall/Kimbrough and examined whether alterations in AUSAs’ decision 
making were impacted by the time period and punishment setting. The results lend partial 
support to the argument that federal prosecutors responded aggressively to the legal 
developments in sentencing policy. Analyses on the enduring effect of the punishment 
policy reforms revealed that the probability of substantial assistance relief was lower for 
defendants immediately and in the long term in the period subsequent to the Booker 
decision. Contrary to expectations, the probability of receiving a substantial assistance 
departure was enhanced for defendants in the long term in the period following the 
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Gall/Kimbrough decisions, although no immediate effect was associated within this time 
frame. An explanation for this trajectory in prosecutors’ decisions is that in addition to 
the organizational pressure to preserve adherence to the guidelines and sustain uniformity 
(Eisenstein, 2008; Gonzales, 2005), AUSAs may have anticipated a rise in judicial 
decisions that depart from the presumptive sentencing scheme following the post-Booker 
transition to an advisory punishment structure. This assumption proved to be misleading, 
as judges, by and large, continued to sentence within the federal guidelines (e.g., USSC, 
2006), thereby leading prosecutors to return to their previous charging pattern. Finally, 
the immediate and long-term overall change observed in both the Booker and 
Gall/Kimbrough punishment eras was confined to models that included all cases and 
guidelines cases, not mandatory minimum cases which are specifically controlled by 
prosecutors. This suggests that prosecuting attorneys did not alter their charging practices 
in relation to substantial assistance decisions in cases that triggered a mandatory 
minimum, as the High Court’s rulings only constrained AUSA’s discretion in cases 
associated with the federal guidelines, although the use of substantial assistance 
departures is more pronounced in mandatory minimum cases when compared to 
guidelines cases (USSC, 2011a). 
The second part of the dissertation turns to a test of stability and change in the 
effects of race and ethnicity on AUSAs’ substantial assistance departure decisions amid 
the recent legal developments. That is, the study examined whether the effects of the 
Booker and Gall/Kimbrough decisions on the use of substantial assistance departures 
were conditioned by defendants’ race and ethnicity. The results of the analyses provided 
some support for the theoretical prediction that the reduction in substantial assistance 
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departures would be greater for minority defendants that for White defendants, as the 
probability of receiving a substantial assistance departure was lower for Hispanic 
defendants immediately and over time in the post-Booker era. The results, however, show 
that defendants’ race/ethnicity did not condition the association between the odds of a 
substantial assistance departure and the Gall/Kimbrough decision. What is more, the 
expectation that the race effect would be more pronounced in mandatory cases garners 
considerable support, as the change in the odds of AUSAs’ substantial assistance 
departures for Hispanic defendants after Booker was only found in cases in which 
defendants were facing a mandatory minimum penalty. This implies that federal 
prosecutors tightened their grip on and full control of mandatory minimum cases in 
anticipation of judges’ newfound discretionary power, although the effect was selective, 
disadvantaging Hispanic defendants, and did not transcend the Booker period. This 
suggests that Hispanics in the federal justice system may elicit greater concerns about or 
perceptions of culpability and threat to community safety when compared to other 
racial/ethnic groups. Also, an increase in the disparate treatment of certain defendants in 
the post-reform era may be associated with punishment schemes that are more restrictive 
(see Wooldredge, 2009). In this context, the severe restrictions placed on appellate 
review of judges’ decisions that depart from the guidelines in the wake of Booker and 
Gall/Kimbrough may have led federal prosecutors to engage in more discriminatory 
behavior.  
Alongside the analyses that focused on stability and change and the trajectory of 
racial/ethnic disparities in prosecutorial discretion, the final part of the dissertation 
systematically investigated the degree to which social context influenced AUSAs’ 
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substantial assistance departure decisions. The results provide substantial support for the 
theoretical predictions related to variability between time periods (months) and federal 
districts, including the effect of contextual-level covariates at the time level of analysis. 
Specifically, the overall probability of substantial assistance relief varied significantly 
between months and districts. Moreover, AUSAs’ consideration for efficiency in case 
processing (e.g., Dixon, 1995; Engen and Steen, 2000) was positively and strongly 
associated with substantial assistance decisions, as the probability of being granted 
substantial assistance was significantly higher for defendants in districts with larger 
caseloads. In contrast, defendants convicted in districts characterized by a higher crime 
rate faced reduced odds of receiving a substantial assistance departure. Prosecuting 
attorneys may have exercised a “get tough” orientation and greater concerns for 
community safety in districts branded with higher crime (e.g., Britt, 2000; Crawford et 
al., 1998; see however, Sudnow, 1965), and thus were more reluctant to engage in plea 
negotiations, such as granting a downward departure for providing “substantial 
assistance” to the government, which in turn would have translated into a more lenient 
sentence. The ethnic threat indicator that captured the percentage of Hispanics in the 
population was the only district-level covariate that achieved statistical significance. That 
is, the probability of a substantial assistance departure was reduced in districts with a 
higher percentage of Hispanics. The negative association between percent Hispanic and 
the probability of a motion for substantial assistance, however, was no longer significant 
when the study controlled for inter-circuit court variation. Collectively, these findings 
demonstrated that punishment in the federal justice system is based on the organizational 
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and social environment in which legal actors are embedded (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008; 
Spohn and Fornango, 2008; Ulmer and Feldmeyer, 2011).  
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
Punishment policy reforms aimed at constraining legal actors’ discretion, coupled 
with the availability of methods for circumvention such as the substantial assistance 
downward departure, emerge as a principal source of disparity. The findings from this 
dissertation, which are consistent with prior research on the individual-level and 
contextual-level effects that shape punishment outcomes, raise serious concerns of 
whether substantial assistance departures are implemented as intended and in a racially-
neutral way. In theory, the 5K1.1 or substantial assistance downward departure is based 
on the significance, usefulness, truthfulness, completeness, reliability, nature, and risk 
associated with the defendant’s cooperation with the government (USSC, 2011b: 464). It 
is highly unlikely, however, that defendants convicted immediately and over time 
following the High Court’s decision in U.S. v. Booker (2005) would be less likely to 
provide “assistance” to the prosecution or that defendants convicted in the months 
subsequent to the first month of the Gall v. U.S. (2007) and Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) 
decisions would possess information or testimony deemed more suitable for the federal 
prosecutor. In a similar vein, it seems implausible that Hispanic defendants facing a 
mandatory minimum penalty in the Booker era would possess information less valuable 
to the prosecution, although research has shown that minority defendants are overall less 
likely to engage in plea negotiations that lead to a substantial assistance departure (e.g., 
Bibas, 2004). This glaring disparity observed over time in the use of a legal remedy that 
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is intended to assist both the government and defendants warrants the attention of and 
scrutiny from policy makers. In addition to being accountable to the Department of 
Justice, federal prosecutors’ decisions should be subject to oversight from an external 
administrative body. 
 Furthermore, federal determinate sentencing reforms enacted during the last thirty 
years have emphasized uniformity in sentencing practices, but the majority of political 
and public discourse on extralegal punishment disparities stems from concerns with the 
unregulated discretionary power afforded to judges. For instance, passage of the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372) abolished the long-standing 
mandatory minimum penalty for possession of crack cocaine and reduced the 100-to-1 
quantity disparity between powder and crack cocaine penalties to an 18-to-1 quantity 
distinction. Although these well-intentioned policy innovations attempt to advance 
fairness in sentencing and address mass incarceration, for the most part, they ignore the 
untamed discretion embedded in prosecutors’ decision making. One of the major findings 
of this study implies that racial/ethnic disparity in the Booker period was associated with 
Hispanic defendants facing mandatory minimum sentences—cases under the absolute 
discretion of the federal prosecutor. Therefore, policies developed to promote consistency 
and proportionality in sentencing must take into consideration all discretionary stages of 
the criminal process, in particular charging and plea bargaining decisions directly related 
to the prosecuting attorney. Findings from this dissertation may inform the discussion on 
the extent to which recent rulings from the High Court, which have had a dramatic effect 
on the sentencing process, contributed to unwarranted disparities linked to federal 
prosecutors’ decisions.  
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DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
 The findings from this study have implications for research as well as practice. 
The wave of studies that highlight the interactive effects of race/ethnicity with other legal 
and extralegal considerations (see Zatz, 1987) has unequivocally demonstrated that 
young minority male defendants are singled out for harsher treatment in the criminal 
process (e.g., Cano and Spohn, 2012; Doerner and Demuth, 2009; Spohn and Holleran, 
2000; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; see, however, Johnson, 2014). Similarly, the extant 
literature on the impact of Booker and Gall/Kimbrough on punishment outcomes found 
that imprisonment decisions, and AUSAs’ motions for substantial assistance departures 
to a greater extent, are especially punitive toward Black and Hispanic male defendants 
(e.g., Ulmer et al., 2011a, 2011b). An investigation of the interactive effects of 
race/ethnicity and gender on federal prosecutors’ decision making in relation to Booker 
and Gall/Kimbrough, however, was not possible, as the number of female defendants 
adjudicated each month and in each federal district courts was too small for the modeling 
structure employed in this study.  
Second, the effects of social context on AUSAs’ substantial assistance decisions 
that were observed in this study warrant additional theoretical and empirical attention. 
This dissertation focused primarily on the conditioning effects of defendants’ 
race/ethnicity on the association between the Booker and Gall/Kimbrough rulings and 
substantial assistance departures, in the short term and long term. The results of the 
contextual-level analyses unexpectedly showed that control measures for case rate and 
crime rate, the only two time-varying covariates incorporated at the time level, were 
strongly associated with substantial assistance decisions across all three types of cases 
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(all cases, guidelines cases, and mandatory minimum cases). Drawing from an 
organizational efficiency perspective (Dixon, 1995; Ulmer, 1997), this finding may be 
further addressed by estimating interaction models that test whether districts’ case rate 
and crime rate account for changes in the probability of substantial assistance in the post-
Booker and post-Gall/Kimbrough eras. Because significant variation was revealed in 
substantial assistance motions granted across U.S. Courts of Appeals, and the 
implementation of the guidelines scheme and review of the standard of “reasonableness” 
for sentences that fall outside of the guidelines are tied to circuit court jurisdictions (see 
Starr and Rehavi, 2013), a systematic examination of characteristics related to federal 
circuits may enhance the study of the effects of federal sentencing reforms.  
A third avenue for future research involves examining whether the relationship 
between federal prosecutors’ decision making and the race and ethnicity of the defendant 
is conditioned by the offense category. For instance, the exploratory analysis of case-
level covariates in this study revealed that substantial assistance downward departures 
were more likely in drug cases when compared to any other type of case. This finding 
lends credence to the notion that drug defendants may have more information to offer the 
government in exchange for a more lenient sentence and/or that drug defendants, 
especially those facing more punitive mandatory penalties, may be deemed more 
sympathetic. Thus, the effects of Booker and Gall/Kimbrough on AUSAs’ decision 
making may be more pronounced in cases involving drug offenses and therefore these 
offenses should be examined separately. Despite the Department of Justice’s 
organizational prioritization of prosecuting drug trafficking, weapon, and child 
pornography offenses (Eisenstein, 2008), racial disparity may be heightened in cases 
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related to drug offenses, as prosecutors exert greater discretion when processing less 
serious cases (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966; Smith and Damphousse, 1998; Spohn and 
Cederblom, 1991). To be sure, racial and ethnic inconsistencies are especially 
pronounced in punishment outcomes for drug offenses (Albonetti, 1997; Chiricos and 
Bales, 1991; Crawford et al., 1998; Mitchell, 2005; Myers, 1989; Simons, 2002; Spohn 
and Delone, 2000; Spohn and Fornango, 2009; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000). An 
extensive meta-analysis of sentencing outcomes in state and federal court jurisdictions 
suggests that “Researchers must continue the trend of conducting disaggregated data 
analyses, as the influence of race varies by type of offense and type of sentencing 
outcome” (Mitchell, 2005: 463; see also Spohn, 2000).  
Finally, although significant, the outcome measure examined in this study—the 
probability of AUSAs’ motions for substantial assistance departures—focused on the 
impact of the Booker and Gall/Kimbrough decisions at a single decision point in the 
criminal process. Consistent with the “hydraulic displacement” thesis, the High Court’s 
decisions, which liberated judges but at the same time constrained AUSAs’ discretion, 
may have shifted extralegal disparities downstream, to federal prosecutors’ domain 
beyond downward departure decisions. Almost certainly a result of the dearth of data 
capturing charging and plea bargaining practices, research on the current sentencing 
policy reforms is largely concentrated on imprisonment decisions (see, however, 
Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2012; Starr and Rehavi, 2013). This reality echoes 
Blumstein et al.’s (1983: 222) early contention that, “the narrowness of focus fails to 
acknowledge the complexity of criminal case processing and opportunities for the 
exercise of discretion that it affords.” An emerging body of work exploring cumulative 
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disadvantage has demonstrated that racial disparities exist, especially for Black 
defendants, and the extent of such disparities varies significantly across various stages of 
the criminal justice process (Johnson, 2014; Kutateladze et al., 2014; Stolzenberg, 
D’Alessio, and Eitle, 2013; Sutton, 2013; Wooldredge, Frank, Goulette, and Travis, 
2015). As Spohn (2015: 6) recently opined, “The latest wave of race and sentencing 
research continues to unfold and as researchers devise new ways of estimating 
cumulative disadvantage, more definitive answers to questions regarding racial disparity 
and racial discrimination in punishment should be forthcoming” (see also Johnson, 2015). 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Considered together, this dissertation sheds light on the trajectory of Assistant 
U.S. Attorneys’ discretionary power in relation to unwarranted disparities amid dramatic 
changes to punishment policy reforms. Thus, accounting for the significance of the 
punishment setting (guidelines and statutory mandatory minimums) and time-level and 
district-level social context, the findings reveal that substantial assistance downward 
departures decisions were significantly altered in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
rulings in U.S. v. Booker (2005) and Gall/Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007). AUSAs exercise 
unfettered discretion and their conceptualization of race and ethnicity varies across time, 
place, and setting.  
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